34 found
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  1.  81
    Three problems in induction.Nathan Stemmer - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):287 - 308.
  2.  8
    The roots of knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1983 - New York: St. Martin's Press.
  3. The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory.Nathan Stemmer - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the (...)
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  4.  39
    A partial solution to the Goodman paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (2):177 - 185.
  5.  40
    A relative notion of natural generalization.Nathan Stemmer - 1975 - Philosophy of Science 42 (1):46-48.
    According to our intuitions, certain generalizations are better confirmed by positive instances than others. In order to characterize the difference between these generalizations, I have proposed in [3] to investigate the generalizing behavior of living beings. Such an investigation makes it possible to classify into different categories the generalizations that are intuitively confirmed by their positive instances and those that are not intuitively confirmed by such instances. One important aspect of my treatment, however, has been shown to be unsatisfactory: sentences (...)
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  6. (1 other version)The Roots of Knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174 (2):232-232.
     
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  7.  38
    (1 other version)The Goodman paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1975 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 6 (2):340-354.
    Summary With the help of psychological and biological concepts it is possible todescribe adequately a fundamental class of inductive inferences that are intuitively correct. Moreover, by relying on evolutionary theories it is possible tojustify them, because they reflect innate, hence useful, capacities. These inferences, however, refer to the past, i.e. the inferred generalization is of the form All Awere B . The reason is that evolutionary theories only claim that innate capacitieshad survival value. With respect to inductive inferences about the (...)
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  8.  31
    Generalization classes as alternatives for similarities and some other concepts.Nathan Stemmer - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):73 - 102.
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  9.  17
    Hume's Two Assumptions.Nathan Stemmer - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (2):93-104.
    One usually speaks of Hume's problem of induction in the singular, as if Hume had called our attention to only one problem which affects the justification of inductive inferences. But Hume shows that this justification depends on two assumptions which are not logically valid. In most studies about the justification of inductive inferences, Hume's approach to base the justification on two assumptions has not been discussed. This seems to have been a mistake, however. Not only do these assumptions play different (...)
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  10.  98
    Physicalism and the argument from knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):84-91.
  11.  62
    Projectible predicates.Nathan Stemmer - 1979 - Synthese 41 (3):375 - 395.
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  12.  93
    A solution to the lottery paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1982 - Synthese 51 (3):339 - 353.
  13.  18
    Covert Behavior and Mental Terms: A Reply to Moore.Nathan Stemmer - 2003 - Behavior and Philosophy 31:165 - 171.
  14. The Hempel and Goodman Paradoxes: A Reply to Adler.Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 15 (2):165.
  15.  36
    On Hetherington's solution of the Goodman paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (4):617-623.
    The Goodman paradox presents us with the problem of selecting the hypotheses that are confirmed by their positive instances. In a recent paper, Stephen Hetherington proposes a criterion that enables us to specify the hypotheses that are subjectively confirmed by these instances. But there is also an objective aspect to be considered here because, as a matter of fact, the hypotheses selected by the criterion have often been highly reliable even if they were based on the observation of only a (...)
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  16.  77
    The Goodman Paradox: Three Different Problems and a Naturalistic Solution to Two of Them.Nathan Stemmer - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):351-370.
    It is now more than 50 years that the Goodman paradox has been discussed, and many different solutions have been proposed. But so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution to the paradox. In this paper, I present the naturalistic solutions to the paradox that were proposed in Quine (1969, 1974), Quine and Ullian (1970/1978), and Stemmer (1971). At the same time, I introduce a number of modifications and improvements that are needed for overcoming shortcomings (...)
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  17.  78
    The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses.Nathan Stemmer - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):395 - 404.
    According to Nicod's criterion of confirmation, a hypothesis of the form ‘All P are Q’ is confirmed by its positive instances, i.e. by entities that are P and Q. It is well known, however, that the criterion gives origin to counterintuitive results. For example, it sanctions the confirmation of ‘All nonblacks are nonravens’ by a nonblack nonraven. Since this hypothesis is logically equivalent to ‘All ravens are black,’ it follows that the criterion indirectly sanctions the counterintuitive confirmation of ‘All ravens (...)
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  18.  16
    A behaviorist account to theory and simulation theories of folk psychology.Nathan Stemmer - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1):29-41.
  19.  29
    Brody's defense of essentialism.Nathan Stemmer - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):393-396.
  20.  46
    Behavioral materialism, the success of folk psychology, and the first-person case.Nathan Stemmer - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2):1-14.
  21.  4
    Eduardo García Máynez. Lógica del juicio jurídico. Fondo de Cultura Económica. México. 1955. 197 páginas.Nathan Stemmer - 1958 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 5 (3):147-149.
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  22.  20
    (1 other version)Empiricist versus mentalist theories of language acquisition.Nathan Stemmer - 1984 - Semiotica 49 (1-2).
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  23.  23
    Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle.Nathan Stemmer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):137-159.
    Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume's account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman's opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the (...)
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  24.  10
    Innate Ideas and Quality Spaces.Nathan Stemmer - 1971 - Semiotica 3 (3).
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  25.  22
    On the Nature of Meanings.Nathan Stemmer - 1979 - Semiotica 27 (4).
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  26.  23
    Quine’s Eliminativism and the Crystal Spheres.Nathan Stemmer - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):315-327.
    Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues such as mental causation, the (...)
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  27. Reviews and replies.Lynn Stephens, Norman Malcolm, D. M. Armstrong, Jonathan E. Adler, Nathan Stemmer & Steven C. Hayes - 1987 - Behaviorism 15:77.
     
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  28.  27
    (1 other version)The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: The superiority of empiricist over cognitive theories.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):41-61.
  29.  26
    (1 other version)The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to professor place.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):147-149.
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  30.  28
    The reliability of inductive inferences and our innate capacities.Nathan Stemmer - 1978 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (1):93-105.
    One of the important problems that have to be dealt with in the Philosophy of Science is to account for the high reliability of a very large part of our inductive inferences. This reliability is noteworthy because not only were many of these inferences made by ordinary people, even by children, but they were very often based on the observation of just a few positive instances. In the present paper, I deal with this problem by treating it as a normal (...)
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  31. Una solución a la paradoja de Hempel.Nathan Stemmer - 1977 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):119-128.
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  32. The hypothesis of other minds: Is it the best explanation? [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):109-121.
  33. (1 other version)On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine’s resemblance theory. [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):75 - 90.
    The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and (...)
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  34.  12
    Review: A Naturalist Account of Language Acquisition. [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):195 - 196.