Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l'argumentation de Parménide à propos de l'inexistence du non- être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c'est la langue grecque qui, du fait d'identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d'exprimer « ce qui n'est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n'est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l'ont précédé et il découvre (...) que, mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non- être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non- être relatif : l' Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l'Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité. When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides' argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Creek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since tbe false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that wbich is not » exists, Plato examines the théories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness — on which he shares Parmenides' judgement —, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of prédication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Différent. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the définition of every reality. (shrink)

The adventure of philosophy began in Greece, where it was gradually developed by the ancient thinkers as a special kind of knowledge by which to explain the totality of things. In fact, the Greek language has always used the word onta , "beings," to refer to things. At the end of the sixth century BCE, Parmenides wrote a poem to affirm his fundamental thesis upon which all philosophical systems should be based: that there are beings. In By Being, It Is (...) , Nestor-Luis Cordero explores the richness of this Parmenidean thesis, which became the cornerstone of philosophy. Cordero's textual analysis of the poem's fragments reveals that Parmenides' intention was highly didactic. His poem applied, for the first time, an explicative method that deduced consequences from a true axiom: by being, it is . To ignore this reality meant to be a victim of opinions. This volume explains how without this conceptual base, all later ontology would have been impossible. This book offers a clear and concise introduction to the Parmenidean doctrine and helps the reader appreciate the imperative value of Parmenides's claim that "by being, it is." "This thorough and controversial book will certainly be valued highly by the international community of scholars devoted to the study of ancient philosophy as well as by educated readers worldwide." --Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Georgetown University " By Being, It Is offers a meticulous discussion of one of the most puzzling theses in the history of philosophy. It is a highly challenging piece of work from a philosophical viewpoint, an outstanding model of philological work, and a contribution that causes anyone interested in philosophical matters to reflect." --Marcelo D. Boeri, National Council for Scientific and Technological Research, Argentina "Parmenides' importance consists in the fact that he represents an absolute beginning in history, and particularly in the history of thought. We can understand why, for more than twenty years now, N.L. Cordero has devoted tremendous efforts to understanding the few verses that remain to us of this Poem. The result is the present book, characterized by its completeness and its rigor. It is an essential work on a seminal author." --Luc Brisson, National Council for Scientific Research, France. (shrink)

La Déesse de Parménide annonce toujours que les δόξαι sont un produit humain. Mais il y a un point qui n'a pas été en général remarqué dans les études consacrées à l'étude des δόξαι: elles décrivent une activité humaine qui consiste a expliquer la réalité par la présence de principes opposés, et qui est toujours en rapport avec la "nomination". Il y avait à l'époque de Parménide une école qui correspondait à ce portrait robot, ou s'agit-il d'un collage de Parménide? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, il est attesté la présence d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui se caractérisait, précisément, pour "placer" des noms sur les choses. (shrink)

Un dialogue est un logos qui va d'un interlocuteur a un autre. Cet echange d'idees, s'il veut etre fructueux, s'appuie sur un principe tres simple: comme le dialogue n'est pas un monologue, on dialogue avec quelqu'un; et on dialogue sur quelque chose. C'est le cas des travaux qui composent ce volume. L'interlocuteur privilegie est Pierre Aubenque. Ses travaux, son activite en tant qu'enseignant, ses prises de position sur des sujets tres divers ont suscite, de la part de ses disciples, collegues (...) et amis, une veritable envie de dialoguer avec lui, un desir de suivre son exemple. Les auteurs de ces reflexions ont ainsi voulu demontrer que le dialogue instaure pendant plus de vingt ans par le Directeur du centre Leon Robin, reste toujours ouvert. (shrink)

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l’argumentation de Parménide à propos de l’inexistence du non-être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c’est la langue grecque qui, du fait d’identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d’exprimer « ce qui n’est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n’est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l’ont précédé et il découvre que, (...) mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non-être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non-être relatif : l’Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l’Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité.When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides’ argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Greek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since the false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that which is not » exists, Plato examines the theories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness – on which he shares Parmenides’ judgement –, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of predication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Different. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the definition of every reality. (shrink)

À la ligne 35 du fr. 8 de son Poème, Parménide aurait dit, selon le texte transmis par Simplicius : « Sans l'être dans lequel il se trouve exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » La difficulte qui consisterait à placer le penser dans l'être disparaît si l'on adopte le texte transmis par Proclus : « Sans l'être, grâce auquel il est exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » Line 35, fr. 8 of his Poem, Parmenid is said (...) to have said, according to the text handed down by Simplicius : « Were it not for the being in which it is expressed, you will never find thinking. » The difficulty of resting thought in the being disappears if one adopts Proclus' text: « Without the being, through which it expresses itself, you never find thought. ». (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

