11 found
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  1. Who’s Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias.Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    In this paper we aim to think systematically about, formulate, and begin addressing some of the challenges to applying theories of moral responsibility to behaviors shaped by a particular subset of unsettling psychological complexities: namely, implicit biases.
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  2. The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge: An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.Laura Niemi, Natalia Washington, Clifford Workman, de Brigard Felipe & Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela - 2024 - Acta Psychologica 244.
    According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice, baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with marginalized social identities is a central driver of prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of epistemic injustice’s impact by examining emotional responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized social group membership predicts these responses. We conducted a novel (...)
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  3. Agency in Mental Illness and Cognitive Disability.Dominic Murphy & Natalia Washington - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 893-910.
    This chapter begins by sketching an account of morally responsible agency and the general conditions under which it may fail. We discuss how far individuals with psychiatric diagnoses may be exempt from morally responsible agency in the way that infants are, with examples drawn from a sample of diagnoses intended to make dierent issues salient. We further discuss a recent proposal that clinicians may hold patients responsible without blaming them for their acts. We also consider cognitively impaired subjects in the (...)
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  4.  64
    Culturally Unbound: Cross-Cultural Cognitive Diversity and the Science of Psychopathology.Natalia Washington - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (2):165-179.
    It is now taken for granted in many circles that substantial psychological variability exists across human populations; we do not merely differ in the ways we behave, but in the ways we think, as well. Versions of this view have been around since early interest in ‘cultural relativism’ in cultural psychology and anthropology, but Joe Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan’s 2010 paper, ‘The Weirdest People in the World?’ has had an exciting and catalyzing impact on the field, getting researchers (...)
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  5.  52
    Implicit Cognition and Gifts: How Does social Psychology help Us Think Differently about Medical Practice?Nicolae Morar & Natalia Washington - 2016 - Hastings Center Report 46 (3):33-43.
    This article takes the following two assumptions for granted: first, that gifts influence physicians and, second, that the influences gifts have on physicians may be harmful for patients. These assumptions are common in the applied ethics literature, and they prompt an obvious practical question, namely, what is the best way to mitigate the negative effects? We examine the negative effects of gift giving in depth, considering how the influence occurs, and we assert that the ethical debate surrounding gift-giving practices must (...)
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  6. I Don't Want to Change Your Mind: A Reply to Sherman.Natalia Washington - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
  7.  14
    Neuroscience and Mental Illness.Natalia Washington, Christina Leone & Laura Niemi - 2022 - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    The fast-developing field of neuroscience has given philosophy, as well as other disciplines and the public broadly, many new tools and perspectives for investigating one of our most pressing challenges: addressing the health and well-being of our mental lives. In some cases, neuroscientific innovation has led to clearer understanding of the mechanisms of mental illness and precise new modes of treatment. In other cases, features of neuroscience itself, such as the enticing nature of the data it produces compared to previous (...)
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  8. Practical Reason and Social Science Research.Valerie Tiberius & Natalia Washington - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 276-290.
    In many areas of philosophy, it is becoming more and more mainstream to appeal or at least refer to social science research. For example, in moral psychology, the empirically informed approach is well established in the literature on moral judgment, moral emotions, and moral responsibility (Greene, 2013; Nichols, 2004; Prinz, 2007; Kelly, 2011; Doris, 2016; Roskies, 2006; Vargas, 2013). Does work in the social sciences have any bearing on philosophical questions about practical reason or reasoning? While there has been some (...)
     
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  9.  52
    Contextualism as a Solution to Paternalism in Psychiatric Practice.Natalia Washington - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):235-243.
    Self-knowledge is a difficult thing. Many have had the experience of knowing that a friend or partner is in a bad mood before she herself realizes it. Similarly, with mental illness it seems that a person may be sick without realizing it, or even while denying it outright. Anosognosia, the lack of awareness that one is mentally ill, is most visible in cases of dementia or brain damage, but recent insights in psychology have shown that healthy human beings too generally (...)
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    Do we know how stressed we are?Natalia Washington - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38:e127.
    I take issue with Kalisch et al.’s formulation of PASTOR, arguing that care must be taken in understanding what is meant by “appraisal.” I examine the implications of PASTOR given two competing possibilities for what counts as an appraisal – first, if appraisal is restricted to conscious reflection on one’s circumstances, and second, if appraisal is expanded to include subconscious mechanisms of evaluation.
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  11.  29
    Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):158-159.
    We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.
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