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Naomi Eilan [32]Naomi M. Eilan [15]
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Naomi Eilan
University of Warwick
  1. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
  2. The Body and the Self.Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) - 1995 - MIT Press.
  3.  82
    The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.
    This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person . It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made in these papers about the existence and/or nature of second person (...)
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  4. Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology.Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.) - 1993 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...)
     
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  5.  14
    Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Non-Conceptual Point of View.José Luis Bermúdez, Naomi Eilan & Anthony Marcel - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
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  6. Agency and Self Awareness.Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
  7.  70
    Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology.Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  8. A Relational Response to Newman's Objection to Russell's Causal Theory of Perception.Naomi Eilan - 2015 - Theoria 81 (1):4-26.
    The causal theory of perception has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman's set-theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP, in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: Newman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge to all versions (...)
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  9. Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response to Burge’s Challenge.Naomi Eilan - 2015 - Topoi:1-12.
    My question is: does phenomenal consciousness have a critical role in explaining the way conscious perceptions achieve objective import? I approach it through developing a dilemma I label ‘Burge’s Challenge’, which is implicit in his approach to perceptual objectivity. It says, crudely: either endorse the general structure of his account of how objective perceptual import is achieved, and give up on a role for consciousness. Or, relinquish Caused Representation, and possibly defend a role for consciousness. Someone I call Burge* holds (...)
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  10.  91
    Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness.Naomi M. Eilan - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
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  11.  9
    Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):528-530.
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  12.  27
    On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein's Response to Kohler.Naomi Eilan - 2013 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (3).
  13.  96
    Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind.Naomi Eilan - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...)
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  14.  21
    On Understanding Schizophrenia.Naomi Eilan - 2000 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 97--113.
  15. Spatial Representation. Problems in philosophy and psychology.Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen Mccarthy & Bill Brewer - 2001 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 191 (1):119-120.
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  16.  22
    Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction.Naomi M. Eilan & Anthony J. Marcel - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  17.  64
    Intelligible Realism About Consciousness: A Response to Nagel's Paradox.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):32-52.
    Is the location of consciousness in the objectively represented world intelligible? The paper examines the grounds for Nagel's negative answer, which can be presented as a response to the following paradox. (1) We are realists about consciousness. (2) Realism about a domain of reference requires commitment to the possibility of an objective, perspective-free conception of it. (3) The phenomenal character of an experience can only be captured by means of perspectival concepts. According to Nagel, we can have either realism about (...)
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  18. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Communication.Naomi Eilan - 2007 - In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.
  19.  15
    Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response to Burge’s Challenge.Naomi Eilan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):287-298.
    My question is: does phenomenal consciousness have a critical role in explaining the way conscious perceptions achieve objective import? I approach it through developing a dilemma I label ‘Burge’s Challenge’, which is implicit in his approach to perceptual objectivity. It says, crudely: either endorse the general structure of his account of how objective perceptual import is achieved, and give up on a role for consciousness. Or, relinquish Caused Representation, and possibly defend a role for consciousness. Someone I call Burge* holds (...)
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  20. Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind.Naomi M. Eilan - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  21. Perception, Causation, and Objectivity.Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience (...)
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  22. Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought. [REVIEW]Naomi Eilan - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433–440.
    Suppose you are a blindsighted subject and an experimenter sitting opposite you says of an object in your functionally blind field ‘that peach looks delicious’. Unless you move your head to encompass the object within your normal field of vision you will not know which object she is talking about. Suppose now she reverts to the strategy used by neurophsychologists who work with blindsighted subjects and simply tells you that there is an object there and asks you either to reach (...)
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  23.  40
    IV—The First Person Perspective.Naomi Eilan - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):51-66.
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  24. The Second Person: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives.Naomi Eilan (ed.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    The past few years have witnessed an exponentially growing body of work conducted under the ‘second person’ heading. This idea has been explored in various areas of philosophy , in developmental psychology, in psychiatry, and even in neuroscience. We may call this interest in the second person the ‘You Turn’. To put it at its most general, and ambitious, the idea driving much of the work is this: proper attention to the ways in which we relate to one another when (...)
     
