GONÇALVES, Delmo. O neopentecostalimo da IURD: Emergência ético-religiosa. Dissertação (Mestrado) 2013. 99p. - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

O ponto de partida do presente artigo consiste na afirmação de que as religiões originárias do Próximo Oriente - Judaísmo, Cristianismo, e Islamismo - contêm em si mesmas inconsistências práticas e teóricas. Mais ainda, o autor afirma que estas religiões estão em contradição umas com as outras no que diz respeito a aspectos teológicos essenciais, para além de que entre elas existe um passado de guerra e de conflito. Ora estas são precisamente as razões pelas quais o autor considera que (...) a credibilidade epistemológica e moral destas religiões foi dramaticamente afectada. Daí o principal objectivo do artigo: contribuir para o esclarecimento do modo como Filosofia e Teologia podem cooperar entre si em ordem a uma mitigação destas deficiências. Nesse sentido, segundo o autor, uma e outra devem abraçar a possibilidade de demonstrar epistemologicamente que os conteúdos da revelação do ponto de vista da razão não são nem demonstráveis nem refutáveis, pois esses conteúdos não são proposições científicas acerca de eventos e processos interiores ao mundo, mas apenas a expressão de uma atitude religiosa em relação ao mundo no seu todo (e em relação a Deus). Nessa medida, diz o autor, nada justifica que atitudes religiosas de fé e de amor sejam caracterizadas como 'irracionais', antes a elas se devendo aplicar a designação de 'a-racional' ou simplesmente de 'transracional. Mais ainda, a Filosofia e a Teologia estão em posição de mostrar de que modo atitudes religiosas fundamentais estão construídas umas sobre as outras. Com efeito, básica em todas as formas de religião é uma atitude em relação ao mundo considerado como um todo, tal como se pode encontrar, por exemplo, no Taoismo ou no Zen-Budismo, de modo que aqui não se encontra qualquer forma de crença numa divindade transcendente; ora é precisamente esta atitude que o autor do artigo designa por 'Religiosidade A'. Como 'Religiosidade B', por outro lado, designa o autor toda a atitude religiosa de fundo que transcende o mundo presente e nos remete para a existência de um Deus único e da sua Revelação, tal como é o caso com o Judaísmo, o Cristianismo, e o Islamismo. Aqui, a tarefa consiste sobretudo em clarificar de forma lógica e conceptual a possibilidade de uma auto-revelação divina bem como da sua aceitabilidade nos termos de uma crença humanamente constituída. Finalmente, o artigo refere também aquela que o autor considera ser a 'Religiosidade C', expressão esta que simplesmente denota aquela atitude em que, com base nas premissas presentes nas formas A e B de religiosidade, somos especificamente remetidos para á Revelação cristã, ou seja, para a experiência nos termos da qual se professa a encarnação de Deus em Jesus de Nazaré e se afirma a sua condição de ser expressão do amor incondicional de Deus para com todos os seres humanos. Na verdade, a natureza incondicional deste amor apresenta-se como um escândalo moral diante da auto-compreensão ética da humanidade. Consequentemente, a incompreensibiliâade deste amor não pode ser senão objecto da revelação divina e da pura fé, únicos modos possíveis de ele se transformar numa possível justificação 'moral' dos seres humanos. /// Starting-point of this article is the fact that the religions originated from the Near East - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - do contain in themselves theoretical and practical inconsistencies. Moreover, they contradict each other in essential theological regards, and they made war upon each other in the past. For these reasons, their epistemological and moral credibility has been dramatically diminished. In this context, the article aims at showing how philosophy and theology might be able to work together in alleviating these deficits. First, they may demonstrate epistemologically that the contents of revelation are neither rationally demonstrable nor refutable because they are not scientific statements upon events and processes within the world but the expression of a religious attitude towards the world as a whole (and towards God). Therefore, such attitudes as religious faith and love shouldn't be designated 'irrational', but rather as arational' or, 'transrational'. Furthermore, philosophy and theology are able to show in what manner fundamental religious attitudes are built upon another: Basic for all higher forms of religion is an attitude towards the world as a whole – as one can find for instance in Daoism or Zen-Buddhism – where there is not yet any belief in a transcendent deity; that attitude is called 'Religiosity A'. So called 'Religiosity B' is a fundamental attitude which transcends this world and refers to a sole God and his revelation as can be found among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Here, the possibility of divine self-revelation and of its acceptability by human faith has to be clarified logically and conceptually. Finally, 'Religiosity C denotes that attitude which, on the premises of those Religiosities A and B, refers to the specifically Christian revelation which confesses the incarnation of God in Jesus and presents him as the expression of God's unconditional love to all human beings. The unconditionality of this love seems to be a moral scandal to human moral understanding. Therefore, this unconceivable love has to be object of divine revelation and of pure faith so that it might be the basis of all possible 'moral' justification of humankind. (shrink)

