Results for 'Necessary'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Truthmakers and Necessary Connections.Ross Paul Cameron - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):27-45.
    In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  2. Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Necessary Moral Truths and Theistic Metaethics.John Danaher - 2014 - Sophia 53 (3):309-330.
    Theistic metaethics usually places one key restriction on the explanation of moral facts, namely: every moral fact must ultimately be explained by some fact about God. But the widely held belief that moral truths are necessary truths seems to undermine this claim. If a moral truth is necessary, then it seems like it neither needs nor has an explanation. Or so the objection typically goes. Recently, two proponents of theistic metaethics — William Lane Craig and Mark Murphy — (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  75
    From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being.Joshua Rasmussen - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):183 - 200.
    I develop new paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being. These paths assume a metaphysical framework in which there are abstract states of affairs that can obtain or fail to obtain. One path begins with the following causal principle: necessarily, any contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. I mark out steps from that principle to a more complex causal principle and from there to the existence of a concrete necessary being. I offer a couple alternative (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5. From a Necessary Being to God.Joshua Rasmussen - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):1-13.
    Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  70
    Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology.Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627.
    Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors. We (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  7
    Necessary a Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory.Ari Maunu - 2017 - Axiomathes 27.
    I argue that Fregeanism with respect to proper names—the view that modes of presentation are relevant to the contents of proper names—is able to account for the thesis that there are necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions such as the one expressed in ‘‘Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus’’, whereas the Direct Reference Theory—according to which the semantic function of certain expressions, e.g., proper names, is only to pick out an object (referent)—is able to deal with only their necessary truth. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  46
    Necessary Evil: Justification, Excuse or Pardon? [REVIEW]Vinit Haksar - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):333-347.
    The problem of necessary evil is a sub-class of the problem of moral dilemmas. In cases of genuine moral dilemmas the agent cannot avoid doing evil whatever he does. In some cases of genuine moral dilemmas, the options facing the agent are incommensurable. But in some other cases of genuine moral dilemmas, though wrong doing is inescapable, there is a rationally best course of action. These are cases of necessary evil. There are several views regarding the doing of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  48
    The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis.Michael J. Shaffer - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):555-563.
    In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition-driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not sufficiently well understood for this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  16
    Hume, Dispositional Essentialism, and Where to Find the Idea of Necessary Connection.William Hannegan - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):787-791.
    Dispositional essentialists hold that the world is populated by irreducibly dispositional properties, called “potencies,” “powers,” or “dispositions.” Each of these properties is marked out by a characteristic stimulus and manifestation bound together in a metaphysically necessary connection. Dispositional essentialism faces an old objection from David Hume. Hume argues, in his Treatise of Human Nature, that we have no adequate idea of necessary connection. The epistemology of the Treatise allegedly rules the idea out. Dispositional essentialists usually respond by attacking (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Metaphysical Nihilism and Necessary Being.Tyron Goldschmidt - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):799-820.
    This paper addresses the most fundamental question in metaphysics, Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is framed as a question about concrete entities, Why does a possible world containing concrete entities obtain rather than one containing no concrete entities? Traditional answers are in terms of there necessarily being some concrete entities, and include the possibility of a necessary being. But such answers are threatened by metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there being nothing concrete is possible, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Salmon on the Contingent a Priori and the Necessary a Posteriori.Graham Oppy - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):5 - 33.
    This paper is an examination of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori. In particular, it considers -- and assesses -- the criticisms that Nathan Salmon makes of the views of Saul Kripke.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Gap? What Gap? - On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - In Giuseppe Motta Udo Thiel (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). de Gruyter.
    This article is based on a presentation held at the conference "Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins", September 2014, Graz University, Austria. A much longer version of this paper appears as Chapter 4 in my forthcoming new book "Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction" (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) Here's an abstract: // In some Anglophone Kant literature (Van Cleve 1999; Gomes 2010; Stephenson 2014; cf. Shaddock 2015), the problem has been raised of an alleged ‘gap’ in Kant’s argument in (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  5
    A Revision of the Notions of Sufficient Condition and Necessary Condition.Frantisek Gaher - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):16-37.
    Analyzing the process of keeping promise we identify its sequence structure and its phase sequences in time. This allows us to arrive at a time order principle forming according to which obligation performance cannot precede in time its sufficient or necessary conditions performance. We further observe that a given promise must always be taken as an element of a certain system of promises. As a result we review definitions of the terms sufficient condition and necessary condition as no (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  8
    On Necessary but External Relations.M. J. Garcia-Encinas - 2013 - Review of Contemporary Philosophy 12:93-101.
