6 found
  1.  29
    Is There No Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?Myeong-Seok Kim - 2014 - Philosophy East and West 64 (1):49-81.
  2. What Cèyǐn Zhī Xīn (Compassion/Familial Affection) Really Is.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2010 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (4):407-425.
    This essay aims to delineate Mengzi’s view of emotion by analyzing his first ethical sprout, often referred to by the Chinese term cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心.Previous scholars usually translate this term as “compassion,” “sympathy,” or “commiseration,” in the sense of the painful feeling one feels at the misfortune of others. My goal in this article is to clarify the nature of this painful feeling, and specifically I argue that (1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic (...)
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  3.  23
    Emotion and Judgment: Two Sources of Moral Motivation in Mèngzǐ.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (1):51-80.
    David Nivison has argued that Mèngzǐ 孟子 postulates only one source of moral motivation, whereas Mèngzǐ’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 or the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. In this essay I critically examine this interpretation of Nivison’s, and alternatively argue that moral emotions in Mèngzǐ, basically understood as concern-based construals, are often an insufficient source of moral action, and an additional source of moral motivation, specifically (...)
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  4.  36
    Respect in Mengzi as a Concern-Based Construal: How It Is Different From Desire and Behavioral Disposition.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2014 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13 (2):231-250.
    Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four (...)
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  5.  18
    Choice, Freedom, and Responsibility in Ancient Chinese Confucianism.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (1):17-38.
  6.  21
    Compassion and Moral Judgment in Mencius.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 9:13-22.
    According to Mencius, human nature is good because human beings are endowed with four sprouts of virtues, namely benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and humans can become fully virtuous by growing these four ethical sprouts. Mencius believed that these four sprouts exist in the human mind mainly in the form of emotion or emotional sensibility, and they are sometimes translated in English as compassion, sense of honor, respect, and feeling of approval and disapproval. What I want to do in this (...)
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