Results for 'Narrow Content'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1. Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Can there be 'narrow' mental content, that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker? This book argues not, and defends instead a thoroughgoing externalism: the entanglement of our minds with the external world runs so deep that no internal component of mentality can easily be cordoned off.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  2.  87
    Is Narrow Content's "Narrow Content" Narrow Content?David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In their monograph Narrow Content, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne argue that all versions of internalism about mental content are either false or "pointless" (roughly, of no interest). We overview Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne's main line of argument and suggest that, while largely correct, it does not touch the core internalist claim that mental states have internally determined contents. Instead of engaging with this claim, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne attack a variety of stronger or weaker claims. The stronger claims fall prey (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Real Narrow Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.
    The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Narrow Content, by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne. [REVIEW]Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):976-984.
    This is an extended review of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne's book: Narrow Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018)..
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Narrow Content.Robert Stalnaker - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: Csli.
  6.  56
    Narrow Content and Parameter Proliferation.Ori Simchen - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy.
    A centerpiece of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne’s Narrow Content (OUP 2018) is the parameter proliferation argument. The authors consider a series of cleverly constructed cases of pairs of corresponding thoughts of qualitatively identical twins and argue that divergence in truth value for such thoughts forces the internalist to admit novel alethic parameters for semantic evaluation that are not independently motivated. I argue that the internalist will resist this argument by denying that such pairs of thoughts diverge in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax.Stephen P. Stich - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  8. What Narrow Content is Not.Ned Block - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  9. Narrow Content and Representation--Or Twin Earth Revisited.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.
    Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  10.  98
    Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  11. The Nature of Narrow Content.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  12. A Slim Book About Narrow Content.Gabriel Segal - 2000 - MIT Press.
    The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  13. Narrow Content.Michael McDermott - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):277-88.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  14. Narrow Content[REVIEW]Ethan Jerzak - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):475-480.
  15. A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
  16.  72
    Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem.Kenneth Taylor - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):355-72.
  17. Is Narrow Content the Same As Content of Narrow State Types Opaquely Taxonomized?Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - In G. Meggle (ed.), Analyomen. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference “Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy” Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. pp. 179-185.
    Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  65
    Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them?Kam-Yuen Cheng - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Narrow Content and Narrow Interpretation.Stephen L. White - 1992 - In The Unity of the Self. MIT Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20.  17
    A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Gabriel M. A. Segal. [REVIEW]Steven E. BoË & R. - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1115-1119.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  21. Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content.Alex Byrne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3017-3026.
    This comment mainly examines Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s preferred framework for examining whether narrow content is viable, arguing that their framework is not well-suited to the task; once a more traditional framework is adopted, Y&H’s case against internalism is strengthened.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. A Slim Book About Narrow Content.Gabriel Segal - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):657-660.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  23.  33
    Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live WIthout Them?Kam-Yuen Cheng - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  13
    A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  25.  8
    Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live WIthout Them?Kam-Yuen Cheng - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Holistic Narrow Content?Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - Il Cannocchiale 2:197-209.
    In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  21
    Review of Narrow Content[REVIEW]David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018 (12).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28.  66
    Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
  29. In Defence of Narrow Content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):539-550.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. How Narrow is Narrow Content?François Recanati - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29.
    SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31.  34
    Narrow Content and Rationality.Mark Jago - unknown
  32. Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33. There is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content.Sarah Sawyer - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 20-34.
    This is an attack on the very notion of narrow content. In particular, I argue against two-factor theories of mental content, Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional account of narrow content and Segal's truth-conditional account of narrow content.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  34.  8
    Narrow Content, Context of Thought and Asymmetric Dependency.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-342.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Narrow Content.Gabriel Segal - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  36.  11
    A Slim Book on Narrow Content.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1999 - MIT Press.
    A good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties—specifically, those that make up what might be called the "cognitive content" of psychological states—are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to their cognitive contents. Segal's thesis, a version of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37.  31
    Narrow Content: A Defense.Arnold Silverberg - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-127.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  18
    How “Meaning” Became “Narrow Content”.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):155-171.
    The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  34
    Narrow Content: A Defense.Arnold Silverberg - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  56
    Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content.Martin Davies - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60:263-83.
  41. Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  42.  48
    Social Norms and Narrow Content.Meredith Williams - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):425-462.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  43. What is the Narrow Content of Fence (and Other Definitionally and Interpretationally Primitive Concepts)?Eric Mandelbaum - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):138-138.
    It's unclear what narrow content is interpersonally shared for concepts that don't originate from core cognition yet are still definitionally and interpretationally primitive. A primary concern is that for these concepts, one cannot draw a principled distinction between inferences that are content determining and those that aren't. The lack of a principled distinction imperils an account of interpersonally shared concepts.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  3
    Narrow Content: A Defense.Arnold Silverberg - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-127.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Svasamvitti as Methodological Solipsism: Narrow Content and the Problem of Intentionality in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind.Dan Arnold - 2009 - In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46.  5
    How Narrow is Narrow Content?François Recanati - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-229.
    SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47.  29
    Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
    If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Three Motivations for Narrow Content.Joe Lau - manuscript
    In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Color and the Narrow Contents of Experience.Stephen White - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23.
  50. Fodor and Block on Narrow Content.Hilary Putnam - 1987 - In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000