Presentists standardly conform to the eternalist’s paradigm of treating all cases of property-exemplification as involving a single relation of instantiation. This, we argue, results in a much less parsimonious and philosophically explanatory picture than is possible if other alternatives are considered. We argue that by committing to primitive past and future tensed instantiation ties, presentists can make gains in both economy and explanatory power. We show how this metaphysical picture plays out in cases where an individual exists to partake in (...) facts about its past and future, and also in cases where that individual no longer exists, and proxies (or surrogates) for that thing must be found. (shrink)

The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the supervaluational solution tell also against the solution (...) to the problem of the many which is suggested by adherents of the epistemic theory of vagueness. (shrink)

Gareth Evans has argued influentially against vague identities. David Lewis and Theodore Sider have argued against vague parthood. Much of the distaste among philosophers for metaphysical vagueness is sourced in these arguments. I argue that even if the considerations adduced by Evans, Lewis and Sider are conclusive, metaphysical boundary vagueness remains possible.

Time passes; sometimes swiftly, sometimes interminably, but always it passes. We see the world change as events emerge from the shroud of the future, clandestinely slinking into the past almost immediately as though they are reluctant to meet our gaze: children are born, old friends and relatives die, governments once full of youthful enthusiasm wane. If the Earth were sentient, it might feel itself being torn apart as tectonic plates diverge, and chuckle as it outlived species upon species of transient (...) parasites. How could anyone possibly deny that time passes? (shrink)

Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem.

The principal aim of this paper is to defend a certain view about temporary properties from an important objection to that view. More specifically, I will be defending the view that ostensible temporary intrinsic properties are really relations between the things that have those properties and times. The objection is, roughly speaking, that by construing ostensible temporary intrinsics as relations to times, persisting things are impoverished, being clothed only by their essential (and perhaps also their permanent) intrinsic properties. The worry (...) is that the relations to times view moves us towards thinking of persisting particulars as being quite bare. I do not suggest that this is the only difficulty for the relations to times view (in fact, I uncover a potential problem for the view in Section 3), but it is an important one. If the objection is successfully addressed, then a significant obstacle to the relations to times view is overcome. (shrink)

(1) Certain of our intentional attitudes appear to have time-asymmetric manifestation conditions. For instance, we dread a certain painful episode only if (we believe) it is future and feel relief about that episode only when (we believe) it is past. We eagerly anticipate events only when they are future and regard them with nostalgia only when they are past.

One winter’s Saturday Clarence wakes up. He realises he has left his umbrella at work. The office is locked, and he can’t get in. Being one of those people who punish themselves for their mistakes, he can’t bring himself to buy a replacement. He has an engagement six kilometres down the road and starts wondering whether it will rain. Normally, this would not be a problem, but his motor vehicle has broken down because he forgot to have it serviced. And (...) of course, he blames himself for this mistake, so it is only natural that he can’t bring himself to hire a cab or take a bus. He really should hope that it rains and that he gets drenched on the way to his engagement, but he is only human after all, and a small part of himhopes that it is a sunny day. (shrink)

Time passes, and the inexorability of its passing has deep emotional significance. One of the main themes of this thesis involves an investigation into the metaphysical nature of the passage of time. What sort of metaphysical account of passage should be given? And do our emotional responses to temporal passage have metaphysical implications? The other main theme of the thesis is the issue of the metaphysics of persistence. When a thing is present at more than one time, what is the (...) metaphysical underpinning of its persistence? Some subsidiary issues, which are nevertheless important in their own right, are also discussed. There are interesting connections between the issues of persistence and these further issues, which include the nature of vagueness, and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. (shrink)