Results for 'Negative facts'

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  1. Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to (...)
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  2. If You Believe in Positive Facts, You Should Believe in Negative Facts.Gunnar Björnsson - 2007 - Hommage À Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Substantial metaphysical theory has long struggled with the question of negative facts, facts capable of making it true that Valerie isn’t vigorous. This paper argues that there is an elegant solution to these problems available to anyone who thinks that there are positive facts. Bradley’s regress and considerations of ontological parsimony show that an object’s having a property is an affair internal to the object and the property, just as numerical identity and distinctness are internal to (...)
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  3.  39
    Falsemakers: Something Negative About Facts.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker (...)
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  4. Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology.L. Nathan Oaklander & Silvano Miracchi - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (3):434-455.
    Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather (...)
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  5.  60
    Russell on Negative Facts.Jay F. Rosenberg - 1972 - Noûs 6 (1):27-40.
    During his atomistic period, Russell felt compelled to include negative facts in his ontology. In this essay, I diagnose the grounds of that compulsion, Assess the cogency of an ontology which includes negative facts, And, Finding it inadequate, Consider finally alternative solutions within the atomistic framework to the root problems of negation.
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  6.  19
    The Existence and Reality of Negative Facts.Carl Erik Kühl - 2014 - SATS 15 (2):121-147.
    The problem of the existence of negative facts as truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. In the debate since then, most writers have tended to reject their existence, Russell himself being the most conspicuous exception. Two other strategies have been offered. The first, usually called incompatibilism, actually goes back to Plato, whereas the second, the totality fact theory, was introduced by D. M. Armstrong in 1997. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  7.  27
    Negative Facts, Ideal Meanings, and Intentionality.Maria E. Reicher - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):181-191.
    This paper is a commentary on David Woodruff Smith's "Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl vis-à-vis Early Wittgenstein" (S J Phil 40 (Supp), 2002). I address three questions: 1. What is a fact according to Wittgenstein? What is the relation between states of affairs on the one hand and facts on the other? Is a fact an existing state of affairs (as Smith suggests), or is it the existence of a state of affairs, as most of Wittgenstein's remarks on this (...)
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  8. Psychic Facts, a Selection From Various Authors, Ed. By W.H. Harrison.William Henry Psychic Facts & Harrison - 1880
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  9. Negative Truths From Positive Facts.Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
    According to the truthmaker theory that we favour, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in the room.') true. We deny the existence of negative facts, show how negative truths are made true by positive facts, (...)
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  10.  10
    The Logical Ontology of Negative Facts: On What is Not.Uwe Scheffler & Yaroslav Shramko - 2000 - In Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Things, Facts and Events. Rodopi. pp. 76--109.
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  11.  48
    Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):389-410.
  12.  26
    Negative Entities and Negative Facts in Navya-Nyāya.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 1984 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (3):265-275.
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  13.  32
    The Problem of Negative Facts in Russell's Logical Atomism.Owen W. Dukelow - 1976 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):7-13.
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    On Negation and Negative Facts.Hans Regnell - 1951 - Theoria 17 (1-3):210-221.
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    Negative Facts and Belief.Edwin B. Allaire - 1960 - Philosophical Studies 11 (1-2):1 - 3.
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    Russell on Negative Facts.David B. Hausman - 1974 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):49-53.
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    On Negative Facts.A. Ushenko - 1931 - Philosophical Review 40 (4):379-384.
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    Father Parmenides; or, Further Concerning Negative Facts.Harold N. Lee - 1953 - Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):70-74.
  19.  2
    Russell on Negative Facts.David B. Hausman - 1974 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):49-53.
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    The Impact of Negative Facts for the Imaginary Logic of NA Vasil'ev.Werner Stelzner - 2000 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76:133-144.
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  21.  1
    The Logical Structure of Russell's Negative Facts.Wayne A. Patterson - 1996 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 16 (1).
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    Negative Facts, Ideal Meanings, and Intentionality.Maria E. Reicher - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement):181-191.
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  23. Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts.S. Gillon Brendan - 1997 - In Bimal Krishna Matilal, Jitendranath Mohanty & Purusottama Bilimoria (eds.), Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal. Oxford University Press.
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  24. Negative Truths From Positive Facts?Josh Parsons - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602.
    I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in S223' and 'Theatetus is not flying') they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to 'There are no unicorns'. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.
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  25.  31
    Negative Positivism and the Hard Facts of Life.Charles Silver - 1985 - The Monist 68 (3):347-363.
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  26. 'Facts' and the Alleged Negative Statistical Relevance.K. I. M. Shin - forthcoming - Philosophy and Culture.
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  27. Setting the Facts Straight.Mark Jago - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
    Substantial facts are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood, promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking, for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of reduction similar to that of the typed λ -calculus and use it to (...)
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  28. Mellor on Negative Properties.Andrew Botterell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be (...)
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  29.  74
    What is a Negative Property?Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, (...)
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  30. The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
    According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. But these (...)
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  31.  54
    Negative Actions.Benjamin Mossel - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):307-333.
    Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims: (i) Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity (...)
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  32.  58
    How to Derive a 'Not' From an 'Is': A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths.Michael Veber - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):79-91.
    Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. The case of negative truths leads some philosophers to postulate negative states of affairs or to give up on truthmaker maximalism. This paper defends a version of the incompatibility view of negative truths. Negative truths can be made true by positive facts, and thus, truthmaker maximalism can be maintained without postulating negative states of affairs.
