5 found
Order:
See also
Nathaniel Gan
National University of Singapore
  1.  59
    A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments.Nathaniel Gan - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-14.
    In ontological debates, realists typically argue for their view via one of two approaches. The _Quinean approach_ employs naturalistic arguments that say our scientific practices give us reason to affirm the existence of a kind of entity. The _Fregean approach_ employs linguistic arguments that say we should affirm the existence of a kind of entity because our discourse contains reference to those entities. These two approaches are often seen as distinct, with _indispensability arguments_ typically associated with the former, but not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  46
    The generous ontology of thin objects: Øystein Linnebo: Thin objects: an abstractionist account. New York: Oxford University Press, xvii + 231 pp, $50.00 HB. [REVIEW]Nathaniel Gan - 2018 - Metascience 28 (1):167-169.
  3.  16
    A Functional Approach to Ontology.Nathaniel Gan - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (1):23-43.
    There are two ways of approaching an ontological debate: ontological realism recommends that metaphysicians seek to discover deep ontological facts of the matter, while ontological anti-realism denies that there are such facts; both views sometimes run into difficulties. This paper suggests an approach to ontology that begins with conceptual analysis and takes the results of that analysis as a guide for which metaontological view to hold. It is argued that in some cases, the functions for which we employ a part (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  36
    J. Azzouni, Ontology without Borders, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, xxxvi + 256 pp. [REVIEW]Nathaniel Gan - 2018 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 24 (2):177-178.
  5.  8
    Fictionalism and Meinongianism.Nathaniel Gan - 2021 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 36 (1):49-62.
    Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark