By and large, shame is not a neutral situation as, for instance, a malady can be. One can be ill without being aware of it, while shame implies both a painful emotion and an awareness that the source of that emotion is in one's own deeds or character, the perception that the cause of that painful emotion is in one's own acts or state which, as such, are improper.
This paper seeks to delineate everyday usage of the two concepts--Will and reason--In order to identify the systematic transformation these concepts underwent in kant's system. It has been observed that even in our everyday interpretation and parlance there are different meanings or nuances or meanings attributed to the phenomenon of will and perhaps also, To a lesser extent, To the phenomenon of will serve as the point of departure of kant's characterization of the concept "will" which is, In the first (...) instance, Congruent with its ordinary usage. Yet in other instances, As we shall see, Kant's characterization of the will is imbued with systematic meaning which has to be seen in the context of his philosophy in general and of his philosophy of practice in particular. (shrink)
The idea of historical progress, despite its many variations, is anchored in a coherent structure of thought which implies a cumulative advance toward an all -encompassing encounter with a universal norm and its realization. The phenomenological structure of history is, however, inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions on which the idea of progress is based. Because meaning is not immanent in history but introduced by human beings, no total merger between reality and meaning is possible. The fact that equality, freedom, and (...) humanity have all been suggested as the ultimate goal of historical progress illustrates that the very idea of a universal norm oversimplifies the complex structure of history. Furthermore, those who try to parallel scientific advancement with historical progress do not recognize that historical deeds cannot be depersonalized like natural events. (shrink)
INTERWOVEN IN THE COMPLEX TEXTURE of Solomon Maimon's system are strands of thought originating in the theories of his avowed creditors. Maimon is one of the first modern philosophers who acknowledges his debt to diverse philosophical trends and traditions. Among his major creditors, Maimon includes Maimonides and Spinoza. The present analysis, however, will be restricted to an exploration of his debt to Leibniz, Hume, and Kant.
The term ἀλλοίωσις appears in Plato's Republic, 381, as a verb, when Socrates speaks about the fact that the brave and wise soul is the least disturbed and changed by external influences. This term as a noun, in its Latin rendering, alienatio, occurs in St. Augustine, as we shall see presently. Plotinus' description of the relationship between contemplation and the soul's loss of knowledge of herself, is of decisive importance in this context. When the soul is immersed in pure contemplation (...) it loses itself, or if we may freely employ this term, achieves the stage of alienation. Plotinus uses the term ἀλλοίωσις, as well as a term connoting the loss of all concepts and forms by the contemplating mind. It is from this rendering of the term alienation and the description contained in it, i.e., the soul's immersion of itself and the concurrent achievement of the immersion in the divine that St. Augustine uses the expression "alienatio mentis a sensibus corporis.". (shrink)
Let us start our analysis with a reference to a thesis formulated by Scholem under the general heading "Ten Unhistorical Propositions about Kabbalah." The ninth thesis reads as follows: "Totalities can only be conveyed [tradierbar] in an occult manner. God’s name is capable of being addressed in language but not of being uttered in language. For only its fragmentariness renders language utterable. The ‘true’ language cannot be uttered, just as the absolutely concrete cannot be realized." In the third thesis he (...) says, "Character of knowledge in Kabbalah: Torah is the medium in which all beings come to know.". (shrink)
Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)
Confidence or trust is obviously a sort of reliance or dependence. Confidence is related to fiducia , which in turn is related to fido and to the Greek peitho . The latter term implies persuasion or persuasiveness. If we follow, as we should, the nuances hidden in these terms, we may assume that confidence is a reliance stemming from persuasion or accompanied by it. Confidence may be related to a person, including oneself, and in this sense we speak of self-confidence; (...) or it may be related to another person, either in the singular or in the plural, or even perhaps to the course of events at large, to history, to the cosmos, to God etc. It is in this sense that confidence is the opposite of or contradictory to fear. And Aristotle indeed placed the brave man between the two poles of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. (shrink)
Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)
Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)