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Murray Clarke [21]Murray Cameron Clarke [1]
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Murray Clarke
Concordia University
  1. Resurrecting the Tracking Theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
    Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.
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  2. Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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  3.  12
    Naturalizing Epistemology.Murray Clarke - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (1):152-153.
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  4.  92
    Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
    In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
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  5.  29
    Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):1-30.
    ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the (...)
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  6. Doxastic Voluntarism and Forced Belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.
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  7. Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
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  8.  29
    Reconstructing Reason and Representation.Murray Clarke - 2004 - Bradford.
    In Reconstructing Reason and Representation, Murray Clarke offers a detailed study of the philosophical implications of evolutionary psychology. In doing so, he offers new solutions to key problems in epistemology and philosophy of mind, including misrepresentation and rationality. He proposes a naturalistic approach to reason and representation that is informed by evolutionary psychology, and, expanding on the massive modularity thesis advanced in work by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, argues for a modular, adapticist account of misrepresentation and knowledge. Just as (...)
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  9.  69
    Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.
    Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
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  10.  36
    Naturalizing Epistemology. Hilary Kornblith.Murray Clarke - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (1):152-153.
  11.  3
    Dual-Process Theory and Epistemic Intuition.Murray Clarke - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 75:63-68.
    In this paper, I seek an account of the nature of epistemic intuition. Given the resources of Dual-Process Theory in Psychology, I argue that the intuitions of elite epistemologists, such as Fred Dretske, are not a priori, pre-theoretic, insights. Instead, they are a posteriori insights into the phenomena of knowledge, not the concept of knowledge. Dretske intuitions are technical, modal intuitions about hypothetical counterfactual cases using System II reflections. Such intuitions depended on thinking about the implications of laws of nature (...)
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  12. Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
    Since Kripke's attack on Nozick's Tracking Theory of knowledge, there has been strong suspicion that tracking theories are false. We think that neither Kripke's arguments and examples nor other recent attacks in the literature show that the tracking theories are false. We cannot address all of these concerns here, but we will show why some of the most discussed examples from Kripke do not demonstrate that the tracking theories are false.
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  13.  13
    Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms.Murray Clarke - 2010 - Logos and Episteme (2):269-286.
    In this paper, I argue that Dual Process Theories of cognition offer a useful framework to understand the nature and role of concepts in cognitive science and intuitions in epistemology.
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  14.  70
    Epistemic Norms and Evolutionary Success.Murray Clarke - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):231 - 244.
    Recent debates concerning the nature of epistemic justification primarily turn on two distinctions: the objective-subjective distinction and the internal-external distinction. John Pollock has defended a view that is both internalist and subjectivist. He has provided a novel, naturalized account of epistemic justification. In this paper, I argue that data from cognitive psychology and biology is radically at odds with Pollock's project.
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  15.  59
    Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project.Murray Clarke - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:75-82.
    It has been suggested, recently and not so recently, by a number of analytic epistemologists that reliabilist and externalist accounts of justification and knowledge are inadequate responses to the goals of traditional epistemology and other goals of inquiry. But philosophers of science decry reliabilism and externalism because they are connected to traditional, analytic epistemology, an outmoded and utopian form of inquiry. Clearly, both groups of critics cannot be right. I think both groups are guilty of conceptual confusions that, once clarified, (...)
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  16.  51
    Darwinian Algorithms and Indexical Representation.Murray Clarke - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):27-48.
    In this paper, I argue that accurate indexical representations have been crucial for the survival and reproduction of homo sapiens sapiens. Specifically, I want to suggest that reliable processes have been selected for because of their indirect, but close, connection to true belief during the Pleistocene hunter-gatherer period of our ancestral history. True beliefs are not heritable, reliable processes are heritable. Those reliable processes connected with reasoning take the form of Darwinian Algorithms: a plethora of specialized, domain-specific inference rules designed (...)
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  17.  15
    Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
    Since Kripke's attack on Nozick's Tracking Theory of knowledge, there has been strong suspicion that tracking theories are false. We think that neither Kripke's arguments and examples nor other recent attacks in the literature show that the tracking theories are false. We cannot address all of these concerns here, but we will show why some of the most discussed examples from Kripke do not demonstrate that the tracking theories are false.
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  18.  18
    Réponses À Mes Critiques.Murray Clarke - 2007 - Philosophiques 34 (2):385-402.
    In this article, I respond to the commentaries on my book, Reconstructing Reason and Reptresentation (MIT, 2004). The commentaries were by Robert Hudson, Michael Bishop, and Luc Faucher.
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  19.  13
    First Page Preview.Jonathan Bain, Timothy Bays, Katherine A. Brading, Stephen G. Brush, Murray Clarke, Sharyn Clough, Jonathan Cohen, Giancarlo Ghirardi, Brendan S. Gillon & Robert G. Hudson - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2-3).
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  20.  3
    Précis de Reconstructing Reason and Representation.Murray Clarke - 2007 - Philosophiques 34 (2):353-362.
  21. Critical Notice: Jose Zalabardo's Scepticism and Reliable Belief.Murray Clarke - 2014 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):93-106.
    I argue that Zalabardo's attack, in Chapter Two of his book, on Bonjour's attack on reliabilism fails. Zalabardo misrepresents Bonjour's argument and then criticizes this misrepresentation.
     
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