RESUMEN Una vez que el foco de la reflexión pasa de las teorías ideales a la aplicación de la justicia social, centrada en las instituciones de las sociedades democráticas, se requiere prestar especial atención a los estilos de vida. Estos tienen una alta incidencia en cómo la justicia es realizada y afectan tanto a la desigualdad económica como a la disponibilidad de los recursos naturales. En nuestras sociedades es posible establecer restricciones a los estilos de vida, especialmente en aquellos casos (...) en que, por el efecto de algunas dinámicas sociales, aquellos se desacoplan de las concepciones del bien. Se defiende que, en tales casos, la base normativa que permite exigir el respeto a los estilos de vida se disuelve y por ello es posible justificar su restricción. ABSTRACT Now that the focus of reflection has shifted from ideal theories to the application of social justice, centered on the institutions of democratic societies, it is necessary to pay special attention to lifestyles, since they not only influence the realization of justice, but also have an effect on economic inequality and the availability of natural resources. In our societies, it is possible to place restrictions on lifestyles, especially in those cases in which, influenced by certain social dynamics, they disengage from conceptions of the good. The article argues that, in those cases, the normative base grounding the demand that lifestyles be respected is dissolved, thus justifying their restriction. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the "object" of study of the first philosophers was the φύσις. Even though the term appears for the first time in Heraclitus, the early answers to the question "what is the 'being' of τὰ ὄντα" present already it as a source of active and dynamic life, according to the etymology of φύσις. This is the meaning in Homer (Od. X.303), and this is also the case of water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), and the γόνιμα contained in the φύσις (...) ἄπειρον (Anaximander, apud Ps.-Plutarch). The φύσις of Heraclitus inherits this meaning, because, for him, reality, "changing, is at rest" (fr. 84a). (shrink)

Platón sostiene que, para confirmar que el sofista es un fabricante de ilusiones, hay que refutar la tesis de Parménides que afirma que sólo existe – según Platón lo interpreta – el ser absoluto. Muy probablemente un eco de esta tesis se encuentre en Antístenes, a quien Platón parece aludir en el Sofista, para quien “lo que es, es verdadero”. Esta concepción de la verdad se conoce como “ante-predicativa” u ontológica, y, según Heidegger, sería originaria. No es así. Desde Homero (...) y hasta Parménides, la verdad fue siempre atribuida a un discurso o a un pensamiento, jamás a un ente. La concepción “ante-predicativa” de la verdad fue una creación de la filosofía, que probablemente comenzó con Parménides y continuó con Antístenes. Cuando Platón la refuta, en la segunda parte del Sofista, no hace sino regresar al pasado, pues hace del discurso el “lugar” de la verdad. (shrink)

In order to confirm that the sophist is a manufacturer of illusions, Plato argues that it is necessary to refute Parmenides’s thesis which states that there is only – as Plato interprets it – the absolute being. Most likely an echo of this thesis is found in Antisthenes, whom Plato seems to allude to in the _Sophist, _for whom “what is, is true”. This conception of truth is known as “ante-predicative” or ontological, and, according to Heidegger, would be original. It (...) is not the case. From Homer to Parmenides, truth was always attributed to a speech or thought, never to a “being”. The “ante-predicative” conception of truth was a creation of philosophy, which probably began with Parmenides and continued with Antisthenes. When Plato refutes it, in the second part of the _Sophist, _only returns to the past, because he makes speech the “place” of truth. (shrink)

Resumen En 1795, un filólogo de origen kantiano, G.G. Fülleborn, agrupó en dos "partes" los fragmentos recuperados del Poema de Parménides: "la Verdad" y "la Doxa". Con pequeñas modificaciones, esta estructura se convirtió en clásica y se acepta hoy en forma unánime. Sin embargo, una lectura de cada fragmento en forma aislada no justifica dicha división, la cual se basa en una interpretación de Simplicio influida por Aristóteles, quien encuentra ya en Parménides un esbozo del dualismo platónico entre lo "sensible" (...) y lo "inteligible", inexistente en éste. Analizo aquí en forma crítica el criterio que emplea Fülleborn, anacrónico para el caso de un pensador preplatónico.In 1795 G.G. Fülleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two "parts" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -"the Truth" and "the Doxa". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the "sensible" and the "intelligible", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by Fülleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. (shrink)

La dificultad de captar el pensamiento de Parménides llevó a los intérpretes ya en la Antigüedad a encarar su filosofía según esquemas de pensamiento posteriores. Fue el caso de Aristóteles, cuya interpretación fue heredada por su discípulo Teofrasto y por sus comentadores, especialmente Simplicio. Simplicio, neoplatónico y aristotélico a la vez, propuso una interpretación, fuertemente dualista, que no se encuentra en las citas recuperadas. En 1789 G.G.Fülleborn, inspirándose en Simplicio, propuso una división del Poema en dos “partes”, aceptada hoy en (...) forma unánime, y que debe ser revisada y rechazada con urgencia. (shrink)

RESUMEN ¿Por qué cuando Platón quiere justificar su definición del sofista como un «fabricante de imágenes», se apoya sobre dos versos auténticos de Parménides que aluden, sin duda alguna, al camino recorrido por los «mortales que nada saben»? ¿Quiere acaso sugerir que esos «mortales», que son en realidad «fabricantes de opiniones», son un antecedente de los sofistas, que son «fabricantes de imágenes»? ABSTRACT Why, when Plato wants to justify his definition of the sophist as an "image maker", he quotes two (...) authentic verses of Parmenides that undoubtedly allude to the path taken by the "mortals who know nothing"? Does he want to suggest that these "mortals", who are actually "opinions makers" are ancestors of the sophists, who are "image makers"? (shrink)

À la ligne 35 du fr. 8 de son Poème, Parménide aurait dit, selon le texte transmis par Simplicius : « Sans l'être dans lequel il se trouve exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. » La difficulte qui consisterait à placer le penser dans l'être disparaît si l'on adopte le texte transmis par Proclus : « Sans l'être, grâce auquel il est exprimé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser. ».

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)