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Profile: Neil Feit (Fredonia State University)
  1.  80
    Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
    In this paper, I construct and defend an account of harm, specifically, all-things-considered overall harm. I start with a simple comparative account, on which an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. The most significant problems for this account are overdetermination and preemption cases. However, a counterfactual comparative approach of some sort is needed to make sense of harm, or so I argue. I offer a counterfactual comparative theory that accounts nicely (...)
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  2.  48
    Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
    Given that a person's death is bad for her, when is it bad? I defend subsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead (...)
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  3.  61
    Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  4. When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  5.  75
    The Time of Death's Misfortune.Neil Feit - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
  6. The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays.Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 1-25.
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  7. Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 105-31.
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  8.  74
    The Most Valuable Player.Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit - 2001 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.
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  9. Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):570-572.
    In this short, clear and engaging book, Neil Feit defends the unorthodox view that the contents of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are properties, and not, as is usually held, propositions. The core of his argument has to do with de se beliefs, beliefs about the self. Based on examples and arguments due to Perry, Lewis and Chisholm, along with considerations about internalism and physicalism, Feit offers a battery of arguments for the conclusion that the contents of de se beliefs (...)
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  10.  80
    Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  11.  77
    Self-Ascription and Belief de Re.Neil Feit - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  12.  8
    Harming by Failing to Benefit.Neil Feit - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    In this paper, I consider the problem of omission for the counterfactual comparative account of harm. A given event harms a person, on this account, when it makes her worse off than she would have been if it had not occurred. The problem arises because cases in which one person merely fails to benefit another intuitively seem harmless. The account, however, seems to imply that when one person fails to benefit another, the first thereby harms the second, since the second (...)
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  13.  42
    Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  14.  45
    Naming and Nonexistence.Neil Feit - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  15. Public Aefairs Quarterly.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.
  16.  42
    Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions.Neil Feit - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  17.  5
    Explaining the Geometry of Desert.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.
  18.  4
    Harm and the Concept of Medical Disorder.Neil Feit - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):367-385.
    According to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA’s harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that one is harmed (...)
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  19.  59
    More on Brute Facts.Neil Feit - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):625 – 630.
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  20.  32
    The Structure of Higher Goods.Neil Feit - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.
  21.  36
    The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience.Neil Feit - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
  22.  13
    On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law.Neil Feit - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.
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  23.  3
    Graduate Papers From the Joint Session 1995: On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law.Neil Feit - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):381-386.
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  24.  37
    Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics.Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.) - 2013 - CSLI Publications.
    In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various (...)
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  25. Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness.Neil Feit - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--213.
     
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