We argue that no sharp boundary can be drawn between the ``authentic'' human body and its instruments. In contrast to some other theorists of the continental canon--notably Heidegger and the Frankfurt school--Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can be read as asserting that the body (transitively) ``lives'' its instruments, weaving with them an intricate web of habitual actions and experiences. For Merleau-Ponty especially, the human body and its instruments are capable of complementing, supplementing, and melting into one another.
The main concern of this paper is to show that understanding mental variation may prove to be relevant to inquiry into thought experiments. First, I examine why Ernst Mach considered the ability to vary the contents of one's thoughts the principal requirement for thought experimentation. Second, I illustrate the wide applicability of mental variation in thought experiments. Third, I suggest, following Kathleen Wilkes, that variation is frequently employed in “realistic” thought experiments.
Co-authored letter to the APA to take a lead role in the recognition of teaching in the classroom, based on the participation in an interdisciplinary Conference on the Role of Advocacy in the Classroom back in 1995. At the time of this writing, the late Myles Brand was the President of Indiana University and a member of the IU Department of Philosophy.
RÉSUMÉ: Le but de cet article est de réexaminer et de raffiner l’analyse proposée par Twardowski de la logique des adjectifs. J’essaierai de montrer que l’analyse de Twardowski peut-être améliorée et renforcée. Les résultats de cette discussion pourront être pertinents pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent à la logique de la détermination des noms ou, plus généralement, à celle des groupes de mots.
Although there are both common and specialised senses of the term variation, there seems to be no well defined use of this term in philosophy. The main task of my thesis is to demonstrate that variation can be defined as a cognitive technique. I suggest that variation has been frequently used by philosophers, although not always in an overt manner. Moreover, I attempt to show that it is reasonable to talk about the relative importance of variation by examining the role (...) of variation in Locke's Essay, Husserl's and Reinach's phenomenology, cognitive science, and thought experiments. (shrink)
The paper examines the reasons for which Camap's and Fodor's theory are considered inadequate by Hilary Putnam in his book Representation and Reality, Putnam deconstmcts his earlier functionalist position and finds himself able to say many things about what language is not and very few about what it is, and, metaphorically speaking, puts human society in an Augustinian position regarding language. As well, this paper investigates whether Putnam's "internal realism" encourages the possible appearence of a new breed of analytic philosophers (...) who will be more sensitive to what was once called "continental metaphysics" and yet who still maintain the conceptual and methodological rigidness of the "old" analytic school. (shrink)
About the Author:Malcolm Murray is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island.Nebojsa Kujundzic is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island.
The paper examines the reasons for which Camap's and Fodor's theory are considered inadequate by Hilary Putnam in his book Representation and Reality, Putnam deconstmcts his earlier functionalist position and finds himself able to say many things about what language is not and very few about what it is, and, metaphorically speaking, puts human society in an Augustinian position regarding language. As well, this paper investigates whether Putnam's "internal realism" encourages the possible appearence of a new breed of analytic philosophers (...) who will be more sensitive to what was once called "continental metaphysics" and yet who still maintain the conceptual and methodological rigidness of the "old" analytic school. (shrink)