    I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  23
    The Reluctant Revolutionary: An Essay on David Hume's Account of Necessary Connection.Alan Schwerin - 1989 - Peter Lang Publishing.
    Hume's contributions to discussions on causality and necessary connection are significant and influential. Yet they remain a source of ongoing debate among philosophers. The analysis in my book is an attempt to dissipate some of the perplexities that surround these issues. The arguments here support what I call a subjectivist interpretation of Hume's views on necessary connection. My central thesis is the suggestion that Hume identifies necessary connection or power with a specific psychological dispositon of the mind (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth.P. Mackie - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):225-236.
  18. Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections.Andreas Hüttemann - 2014 - Theoria 79 (1):29-39.
    In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open.More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: pp. 81-104.
    In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are true a posteriori. How should (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  78
    Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections.Jonathan Tallant - 2015 - Theoria 80 (4):211-221.
    Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby past objects are derivative and depend for their existence upon present objects. I argue that this view should be rejected.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Kripke, the Necessary a Posteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy.Scott Soames - 2006 - In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 272--292.
  22.  45
    Review of Timothy O'Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency[REVIEW]Graham Oppy - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
    This paper is a review of the cosmological argument that Tim O'Connor defends in "Theism and Ultimate Explanation".
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  27
    Is Pain Necessary?Roland Puccetti - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (July):259-69.
    Many writers have been struck by what Ronald Melzack, a leading investigator of pain mechanisms, calls the ‘puzzle’ of pain. Thus the surgeon Leriche, often quoted in this connection, says: Defence reaction? Fortunate warning? But as a matter of fact the majority of illnesses, even the most serious, attack us without warning. Sickness is nearly always a drama in two acts, of which the first takes place, cunningly enough, in the dim silence of bur tissues, with the lights out, before (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
    Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  25.  39
    Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths.Biggs Stephen & Wilson Jessica - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D), advocated by Chalmers (2006) and Jackson (1998), among others, aims to restore the link between necessity and a priority seemingly broken by Kripke (1972/1980), by showing how armchair access to semantic intensions provides a basis for knowledge of necessary a posteriori truths (among other modal claims). The most compelling objections to E2D are that, for one or other reason, the requisite intensions are not accessible from the armchair (see, e.g., Wilson 1982, Melnyk 2008). As we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Is Political Obligation Necessary for Obedience? Hobbes on Hostility, War and Obligation.Thomas M. Hughes - 2012 - Teoria Politica 2:77-99.
    Contemporary debates on obedience and consent, such as those between Thomas Senor and A. John Simmons, suggest that either political obligation must exist as a concept or there must be natural duty of justice accessible to us through reason. Without one or the other, de facto political institutions would lack the requisite moral framework to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay suggests that both are unnecessary in order to provide a conceptual framework in which obedience to coercive political institutions can (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on Explaining X Through X’s Essence.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 7 (2):88-112.
    I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28. Logic, Essence, and Modality — Review of Bob Hale's Necessary Beings. [REVIEW]Christopher Menzel - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):407-428.
    Bob Hale’s distinguished record of research places him among the most important and influential contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In his deep, wide ranging, yet highly readable book Necessary Beings, Hale draws upon, but substantially integrates and extends, a good deal his past research to produce a sustained and richly textured essay on — as promised in the subtitle — ontology, modality, and the relations between them. I’ve set myself two tasks in this review: first, to provide a reasonably thorough (if (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  70
    Natural Properties, Necessary Connections, and the Problem of Induction.Tyler Hildebrand - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    The necessitarian solution to the problem of induction involves two claims: first, that necessary connections are justified by an inference to the best explanation; second, that the best theory of necessary connections entails the timeless uniformity of nature. In this paper, I defend the second claim. My arguments are based on considerations from the metaphysics of laws, properties, and fundamentality.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Tooley's Account of the Necessary Connection Between Law and Regularity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):33-43.
    Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects.Robert D. Rupert - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties are individuated (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  32. Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do otherwise (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  34.  52
    Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  35. On Whether Some Laws Are Necessary.Alexander Bird - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):257–270.