O enfoque principal deste artigo é a relação da ética com a vivência e a prática religiosas. A presença de uma ética não se restringe ao vasto campo da tradição semítica ou religiões proféticas, mas se entende também às raízes da religiosidade mística e sapiencial. O texto tem como um dos principais objetivos aprofundar a compreensão dessa relação, seja nos códigos e normas das diversas religiões, como também na prática religiosa das comunidades. A ética ocupa um lugar (...) fundamental como ciência do ethos. Fazem parte ainda desse estudo algumas distinções terminológicas e semânticas dos termos ética e moral. Dentro do universo religioso, o lugar fundamental da ética será pesquisado através da racionalidade dos valores morais das principais religiões do planeta. Palavras-chave: Filosofia; Ética; Moral; Religião; Antropologia. ABSTRACT This article focuses on the relation between ethics and religious practice and experience. The presence of ethics is not restricted to the wide scope of Semitic tradition or prophetic religions, but reaches the roots of mystical and sapient religiosity. The text aims at understanding that relation in depth, in what concerns the codes and norms of various religions, as well as the religious practice of communities. Ethics plays a fundamental role as a science of ethos. The article also comprises some terminological and semantic distinctions between the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’. Within the religious universe, the fundamental place of ethics is investigated through the rationality of moral values of the main world religions. Key words: Philosophy; Ethics; Morals; Religion; Anthropology. (shrink)

A ascensão das denominações pentecostais no mercado formal da religiosidade brasileira simboliza uma verdadeira quebra de paradigmas. Da marginalidade, do estigma de “seita” que caracteriza este segmento, passaram a ocupar um plano privilegiado no campo econômico e espiritual. Essa exponencial visibilidade social em detrimento de outras denominações religiosas, sobretudo da católica, baliza o marco contextual dessa pesquisa. Entremeio a uma inusitada percepção espiritual da pós-modernidade, ou simplesmente um mega projeto de marketing, o fato é que os neopentecostais ocupam uma posição (...) de destaque no mercado religioso brasileiro. As novas possibilidades de percepção do sagrado são corolários do espaço urbano. Verdadeira profusão de entendimento e amplitude da realidade faz das concepções explicativas vinculadas ao tradicionalismo religioso uma leitura romântica e inverossímil. Porém, nesse mesmo espaço, enquanto uma minoria declara-se sem religião, uma multidão de pessoas lota os templos pentecostais. Em boa medida, o espaço exerce uma pressão no direcionamento das escolhas individuais, entretanto são as condições socioeconômicas que acabam por representar um dos fatores mais significativos desse processo. Palavras-chave: história, sociologia, religiãoThe ascension of Pentecostals denominations in the formal market of Brazilian religiosity symbolizes a real breach of paradigms. From marginality or from the stigma of “sect” that characterizes this segment, they proceeded to occupy a privileged plan in economic and spiritual field. This exponencial social visibility in detriment of other religious denominations, especially the Catholic, guides the contextual landmark of this research. In the middle of an unusual spiritual perception of post modernity, or simply a mega marketing project, the fact is that the neopentecostals occupy a position of prominence in Brazilian religious market. The new possibilities of perception of the sacred are corollaries of urban space. True profusion of understanding and breadth of reality makes the explanatory concepts related to religious traditionalism into a romantic and improbable reading. However, in the same space, while a minority declares itself as no religion, a crowd of people fills the Pentecostal churches. Largely, the space exerts a pressure on the direction of individual choices, but the socioeconomic conditions turns out to be one of the most significant factors in this process. Key words : history, sociology, religion. (shrink)

My paper addresses the notion of moral responsibility in religious ethics. I begin with the outline of the doctrine of moral heteronomy. The scripture stories of the Tables of the Laws and the Holy Covenant provide the general pattern for heteronomic ethics. My claim is that heteronomic ethics transfers the responsibility for the action A an agent x is performing from x to the normative system commanding x to perform A. I then picture the architecture of the normative system of (...) the Decalogue (System D) and I work out criteria for the completeness and consistency of the system. In the next section I make the case for the actual incompleteness and inconsistency of D. As a consequence, an agent subject to the authority of D can not rule his moral conduct by the norms in D. Therefore, the acceptance of D transfers the moral responsibility for the actions by x from x to D, but D does not provide a complete and consistent system of norms to rule x's conduct. In the final section of the paper I briefly present the way religious ethics deals with this problem, by offering an alternative approach to the notion of moral responsibility. (shrink)

