Expanded non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has provoked ethical concerns about its justifiable scope. In this paper, we evaluate the role of the child’s right to an open future in setting the scope of NIPT. This ‘open future principle’ has been cited in arguments both limiting and expanding parental freedoms. This moral right holds that adult autonomy rights which children cannot yet exercise should nonetheless be protected until they can. Its purpose is to protect the future autonomy of the child as (...) a future adult. Several authors have extended this rationale from child to fetus. However, the right was not anticipated to apply to the fetus, a non-legal entity in many jurisdictions. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether this principle is useful to help deliberate the scope of NIPT. We find that extending the open future principle to delineate the scope of NIPT is theoretically flawed. We contend that in the prenatal context its value primarily lies with counselling for prenatal screening where it can be used to encourage parents’ reflection on the implications of knowing for the sake of knowing on their future children and their relationship with them. (shrink)

Assessing the risk-benefit ratio has always been considered key in designing clinical trials. These benefits can be diverse and may include social value and psychological benefits. When it comes to...

Psychologische, rechtstheoretische en sociobiologische benadering van altruïstisch gedrag als grondslag van de menselijke samenleving.

Artikelen over het grensgebied tussen psychologie, recht en moraal vanuit een rechtspsychologisch en behavioristisch uitgangspunt, waarbij de auteur zich onder meer baseert op het gedachtegoed van de Amerikaanse psycholoog Skinner.

In this article the question is raised whether artificial intelligence has any psychological relevance, i.e. contributes to our knowledge of how the mind/brain works. It is argued that the psychological relevance of artificial intelligence of the symbolic kind is questionable as yet, since there is no indication that the brain structurally resembles or operates like a digital computer. However, artificial intelligence of the connectionist kind may have psychological relevance, not because the brain is a neural network, but because connectionist networks (...) exhibit operating characteristics which mimic operant behavior. Finally it is concluded that, since most of the work done so far in AI and Law is of the symbolic kind, it has as yet contributed little to our understanding of the legal mind. (shrink)

Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) argue that on the one hand, conversational artificial intelligence (CAI) does not fulfill the necessary conditions for full attribution of agency, such as having consc...