Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Zwei Vorworte in einem. Evelyn DÖLLING: Alexius Meinong: "Der blinde Seher Theiresias". Jaakko HINTIKKA: Meinong in a Long Perspective. Richard SYLVAN: Re-Exploring Item-Theory. Francesca MODENATO: Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Ways of Dealing with Non-existence. Karel LAMBERT: Substitution and the Expansion of the World. Terence PARSONS: Meinongian Semantics Generalized. Reinhardt GROSSMANN: Thoughts, Objectives and States of Affairs. Peter SIMONS: Meinong's Theory of Sense and Reference. Barry SMITH: More Things in (...) Heaven and Earth. Michele LENOCI: Meinongs unvollständige Gegenstände und das Universalienproblem. Maria E. REICHER: Gibt es unvollständige Gegenstände? Dale JACQUETTE: Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing. Herbert HOCHBERG:s, Functions, Existence and Relations in the Russell-Meinong Dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism Controversy. Jacek PA_NICZEK: Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects? Marie-Luise SCHUBERT KALSI: Apriorische Elemente im Denken. Liliana ALBERTAZZI: Forms of Completion. Johann Ch. MAREK: Zwei Gegenstände und ein Inhalt. Zur Intentionalität bei Meinong. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor. Alberto VOLTOLINI: Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable? Markus S. STEPANIANS: Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff des Annahmeschlusses. Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Imagination and Necessity. R.D. ROLLINGER: Meinong on Perception: Two Questions Concerning Propositional Seeing. Wolfgang G. STOCK: Die Genese der Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion der Grazer Schule. Rudolf HALLER: Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie. Alfred SCHRAMM: Meinongs Wahrscheinlichkeit. Karl SCHUHMANN: Der Wertbegriff beim frühen Meinong. Wilhelm BAUMGARTNER: Wertpräsentation. Ursula ZEGLÉN: Meinong's Analysis of Lying. Seppo SAJAMA: Hitting Reality: France Veber's Concept of Zadevanje. Matja_ POTR_: Sensation According to Meinong and Veber. Róbert SOMOS: Zwei Schüler Brentanos: Ákos von Pauler und Meinong. J.C. NYÍRI: Palágyis Kritik an der Gegenstandstheorie. David M. ARMSTRONG: Reaction to Meinong. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Investigating Hintikka. David PEARS: Hintikka's Interpretation of Wittgenstein's Treatment of Sensation-Language. Allan JANIK: How Did Hertz Influence Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development? Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction. Jan von PLATO: Illustrations of Method in Ptolemaic Astronomy. Peter SIMONS: New Categories for Formal Ontology. Henri LAUENER: How to Use Proper Names. Matti SINTONEN: Knowing and Making: Kantian Themes in Hintikka's Philosophy. Paul WEINGARTNER: A Note on Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge and Belief". Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Naturalism and (...) Modal Reasoning. Ulrike LEOPOLD-WILDBURGER: Induction as a Connection between Philosophy, Psychology and Economics. A Plea for Experimental Research. John PASSMORE: Editing Russell's Papers: A Fragment of Institutional History. Rudolf HALLER: From Archives to Editions. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Investigating Hintikka. David PEARS: Hintikka's Interpretation of Wittgenstein's Treatment of Sensation-Language. Allan JANIK: How Did Hertz Influence Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development? Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction. Jan von PLATO: Illustrations of Method in Ptolemaic Astronomy. Peter SIMONS: New Categories for Formal Ontology. Henri LAUENER: How to Use Proper Names. Matti SINTONEN: Knowing and Making: Kantian Themes in Hintikka's Philosophy. Paul WEINGARTNER: A Note on Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge and Belief". Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Naturalism and (...) Modal Reasoning. Ulrike LEOPOLD-WILDBURGER: Induction as a Connection between Philosophy, Psychology and Economics. A Plea for Experimental Research. John PASSMORE: Editing Russell's Papers: A Fragment of Institutional History. Rudolf HALLER: From Archives to Editions. (shrink)

This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information. We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the problem of (...) measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ Formal Analyses of the Three Interpretations _2.1_ Reduction in doubt _2.2_ Reduction in uncertainty _2.3_ Divergence _3_ Inconsistency with Epistemic Value of Information _4_ Problem of Measure Sensitivity _5_ Reduction in Expected Inaccuracy _6_ Resolution of the Problem of Measure Sensitivity _6.1_ Alternative measures of inaccuracy _6.2_ Resolution by strict propriety _6.3_ Range of applications _7_ Global Scoring Rules _8_ Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the (...) problem of measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. (shrink)

Analytical study of 'Pramāṇa' in Mīmāṃsā philosophy in the light of Śāstradīpikā by Pārthasārathimiśra, active 11th century.

Analytical study of logic (Pramāṇa) in Mimamsa school of Hindu philosophy; includes text of Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.

On various principles of economics in an Islamic society.

Study on the Mimamsa school, as expounded by Jaimini, in Hindu philosophy.

Collection of five works of a Sanskrit author, on Jain philosophy.

Festschrift honoring Maṇḍana Miśra, b. 1929, Sanskrit philosopher; comprises articles chiefly on Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy.

On the life and works of Maṇḍanamiśra, ancient Hindu philosopher.

Lectures by a Jain religious leader on Rahasyapūrṇa ciṭṭhī by Ṭodaramala, 1740-1766, and Paramārtha vacanikā and Upādānanimittanī ciṭṭhī by Banārasīdāsa, 1586-1641?, works on Jaina philosophy.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 304-319, June 2022.

The paper investigates some mechanisms of thought-experimenting, and explores the role of perspective taking, in particular of mental simulation, in political thought-experiments, focusing for the most part on contractualist ones. It thus brings together two blossoming traditions: the study of perspective taking and methodology of thought-experiments. How do contractualist thought-experiments work? Our moderately inflationist mental modelling proposal is that they mobilize our imaginative capacity for perspective taking, most probably perspective taking through simulation. The framework suggests the answers to questions that (...) are often raised for other kinds of thought-experiments as well, concerning their source of data, heuristic superiority to deduction, experiential, qualitative character and ease in eliminating alternatives. In the case of contractualist political thought-experiments, the data come from perspective taking and the capacity to simulate. Mental simulation is way more accessible to subjects than abstract political reasoning from principles and facts. There is a new experience for the subject, the one of simulating. Simulation normally is quick and effortless; the simulator does not go through alternatives, but is constrained in an unconscious way. We distinguish two kinds of political thought-experiments and two manners of imagining political arrangements, building third-person mental models, and fi rst-person perspective taking. The two mechanisms, the fi rst of inductive model building, the second for simulation, and their combination(s), exhaust the range of cognitive mechanism underlying political thought-experimenting. (shrink)

Suhrawardī, Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash, 1152 or 1153-1191 -Criticism and interpretation ; Bābā Afz̤al, active 13th century -Criticism and interpretation ; ʻAṭṭār, Farīd al-Dīn, d. ca. 1230 -Criticism and interpretation.

Contributed articles on dimensions of applied philosophy; felicitation volume in honor of Hr̥daya Nārāyaṇa Miśra, author and Indian philosopher; includes selected works of honouree.