A proposta deste artigo é a de buscar entender as formas de como a Igreja Católica procurou adentrar nas bases psicológicas dos cristãos por meio da Constituição Pastoral Gaudium et Spes em seu Capítulo I intitulado “A promoção da dignidade do matrimônio e da família”. A Instituição insistiu no argumento segundo o qual a união entre homem e mulher constitui um sacramento essencial à família, à sociedade, à moralidade, à boa conduta, à ética e, por fim, à salvação da (...) alma. Pode-se vislumbrar, na construção de tal argumento, um amplo uso de “jogos psicológicos”, sustentados na concepção que buscava transformar o matrimônio em uma macro-política cotidiana da moral, a qual tinha por fim convencer e, por conseguinte, ligar homens e mulheres por meio da idéia da indissolubilidade do matrimônio. O aparato teórico da aqui chamada macro-política cotidiana da moral permite compreender como a Igreja Católica jamais esteve alheia às mudanças que se operavam em meados do século XX. Palavras-Chave: Matrimônio. Família. Igreja Católica. Usos Psicológicos.This article aims to understand the ways used by the Catholic Church in order to enter in the psychological foundations of Christians through the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes in Chapter I entitled “The promotion of the dignity of marriage and the family”. The institution insisted on the argument that the union between man and woman is an essential sacrament to the family, society, morality, good conduct, ethics and, finally, to the salvation of the soul. One can envision, in the construction of such an argument, an extensive use of “mind games”, supported the concept that sought to transform marriage in a macro-politics of everyday morality, which was intended to convince and therefore call men and women through the idea of the indissolubility of marriage. The theoretical apparatus here called the macro-politics of everyday morality allows us to understand how the Catholic Church has never been alien to the changes which were taking place in the mid-twentieth century. Keywords : Marriage. Family. Catholic Church. Psychological Uses. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta apontamentos sobre “marketing de guerra santa ” , o planejamento estratégico de gerenciamento de mercado religioso aplicado por algumas das igrejas cristãs da contemporaneidade. Vale-se de reflexões a partir de observação participante e de consulta a bibliografia especializada. Apontam-se algumas das formas com as quais essas igrejas se midiatizam e se inserem num contexto de espetacularização e mercadorização próprios da sociedade do tempo presente e imediato. O mercado religioso no qual se inserem as agências que praticam este (...) tipo de marketing passa por contextos de adequação ao capital simbólico e ao arcabouço cultural dos fiéis, sendo possível identificar o investimento ideológico e econômico na fabricação e veiculação de suas estratégias, discursos e mercadorias. O objetivo é o de perceber algumas das maneiras com as quais firmas religiosas (tomando como maior exemplo as igrejas neopentecostais) veiculam as mercadorias que produzem ou se apropriam, e os discursos que reverberam, relacionando-os a uma cultura de massa e a uma sociedade espetacular; fomentando a discussão sobre como tais igrejas e outros segmentos religiosos aplicam o marketing de guerra santa para melhor posicionarem sua marca no mercado e conquistarem mais fiéis. Palavras-chave : Marketing de guerra santa. Neopentecostalismo. Mídia. Mercado. Espetáculo da fé.This article presents some notes on Jesus´ marketing, strategic planning of management of religious market applied by some of contemporary Christian churches. For this purpose, the reflections from participant observation and literature on the subject are validated. Some of the ways these churches mediate themselves and are part of a context of spectacle and commoditization are also pointed out. The religious market has adequate to the symbolic capital and to the cultural framework of the participants of the churches. Because of that it is possible to identify the ideological and economic investment in the manufacturing and delivery of their strategies, discourses and products. This article aims to highlight some of the ways in which neo-Pentecostal churches convey the goods they produce and the speeches that reflect them, relating them to a mass culture and a society of the spectacle. Finally, the article wants to encourage the debate on the ways these churches apply the marketing of Jesus in order to co-opt their members and flatten their units Keywords : Holy War’s marketing. Neopentecostalism. Media. Market. Show of faith. (shrink)

Resumo: Ludwig Wittgenstein tentou desenvolver, desde 1929, uma abordagem à filosofia da lógica em termos de escalas de medição. Embora mostrasse grande sensibilidade a diversos tipos de escalas, Wittgenstein não estava bem posicionado para fazer seu projeto render frutos, porque a teoria das medidas não começou a fazer avanços significativos antes do final da década de 1940, e continuou desfrutando de um progresso relevante, até os anos 80. Não obstante, nas suas obras e palestras dos anos 30, Wittgenstein fez diversas (...) tentativas de entender a lógica, ou a “gramática” da linguagem religiosa e ética relativa à medição. Este artigo é uma tentativa de desenvolver algumas dessas ideias que ocorreram a Wittgenstein, na sua fase intermediária, dentro do contexto da evolução posterior da teoria da medição. Especificamente, defende-se que as linguagens religiosa e ética são formas extremas de medição, não empíricas nem fatuais. Elas representam o caso-limite da medição.: Ludwig Wittgenstein attempted to develop an approach to the philosophy of logic in terms of measurement scales. While he showed great sensitivity to different kinds of scaling, Wittgenstein was not in a good position to bring this project to fruition; measurement theory did not begin to develop significantly until the late 1940s, and only made pertinent advances as late as the 1980s. However, in writings and lectures from the 1930s, Wittgenstein made a number of attempts to understand the logic, or “grammar”, of religious and ethical language in relation to measurement. This article is an attempt to develop some of these nascent ideas in intermediate Wittgenstein in terms of later developments in measurement theory. Specifically, it is argued that religious and ethical language are extreme forms of non-empirical and non-factual forms of measurement; they represent the limit-case of measurement. (shrink)

A proposta principal dese livro é fazer uma tessitura entre ética, arte e imaginário, elementos primordiais que se entrelaçam na relação com a sagrado e com as experiências religiosas. A obra é fruto de algumas pesquisas decorrentes do grupo Imagem, Arte, Ética e Sociedade, coordenado pela Profa. Dra. Kátia Mendonça e pelo Prof. Dr. Jones Gomes, em parceria entre as Universidade do Estado do Pará, Federal do Pará e Metodista de São Paulo por meio do Programa de Cooperação Acadêmica - (...) PROCAD. (shrink)

The plurality of discussions and the diversity with which the main ethical questions were approached permit the separation of relative theories elaborated in Islam into three distinct dimentions: religious morality, theological ethics and philosophical ethics. Religious morality was elaborated based exclusively on the precepts of the Koran, and on the teachings of the Tradition (Hadīth). This morality establishes the fundamentals to determine: a) the nature of what is correct, and of what is iniquous; b) that which is within the law (...) and divine power’s reach; c) the liberty, and the moral responsibility of each one. Among the thinkers who elaborated a theological ethic founded on the koranic precepts, and on the Tradition (Hadīth), making use of theological concepts, philosophical categories and, at times, inspirations coming from Sufism, Al-Ghazālī stands out as the most respected theologian of sunni Islam. Among the philosophers, Al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Avempace and Averroes made ample use of Nicomachean Ethics. As they sought to conciliate the teachings of the Koran, and of the Tradition (Hadīth) with philosophy, these philosophers found in the Aristotelian ethics the appropriate indications to realize the ideal model for human society. Miskawayh also stands out who, although did not elaborate any ethical system based on philosophical norms, proficuously utilized the Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines, and the works of Arab philosophers before him such as Al-Kindī, Al-Rāzī and Al-Fārābī. (shrink)

Procuramos mostrar neste breve artigo que o processo de secularização estudado por Max Weber, levou a religião a adaptar-se num ambiente de livre-escolha, conduzindo os sujeitos a uma escolha na qual o indivíduo, diante de inúmeras possibilidades e necessidades, é capaz de optar por aquela que melhor lhe servir. Apesar de a secularização ter perdido sua hegemonia, ela continua a suscitar calorosas discussões e inúmeros debates entre os pesquisadores do fenômeno religioso, particularmente sobre o pluralismo, as mudanças dos papéis sociais (...) das organizações religiosas, a competição entre agências produtoras de sentido, as novas possibilidades de escolhas. Diante desse quadro, procuramos mostrar que o movimento neopentecostal oferece ao indivíduo inúmeras opções de bens religiosos, provocando com isso o trânsito religioso . Esse trânsito tem feito com que os líderes das igrejas neopentecostais, na tentativa de atrair novos adeptos, produzam com maior intensidade “novos” bens religiosos, assim como busquem fidelizar esses novos membros à sua igreja. Como resultado, percebemos dentro do campo religioso brasileiro uma intensa movimentação de fiéis, bens e igrejas produzindo e consumindo religião para o seu próprio deleite e consumo. Palavras-chave: Neopentecostalismo; Secularização; Trânsito Religioso.The purpose of this paper is to show that the process of secularization studied by Max Weber, led religion to adapt itself in an environment of free choice, leading subjects to a personal choice, where the individual, confronted by innumerous possibilities and necessities, can opt for the one that bests suits him. Although secularization has lost its hegemony, it keeps on inspiring discussions and debates among researchers of religious phenomena, particularly on pluralism, the changes on social roles of religious organizations, the competition among agencies producing meaning, the new possibilities of choices.Given the situation, we demonstrate that the neo-pentecostal offers the individual, various options of religious goods, generating what can be called “religious transit”. This flow of people has caused the leaders of the neo-Pentecostal churches, in search of new followers, to produce with greater intensity “new” religious goods in order to attract more people and make them faithful to their churches. As a result of that, we can perceive in the brazilian religious field an intense flow of believers, religious symbols and churches producing and consuming religion for their own pleasure and consumption. Key words : Pentecostalism; Secularisation; Religious Traffic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Ahmadis: Community, Gender, and Politics in a Muslim Society. By Antonio Gualtieri. