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Nicola Dimitri [5]N. Dimitri [1]
  1.  79
    The race for an artificial general intelligence: implications for public policy.Wim Naudé & Nicola Dimitri - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (2):367-379.
    An arms race for an artificial general intelligence would be detrimental for and even pose an existential threat to humanity if it results in an unfriendly AGI. In this paper, an all-pay contest model is developed to derive implications for public policy to avoid such an outcome. It is established that, in a winner-takes-all race, where players must invest in R&D, only the most competitive teams will participate. Thus, given the difficulty of AGI, the number of competing teams is unlikely (...)
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  2.  46
    (1 other version)Index of Authors of Volume 12.D. Ahn, G. Ben-Avi, D. Ben Shalom, Ph Besnard, K. Borthen, C. Caleiro, W. A. Carnielli, M. E. Coniglio, R. Cooper & N. Dimitri - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (531):531.
  3.  6
    Cognitive Processes and Economic Behaviour.Marcello Basili, Nicola Dimitri & Itzhak Gilboa (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    In recent years the understanding of the cognitive foundations of economic behavior has become increasingly important. This volume contains contributions from such leading scholars as Adam Brandenburger, Michael Bacharach and Patrick Suppes. It will be of great interest to academics and researchers involved in the field of economics and psychology as well as those interested in political economy more generally.
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  4.  51
    Coordination in an email game without ``almost common knowledge''.Nicola Dimitri - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):1-11.
    The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a (...)
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  5.  44
    Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems.Nicola Dimitri - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (4):345-354.
    In a stimulating paper, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she has a particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such memory limitation obtains whenever information sets include decision histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the absentminded driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main theorem of this article provides a general result of dynamically consistent (...)
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  6. Time Discounting and Time Consistency.Nicola Dimitri & Jan van Eijck - unknown
    Time discounting is the phenomenon that a desired result in the future is perceived as less valuable than the same result now. Economic theories can take this psychological fact into account in several ways. In the economic literature the most widely used type of additive time discounting is exponential discounting. In exponential discounting, the fall of valuation depends by a constant factor on the length of the delay period. It is well known, however, that exponential time discounting often does not (...)
     
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