    In 'Necessarily, salt dissolves in water' (Analysis 61 (2001)), I argued that because the laws required for the existence of salt entail the laws that ensure dissolving in water, there is no possible world in which salt exists but fails to dissolve in water. In this paper I respond to criticisms from Helen Beebee and Stathis Psillos (Analysis 62 (2002)). I also introduce the 'down-and-up' structure, generalising the case. Whether or not this structure is instantiated is a matter for a (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  36. Finite Trees and the Necessary Use of Large Cardinals.Harvey Friedman - manuscript
    We introduce insertion domains that support the placement of new, higher, vertices into finite trees. We prove that every nonincreasing insertion domain has an element with simple structural properties in the style of classical Ramsey theory. This result is proved using standard large cardinal axioms that go well beyond the usual axioms for mathematics. We also establish that this result cannot be proved without these large cardinal axioms. We also introduce insertion rules that specify the placement of new, higher, vertices (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37. Necessary Laws and Chemical Kinds.Nora Berenstain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):631-647.
    Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001, 2002, 2005, 2007] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. From Necessary Chances to Biological Laws.C. Haufe - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):279-295.
    In this article, I propose a new way of thinking about natural necessity and a new way of thinking about biological laws. I suggest that much of the lack of progress in making a positive case for distinctively biological laws is that we’ve been looking for necessity in the wrong place. The trend has been to look for exceptionlessness at the level of the outcomes of biological processes and to build one’s claims about necessity off of that. However, as Beatty (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. Necessary Existents.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - In A. O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 269-87.
    It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  40. Review of Bob Hale's Necessary Beings. [REVIEW]Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Disputatio (40).
    Review of Bob Hale's "Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them". Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, ISBN 9780199669578.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  39
    The Cognitive Impenetrability of the Content of Early Vision is a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Purely Nonconceptual Content.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42. First-Order Modal Logic in the Necessary Framework of Objects.Peter Fritz - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):584-609.
    I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  81
    Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?Wes Morriston - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (2):143-160.
    This paper elaborates and defends an argument for saying that if God is necessarily good (morally perfect in all possible worlds), then He does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power and so is not all-powerful. It considers and rejects several of the best-known attempts to show that necessary moral perfection is consistent with the requirements of omnipotence, and concludes by suggesting that a less than all-powerful person might still be the greatest possible being. Great is your power, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44.  30
    Is Sex Really Necessary? And Other Questions for Lewens.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):297-308.
    It has been claimed that certain forms of individual essentialism render the Theory of Natural Selection unable to explain why any given individual has the traits it does. Here, three reasons are offered why the Theory ought to ignore these forms of essentialism. First, the trait-distributions explained by population genetics supervene on individual-level causal links, and thus selection must have individual-level effects. Second, even if there are individuals that possess thick essences, they lie outside the domain of the Theory. Finally, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  45.  92
    Why Unification is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Explanation.Victor Gijsbers - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):481-500.
    In this paper, I argue that unification is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation. Focusing on the versions of the unificationist theory of explanation of Kitcher and of Schurz and Lambert, I establish three theses. First, Kitcher’s criterion of unification is vitiated by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself, a flaw that it is unable to overcome. Second, because neither Kitcher’s theory nor that of Schurz and Lambert can solve the problems of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  46. Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation: Malebranche's Two Arguments for Occasionalism.Sukjae Lee - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):539-565.
    Malebranche presents two major arguments for occasionalism: the “no necessary connection” argument (NNC) and the “conservation is but continuous creation” argument (CCC). NNC appears prominently in his Search After Truth but virtually disappears and surrenders the spotlight to CCC in his later major work, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion . This paper investigates the possible reasons and motivations behind this significant shift. I argue that the shift is no surprise if we consider the two ways in which the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47. Necessities and Necessary Truths: A Prolegomenon to the Use of Modal Logic in the Analysis of Intensional Notions.V. Halbach & P. Welch - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):71-100.
    In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as 'There are necessary a posteriori propositions' or 'All laws of physics are necessary' in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  48. Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  79
    Logical and Analytic Truths That Are Not Necessary.Edward N. Zalta - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):57-74.
    The author describes an interpreted modal language and produces some clear examples of logical and analytic truths that are not necessary. These examples: (a) are far simpler than the ones cited in the literature, (b) show that a popular conception of logical truth in modal languages is incorrect, and (c) show that there are contingent truths knowable ``a priori'' that do not depend on fixing the reference of a term.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  50. The Necessary Framework of Objects.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Topoi 19 (2):201-208.
    The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but the original publication is available at springerlink.com . Citation: Williamson, T. . 'The necessary framework of objects', Topoi 19, 201-208. N.B. Tim Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000