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 192. Hardcover $65.00. Paper Cdn $24.95 / U.S. $19.95.American Knees. By Shawn Wong. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005. Pp. xxi + 229. Paper $14.95.The Art of Worldly Wisdom. By Baltasar Gracian and translated by Joseph Jacobs. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. (...) xiii + 114. Paper $5.95.Bashō's Journey: The Literary Prose of Matsuo Bashō. Translated by David Landis Barnhill. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xvii + 191. Hardcover $59.50. Paper $17.95.Bringing the Gods to Mind: Mantra and Ritual in Early Indian Sacrifice. By Laurie L. Patton. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 289. Hardcover $49.95/£32.50.Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. viii + 145. Hardcover $89.95.A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch'ien Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on Science and Confucian Ethics. By Donald J. Munro. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005. Pp. xlv + 158. Hardcover $33.00.Chinese Theories of Reading and Writing: A Route to Hermeneutics and Open Poetics. By Ming Dong Gu. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 334. Hardcover $85.00.A Dictionary of Cantonese Slang: The Language of Hong Kong Movies, Street Gangs, and City Life. By Christopher Hutton and Kingsley Bolton. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. xxiv + 492. Paper $28.00.Ghazālī and the Poetics of Imagination. By Ebrahim Moosa. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Pp. xiii + 349. Hardcover $59.95. Paper $22.50.Going Forth: Visions of Buddhist Vinaya. Edited by William M. Bodiford. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. x + 317. Hardcover $48.00.The Harem: Inside the Grand Seraglio of the Turkish Sultans. By N. M. Penzer. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. 277. Paper $14.95.Ideals of the East: The Spirit of Japanese Art. By Kakuzo Okakura. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. xiv + 106. Paper $5.95. [End Page 365]An Illustrated Chinese Materia Medica. By Jing-Nuan Wu. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 706. Price not given.Jews and Arabs: A Concise History of Their Social and Cultural Relations. By S. D. Goitein. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. xv + 263. Paper $12.95.The Logic of Nothingness: A Study of Nishida Kitarō. By Robert J. J. Wargo. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp xi + 241. Paper $25.00.The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. By Raghavan N. Iyer. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 449. Paper Rs 520.00.Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. By T. K. Seung. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. Pp. xxviii + 370. Hardcover $83.00. Paper $27.95.Of Guilds, Companies, Corporations, and Governance: A Conceptual Sketch. By Leonardo R. Silos. Makati City, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management, 2005. Pp. xvi + 238. Price not given.The Path to Rome. By Hilaire Belloc. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005. Pp. ix + 251. Paper $12.95.The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgātā : A Study based on the Evaluation of the Commentaries of Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. By S. M. Srinivasa Chari. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2005. Pp. xxvi + 294. Hardcover Rs 575.00.The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore. By Kalyan Sen Gupta. Burlington, VT: Ash-gate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. ix + 103. Hardcover $79.95.The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse. By Thomas Michael. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 170. Hardcover $60.00. Paper $21.95.Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume. Edited by Shoun Hino and Toshihiro Wada. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 2004. Pp. xx + 903. Hardcover Rs. 1800.The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism. By Randall Studstill. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005. Pp. xii + 304. Hardcover @89/$127.00.Writing the World: On Globalization. Edited by David... (shrink)

The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...) threads of moral discourse, made in turn of other interwoven threads, including transmission of shared codes, appeals to reform of prevailing custom, rational argument about the justification of some precept on the basis of some shared general teaching or principle, and rational argument about the ultimate basis for principles and justification of authoritative teaching. That is, the approach adopted to the reading of ethical texts depends on a firm belief in the fact that philosophers hardly created any ethical doctrine out of nothing. The main point this book tries to highlight is how different philosophical theories emerged and followed each other as a result of attempts at accounting for what was going on in the world of moral traditions. Changes were propelled by controversies between different schools, and highly abstract arguments were the unintended effects of moves made by controversialists forced to transform (and occasionally to turn upside down) their own doctrines in order to face the challenge posed by other arguments. This is the reason why the book examines not only texts that already enjoy pride of place in the history of philosophy (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), but also other texts usually treated in the histories of religions (the Bible, the Talmud, the Quran), and others considered to be much less philosophical (Plutarchus, Pufendorf). -/- 1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism. Two different traditions of morality in VI-V century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates answer to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy. Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistence in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The chapter illustrates then the relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater familias, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexis, or ‘disposition’. Prudence, or better practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with bouleusis or deliberation is examined, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a way of life. The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. -/- 4. Epicurus and ethics as self-care. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of a science of well-being aiming, more than at pleasure as in the popular view, at reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. Cicero is treated, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is chosen as the best example of what the Stoic tradition could yield, an art of living based on sophisticated introspection, in turn aimed at making a kind of cognitive therapy possible, dismantling obnoxious passions at their root by systematically correcting false representations. -/- 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism. A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torā (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Leviticus is stressed as the turning point when emphasis mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, is combined with the legal tradition, yielding the change in sensibility of the Second Temple time. Philo of Alexandria is described as one of the three leading figures – together with Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Yeshua – at the apex the emergence of the mentioned new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, two eventually identical precepts whose meaning is arguably more sober and sensible than the long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine has made us believe and no novelty vis-à-vis so-called Ancient-Testament teachings. -/- 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism. The first section examines the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirqé Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deòt, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexeis and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was ‘the tool by which the world was built’; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous , but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure Judaism. The third section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manichaeism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. The last section summarizes the turbulent history of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and a few topics from the Stoic-Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua had been influenced by cynic preachers, is a proof of the necessity felt by Christian preachers to translate the original ‘Christian’ teaching into a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where an early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 8. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism. The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. Al-Farabi wrote an enjoyable remake of the Platonic Republic, arguing that the citizen’s virtues were the basis on which the political building needs to rest. The secular lawgiver is enlightened by the light of reason in his everyday practice of governance, but room is made for the Prophet as the voice of revealed truth that confirms and completes the rational truth that philosophy may afford. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 9. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelian ethics. The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place a first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed just less striking traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Torah and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirké Avot could be translated. -/- 10. Thomas Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics. In the first section the fresh start is described of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium. In a first phase, Anselm and Peter Abelard built on a Platonic and Augustinian legacy. In this phase. remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. Aquinas’s ethics is a theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract a self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave "pure nature" incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones, such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too demanding and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Ia-IIae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas could reduce the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethic, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is not ethical ‘absolutism’, as both traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularist enemies of dogmatic morality tend to believe. It is instead an ethic of prudential judgment. Exceptions to this approach – or better results of logical fallacies – are such