31 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Neil C. Manson [27]Neil Campbell Manson [4]
  1. Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics.Neil C. Manson - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive communicative transactions, by which (...)
  2.  12
    The Biobank Consent Debate: Why ‘Meta-Consent’ is Not the Solution?Neil C. Manson - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (5):291-294.
    Over the past couple of decades, there has been an ongoing, often fierce, debate about the ethics of biobank participation. One central element of that debate has concerned the nature of informed consent, must specific reconsent be gained for each new use, or user, or is broad consent ethically adequate? Recently, Thomas Ploug and Søren Holm have developed an alternative to both specific and broad consent: what they call a meta-consent framework. On a meta-consent framework, participants can choose the type (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3.  31
    How Not to Think About the Ethics of Deceiving Into Sex.Neil C. Manson - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):415-429.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  71
    Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3317-3334.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  48
    Normative Consent Is Not Consent.Neil C. Manson - 2013 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 22 (1):33-44.
  6.  15
    Misleading by Omission: Rethinking the Obligation to Inform Research Subjects About Funding Sources.Neil C. Manson - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (6):720-739.
    Informed consent requirements for medical research have expanded over the past half-century. The Declaration of Helsinki now includes an explicit positive obligation to inform subjects about funding sources. This is problematic in a number of ways and seems to oblige researchers to disclose information irrelevant to most consent decisions. It is argued here that such a problematic obligation involves an “informational fallacy.” The aim in the second part of the paper is to provide a better approach to making sense of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Why “Consciousness” Means What It Does.Neil C. Manson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.
    Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  28
    Freud's Own Blend: Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation, and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology.Neil C. Manson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):179–195.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9.  95
    State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction.Neil Campbell Manson - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
    It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct properties. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10.  25
    Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal.Neil C. Manson - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (2):66-73.
    In many jurisdictions, adolescents acquire the right to consent to treatment; but in some cases their refusals – e.g. of life-saving treatment – may not be respected. This asymmetry of adolescent consent and refusal seems puzzling, even incoherent. The aim here is to offer an original explanation, and a justification, of this asymmetry. Rather than trying to explain the asymmetry in terms of a variable standard of competence – where the adolescent is competent to consent to, but not refuse, certain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  50
    'A Tumbling-Ground for Whimsies'? The History and Contemporary Role of the Conscious/Unconscious Contrast.Neil Campbell Manson - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12.  68
    What is Genetic Information, and Why is It Significant? A Contextual, Contrastive, Approach.Neil C. Manson - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):1–16.
    Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question (the genetic exceptionalism debate). Genetic information is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why genetic information is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that genetic information is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  9
    Epistemic Consciousness.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
  14.  32
    Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to 'why' questions that assuage agents' puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  14
    Freud's Own Blend : Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology.Neil C. Manson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):179-195.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  4
    What is Genetic Information, and Why is It Significant? : A Contextual, Contrastive, Approach.Neil C. Manson - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):1-16.
    Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question. Genetic information is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why genetic information is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that genetic information is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to the problem of significance (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  4
    Freud's Own Blend: Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation, and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology.Neil C. Manson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):179-195.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18.  5
    The Ethics of Biobanking: Assessing the Right to Control Problem for Broad Consent.Neil C. Manson - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (5):540-549.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  65
    Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):521-540.
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  64
    Brains, Vats, and Neurally-Controlled Animats.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):249-268.
    The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view of a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience—the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm—that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  12
    When is a Choice Not a Choice? ‘Sham Offers’ and the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal.Neil C. Manson - 2017 - Bioethics 31 (3):296-304.
    In some jurisdictions there is a puzzling asymmetry between consent and refusal, where, for some kinds of treatment, the adolescent patient has the power to permit her own treatment but her refusal does not have the same kind of normative significance as refusal of treatment by a competent adult. In this journal I recently offered a clarification and defence of this asymmetry in terms of a paternalistic justification of the sharing of normative powers between adolescents and other parties. Lawlor offers (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  15
    Brains, Vats, and Neurally-Controlled Animats.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):249-268.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  12
    Reason Explanation:A First-Order Normative Account.Neil C. Manson - unknown
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  30
    Epistemic Inertia and Epistemic Isolationism: A Response to Buchanan.Neil C. Manson - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):291-298.
    abstract Allen Buchanan argues that conventional applied ethics is impoverished and would be enriched by the addition of social moral epistemology. The aim here is to clarify this argument and to raise questions about whether such an addition is necessary about how such enrichment would work in practice. Two broad problems are identified. First, there are various kinds and sources of epistemic inertia, which act as an obstacle to epistemic change. Religion is one striking example and seems to pose a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  22
    Consent in the Law – by Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword.Neil C. Manson - 2010 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):215-217.
  26.  24
    Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences – by Karsten R. Stueber.Neil C. Manson - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):187-191.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  10
    Contemporary Naturalism and the Concept of Consciousness.Neil C. Manson - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  13
    How Not to Think About Genetic Information.Neil C. Manson - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (4):3-3.
  29.  3
    Brains, Vats, and Neurally-Controlled Animats.Neil C. Manson - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):249-268.
    The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view of a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience—the neurally-controlled animat paradigm—that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in vitro (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  4
    Rights, Wrongs and Neurons.Neil C. Manson - 2006 - .
  31. The Case Against Meta-Consent: Not Only Do Ploug and Holm Not Answer It, They Make It Even Stronger.Neil C. Manson - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics:medethics-2019-105955.
    In a recent article, I argued that Ploug and Holm’s ‘meta-consent’ proposal should be rejected for biobank governance. This was because, although meta-consent is permissible, it is both burdensome and ethically omissible. There is no ethical reason why funders should undertake the additional costs. Ploug and Holm have sought to respond to these arguments. Here, it is noted that not only do they fail to adequately refuse the case against meta-consent, they fail to even engage with the arguments, either misunderstanding (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark