Introduction -- Just war theory -- Objections to just war theory -- Easy cases : Germany, Japan, Korea -- Harder cases : Serbia, Russia, Kosovo, Iraq -- Multiple reasons -- More problems with just war theory -- Prevention : Sri Lanka, Thailand -- Two just war theories -- Problems with just war theory I -- Problems for just war theory II -- Closing thoughts.
Moral Constraints on War offers a principle-by-principle presentation of the transcultural roots of the ethics of war in an age defined by the increasingly international nature of military intervention.
As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.
Just War Theory is becoming increasingly important to nations when they contemplate and participate in war. This book recognizes the timeliness of the topic and so seeks, in concrete historical terms, to deal with the issue of constraining war on the basis of moral principles.
This commentary on Professor Kasher's and General Yadlin's article employs a bit of violence. It transforms and broadens some of the ideas presented in their article. I argue that committing these acts of violence are justified because, if their article is left as written, it is difficult to tell at what point the Kasher/Yadlin (K/Y) theory corresponds with just war theory and at what points it does not. This commentary alters K/Y theory, and alters classical just war theory as well, (...) so as to place the two theories in parallel as much as possible. Once the alterations are complete, it becomes more evident that the two theories share much in common. What also becomes more evident is that the two theories differ in important respects since the one deals with conventional war and the other with unconventional (asymmetric) war. The differences vindicate Kasher's and Yadlin's claim that it is necessary to spend time to re-think just war theory, especially when dealing with terrorism. (shrink)
In his article "categorial consistency in ethics" ("the philosophical quarterly," october, 1967, Pages 289-297) alan gewirth argues that he can catch the fanatic in an inconsistency by a unique application of the generalizability principle. The fanatic, He says, Operates under "...A second order rule that agents or persons who are going to act have the right to decide...." the fanatic is inconsistent, According to gewirth, Because he fails to apply this second order principle to those he will subjugate. Unfortunately, The (...) fanatic has a way out. The second order principle he operates under need not be the one gewirth forces upon him. Rather, With perfect consistency, The fanatic can operate under the second order principle 'superior (not all) agents have a right to decide'. (shrink)