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  25.  90
    Consciousness and the Self.Naomi M. Eilan - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 291--310.
  26. On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention?Naomi M. Eilan - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
    The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...)
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  27.  4
    Perceptual Intentionality. Attention and Consciousness: Perceptual Interntionlity, Attention and Consciousness.Naomi Eilan - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:181-202.
    A representative expression of current thinking on the ‘problem of consciousness’ runs as follows. There is one, impenetrably hard problem; and a host of soluble, and in this sense easy problems. The hard problem is: how could a physical system yield subjective states? How could there be something it is like to be a physical system? This problem corresponds to a concept of consciousness invariably labelled ‘phenomenal consciousness’. It is here, with respect to phenomenal consciousness, that we encounter an ‘explanatory (...)
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  28.  3
    Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness.Naomi Eilan - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
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  29. Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness.Naomi M. Eilan - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
  30. Molyneux's Question and the Idea of an External World.Naomi M. Eilan - 1993 - In Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  31.  75
    You Me and the World.Naomi Eilan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):311-324.
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  32. The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action.Naomi M. Eilan - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press. pp. 188-201.
  33.  39
    Experiential Objectivity.Naomi Eilan - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. This volume collects nineteen original essays by leading (...)
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  34.  8
    Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought.Naomi Eilan - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433-440.
    Suppose you are a blindsighted subject and an experimenter sitting opposite you says of an object in your functionally blind field ‘that peach looks delicious’. Unless you move your head to encompass the object within your normal field of vision you will not know which object she is talking about. Suppose now she reverts to the strategy used by neurophsychologists who work with blindsighted subjects and simply tells you that there is an object there and asks you either to reach (...)
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  35.  12
    II—Naomi Eilan: On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention?Naomi Eilan - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
  36. On the Reality of Color.Naomi M. Eilan - manuscript
    The Quest for Reality, contains, amongst much else, a sustained and deeply illuminating investigation of the thesis Barry Stroud labels ’subjectivism’ about colours. The grounds he relentlessly amasses for rejecting the thesis are, in my view, compelling. There is a sense, indeed, in which I think they are more compelling than he says he himself finds them. For as I understand his arguments, they contain the materials for delivering a positive answer to the question: are objects really coloured? As Stroud (...)
     
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  37.  77
    Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'.Naomi M. Eilan - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
    [opening paragraph]: If we think intuitively and non-professionally about the evolution of consciousness, the following is a compelling thought. What the emergence of consciousness made possible, uniquely in the natural world, was the capacity for representing the world, and, hence, for acquiring knowledge about it. This is the kind of thought that surfaces when, for example, we make explicit what lies behind wondering whether a frog, as compared to a dog, say, is conscious. The thought that it might not be (...)
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  38. Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation.Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.) - 1993 - Blackwell.
  39.  47
    Philosophy of Mind.Naomi Eilan - 1998 - The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (2):50-51.
  40.  7
    The A Priori and the Empirical in Theories of Emotion: Smedslund's “Conceptual Analysis” of Emotion.Naomi Eilan - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (6):457-466.
  41.  19
    Sensorimotor Skills and Perception.Andy Clark & Naomi Eilan - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):67-88.
    [Andy Clark] What is the relation between perceptual experience and the suite of sensorimotor skills that enable us to act in the very world we perceive? The relation, according to 'sensorimotor models' is tight indeed. Perceptual experience, on these accounts, is enacted via skilled sensorimotor activity, and gains its content and character courtesy of our knowledge of the relations between movement and sensory stimulation. I shall argue that this formulation is too extreme, and that it fails to accommodate the substantial (...)
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  42.  39
    Meaning, Truth, and the Self: Commentary on Campbell and Parnas and Sass.Naomi Eilan - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):121-132.
  43. Self-Location, Consciousness, and Attention.Naomi M. Eilan - manuscript
    ‘Like the shadow of one’s own head, [the referent of one’s ‘I’ thoughts] will not wait to be jumped on. And yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, sometimes it does not seem to be ahead of the pursuer at all. It evades capture by lodging itself in the very inside of the muscles of the pursuer. It is too near even to be within arm’s reach.’(C of M 177-89).
     
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  44.  10
    The Imagery Debate.Naomi M. Eilan - 1993 - Philosophical Books 34 (3):137-142.
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  45.  1
    Philosophy of Mind: The Next Stage.Naomi Eilan - 1998 - The Philosophers' Magazine 2:50-51.
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  46. Introduction.Naomi Eilan & Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
     
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  47. Self-Consciousness and Experience.Naomi Eilan - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;We find ourselves in a world not of our own making; and in acquiring knowledge about the world and our situation in it we have nothing to go on but our psychological states; they are the immediate given. Let us label this claim the Basic Datum. What I shall call the Minimal Constraint is the claim, 'An account of the states of mind of subjects credited with knowledgeable thoughts (...)
     
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