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  33. Grounding, Contingency and Transitivity.Roberto Loss - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):1-14.
    Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.
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  34.  43
    Positive Truthmakers for Negative Truths: A Solution to Molnar’s Problem.Jonas Waechter - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):579-592.
    The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible (...)
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    From Falsemakers to Negative Properties.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):53-77.
    I shall argue in this article that, if we need to admit of negative facts in our ontology as falsemakers of false propositions, then it is plausible to accept that there are also negative properties conceived of as modes. After having briefly recalled the falsemaker argument, I shall explore five different alternative interpretations of negative facts and I shall demonstrate that each alternative – except for the one involving negative properties – is affected by (...)
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  36. Negative Truth and Falsehood.Stephen Mumford - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71.
    What makes it true when we say that something is not the case? Truthmaker maximalists think that every truth has a truthmaker—some fact in the world—that makes it true. No such facts can be found for the socalled negative truths. If a proposition is true when it has a truthmaker, then it would be false when it has no truthmaker. I therefore argue that negative truths, such as t<p>, are best understood as falsehoods, f<p>.
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  37.  17
    Making Sense of Negative Properties.David Hommen - 2017 - Axiomathes:1-26.
    Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such entities. By contrast, I believe not only that negative properties are quite conceivable, but also that there are good reasons for thinking that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I would like to explicate a concept of negative properties which I think avoids the logical absurdities commonly believed to frustrate theories of negative existences. To do (...)
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  38. Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist?Alexander Skiles - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it (...)
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  39. Facts and Truth-Making.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):137-145.
    This essay is a reflection on the idea of truth-making and its applications. I respond to a critique of my 1986 paper on truth-making and discuss some key principles at play in the Truth-maker Program as it has emerged over the past 25 years, paying special attention to negative and general truths. I maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them. In the end, I accept Truth-maker (...)
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  40.  6
    Making Sense of Negative Properties.David Hommen - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):81-106.
    Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such entities. By contrast, I believe not only that negative properties are quite conceivable, but also that there are good reasons for thinking that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I would like to explicate a concept of negative properties which I think avoids the logical absurdities commonly believed to frustrate theories of negative existences. To do (...)
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  41.  27
    Antecedent-Contained Deletion in Negative Polarity Items.Jason Merchant - unknown
    This squib investigates a paradox that arises from the interaction of two well-studied domains of grammar: antecedent-contained deletion and the licensing of negative polarity items. The conflict arises from a simple set of facts that have been overlooked in the literature, given in (1).
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  42.  4
    Fake Facts and Alternative Truths in Medical Research.Bjørn Hofmann - 2018 - BMC Medical Ethics 19 (1):4.
    Fake news and alternative facts have become commonplace in these so-called “post-factual times.” What about medical research - are scientific facts fake as well? Many recent disclosures have fueled the claim that scientific facts are suspect and that science is in crisis. Scientists appear to engage in facting interests instead of revealing interesting facts. This can be observed in terms of what has been called polarised research, where some researchers continuously publish positive results while others publish (...)
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    Aboutness and Negative Truths: A Modest Strategy for Truthmaker Theorists.Arthur Schipper - forthcoming - Synthese:1-38.
    A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths. In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light (...)
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    Creating Facts and Values.Ruth Anna Putnam - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):187-204.
    Moral sceptics maintain that there are no objective moral values, or that there is no moral knowledge, or no moral facts, or that what looks like a statement which makes a moral judgment is not really a statement and does not have a truth-value. All of this is rather, unclear because all of it is negative. It will be necessary to remove some of this unclarity because my aim in this paper is to establish a proposition which may (...)
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    All Facts Great and Small.Richard Manning - 1998 - ProtoSociology 11:18-40.
    I examine the arguments Donald Davidson has offered through the years concerning the ontological bona fides of facts. In "Truth and Meaning", Davidson uses the so-called "slingshot" argument to the effect that if true sentences refer, then they are all coreferential. Through a detailed examination of the assumptions underlying this argument, I show that, while it is effective as part of a reductio of bottom-up, reference based semantics, it has no tendency to establish the truth of its negative (...)
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    Shame and HIV: Strategies for Addressing the Negative Impact Shame has on Public Health and Diagnosis and Treatment of HIV.Phil Hutchinson & Rageshri Dhairyawan - 2018 - Bioethics 32 (1):68-76.
    There are five ways in which shame might negatively impact upon our attempts to combat and treat HIV. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician. Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care. Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV status to new (...)
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  47.  52
    Definite Descriptions and Negative Polarity.Daniel Rothschild - manuscript
    The argument here comes from consideration of a certain sort of linguistic expression called negative polarity items (NPIs). These are expressions such as “any,” “at all” and “ever.” NPIs are of particular interest for semantics because they can only be used in contexts with a certain rather abstract semantic feature. However, the precise characterization of the feature is itself a matter of some controversy. For those interested in the semantics of natural language it is worthwhile to figure out precisely (...)
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    Effects of Dysphoria and Induced Negative Mood on the Processes Underlying Hindsight Bias.Julia Groß & Ute J. Bayen - 2017 - Cognition and Emotion 31 (8):1715-1724.
    ABSTRACTHindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, (...)
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    Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory.Gustavo Picazo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...)
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  50.  33
    Causal Truthmaking.Robin Stenwall - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
    This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. (...)
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