This attitude was closely connected with the situation of science and philosophy, both of which, a century ago, spoke the language of necessity. Science believed that the facts of nature formed an endless chain of cause and effect, each link of which was determined by the preceding one and in turn infallibly determined the following one, so as to make a rigid system from which no part or element of reality could escape. Science believed that causality in its most rigorous (...) and deterministic sense was the only valid principle that explained natural phenomena; and it measured the success of its work to the extent that it discovered this necessary causal connection. On the other hand, the two great trends of philosophy, positivism and idealism, spoke a similar language: positivism extended causal determinism to the entire scope of reality, and idealism replaced it with a dialectical-rational determinism which was not less necessitating. It is true that these two trends were engaged in bitter controversy, the one speaking of nature or matter, the other of spirit or reason; the one placing mankind, the other infinite Reason, as the ultimate aim and climax of the development of reality. But in spite of their polemics and controversies, the horizon in which both these trends moved was the same: that of necessity. Everything that happens, in nature or in history, must necessarily happen. Every phenomenon, every event, every characteristic or determination of reality is exactly what it should be by virtue of the infinite principle that governs reality itself. This infinite principle was interpreted by positivism in terms of mechanical causality, and by idealism in terms of dialectic rationality; but this diversity of interpretation made no difference on the fundamental point, which was the necessity of reality as such. This necessity meant that any fact or happening, in nature or in history, was fully justified by the mere fact that it was a fact or a happening: at that particular point of the uninterrupted chain of facts, it was the only thing that could and should have happened. Accordingly, each fact or event was an improvement and a progress over the preceding ones, and in turn anticipated a further progress. Progress itself seemed necessary and infallible; and those events which seemingly belied it were actually a promise or a preparation for a greater future progress. (shrink)

F. Enriques and G. de Santillana have begun in collaboration the composition of a general history of scientific thought. The first volume of this work, which has been recently published, is concerned with the science of antiquity,1 and to a large extent covers the same ground as the history of ancient philosophy, as the frontiers of philosophy and natural science, at any rate until the time of Aristotle, were not yet clearly differentiated. But the two historians are interested in bringing (...) into prominence a great many problems and personalities that the history of philosophy generally leaves on one side, although they help to complete and vivify the picture of the mentality of the ancients. Mathematics, medicine, geography, astronomy, applied mechanics, and physics, in short all the particular scientific studies that were just beginning to detach themselves from the parent trunk of general philosophy are studied by the authors in their individual developments and through the personalities of their cultivators. The explanations are clear and simple and can be followed even by readers unversed in science; the information is at first hand and is supplemented by a careful discussion of sources. The scientific questions are not isolated from the historical setting of the civilization of antiquity, but are shown in relation to matters of philosophy, religion, art, and moral and political life. The bibliography, intended for the more purely scientific and technical departments of philosophy, forms a very useful and timely completion of the bibliography of philosophic thought in general. (shrink)

About a year ago some important philosophical works were published in Italy which, both in the agreement and in the divergence of the trends they indicate, may be useful for characterizing the present situation of Italian philosophy. I think it opportune, therefore, for the information of the English reader, to give a fuller notice of these books than usual. One of them is by Ugo Spirito, La vita come amore , with the subtitle “The downfall of Christian civilization ”. Ugo (...) Spirito, who was one of the most intelligent and restless pupils of Giovanni Gentile, announced his secession from idealism in 1937.In that year he published a book entitled La vita come ricerca , in which, as sole alternative to idealistic philosophy, henceforth considered untenable, he pointed to a philosophy of never concluded enquiry, which, while positing numerous problems, never solves them. The intention of the book was to conclude in the impossibility of philosophy as “system” or as “metaphysics”, on the supposition that all the possibilities of metaphysics had been exhausted in the course of its historical development, culminating in Gentile. In a certain sense this presupposition remains in the book now under examination; but here it is a question of defining positively the way that philosophy, and with it human life, ought to take, which is, according to Spirito, the way of love. (shrink)

About a year ago some important philosophical works were published in Italy which, both in the agreement and in the divergence of the trends they indicate, may be useful for characterizing the present situation of Italian philosophy. I think it opportune, therefore, for the information of the English reader, to give a fuller notice of these books than usual. One of them is by Ugo Spirito, La vita come amore, with the subtitle “The downfall of Christian civilization ”. Ugo Spirito, (...) who was one of the most intelligent and restless pupils of Giovanni Gentile, announced his secession from idealism in 1937.In that year he published a book entitled La vita come ricerca, in which, as sole alternative to idealistic philosophy, henceforth considered untenable, he pointed to a philosophy of never concluded enquiry, which, while positing numerous problems, never solves them. The intention of the book was to conclude in the impossibility of philosophy as “system” or as “metaphysics”, on the supposition that all the possibilities of metaphysics had been exhausted in the course of its historical development, culminating in Gentile. In a certain sense this presupposition remains in the book now under examination; but here it is a question of defining positively the way that philosophy, and with it human life, ought to take, which is, according to Spirito, the way of love. (shrink)

In the series Collezione di Filosofia published by Taylor of Turin since 1947, some of the most significant works on Italian existentialism have appeared. The series was inaugurated by two books by the writer of this article: Introduzione all esistenzialismo, second edition, 1947 ; and Filosofia religione scienza, 1947. These were followed by Pietro Chiodi, L'esistenzialismo di Heidegger, 1947; Armando Vedaldi, Essere gli altri, 1948; Uberto Scarpelli, Esistenzialismo e marxismo, 1949; Enzo Paci, II nulla e il problema dell'uomo, 1950; Luigi (...) Pareyson, Esistenza e persona, 1950; and Armando Vedaldi, Struttura della proprietà, 1951. (shrink)