claims as the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts", claims that simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences Thomas did not live long enough to draw or was not consistent enough to dare to draw. -/- 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry. The first topic illustrated is the discussion about the notion of pura natura, namely the human condition after the original sin and before divine revelation. The core notion was already there in Aquinas but was later developed by Caietanus (Thomas de Vio) with a number of interesting implications: firstly a view of human nature as such much more positive than Augustine’s and his followers’ view, including both Calvinists and Jansenists; secondly, the implication that the philosopher’s morality, as opposed to the Christian’s morality, is a quite respectable kind of morality; thirdly, that theocracy and prosecution of the unfaithful lacked justification, with more far-fetching consequences than Aquinas himself had dared to draw. The second topic is casuistry, a new name for a comparatively older way of thinking, which was already there in late Stoicism and Cicero as well as in the Talmudic literature. This is an approach aimed at yielding probable enough solutions for doubtful cases even in absence of completely safe staring points. The genre developed from medieval reference books for confessors and became by the sixteenth-century a sophisticated tool-box for dealing with various fields of applied ethics. Francisco Vitoria, the main authority of Baroque Scholasticism, was a controversial figure, among the proponents of the new discipline of casuistry and a consistent proponent of more separation between the religious and the civil authority, stricter limits to the legitimacy of war, innate rights of non-Christian nations in the New World based on the notion of pura natura, providing a standard of ‘natural’ goodness, previous to revelation, on which the Indian nations were judged to live in a naturally good condition, provided with the institutions of family, justice, and religion had accordingly a right to full respect by Christian sovereigns. Bartolomé de Las Casas, arguing along similar lines, was the leader of a historical battle in defence of the rights of the Indios. -/- 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living. A short description of one of the Renaissance Phyrronism, one of the classical philosophies revived in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Montaigne combines the sceptical epistemology with an understanding of ethics – indeed of philosophy as a whole – in terms of an art of living inspired by two basic ideas, sagesse, that is, practical wisdom as the only kind of rationality available after theology, science, and tradition have declared bankrupt, and an aesthetic ideal of self-transformation through the art of writing and introspection. -/- 13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism. The chapter illustrates first the vicissitudes of Augustinianism newly born after the late medieval triumph of Thomist Aristotelianism in the alternative Protestant and Catholic versions processed by the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Then it illustrates the doctrines of Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal’s best disciple, on the impossibility of introspection, on the ubiquity of self-deception, on the incurably evil character of the passion of love, and on the two moralities, the one of the man of the world, the morality of honesty which is indispensable for granting peace and order but devoid of any true value for eternal salvation, since the same external behaviour may be prompted by opposite motivations, and the morality of charity, the only true one but also useless to society. The third topic is Pierre Malebranche’s view of self-deception as a ubiquitous phenomenon accounting for human action and responsibility and his reformulated theory of self-love, no less ubiquitous than for Nicole and yet not as incurably evil, given the distinction between morally indifferent and even necessary amour de soi and vicious amour proper, a distinction on which the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political theory rests. -/- 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality. The chapter is dedicated to the discovery of the idea of a ‘new moral science’. Hugo Grotius is discussed first highlighting the real character of his project, much closer to the Thomist idea of a natural law accessible to non-corrupted human reason when human beings are living in a state of pura natura. Then Hobbes’s combination of scepticism, voluntarism, and conventionalism is described and both the continuity with Grotius’s new science, in the search for non-revealed rational morality, and the break with him, in the adoption of voluntarism and refusal of an intellectualist view of natural law, are illustrated. Pufendorf’s work is illustrated as a synthesis of the two previous attempts and the – up to Schneewind underestimated – paradigmatic example of the new science of morality. -/- 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism. The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number possible sets of laws on a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world. 16. Richard Price and intuitionism. The chapter describes first the doctrines of the Cambridge Platonists, an example of hyper-rationalist reaction to Calvinism. Secondly it describes the sophisticated and universally ignored – from Sidgwick to Anscombe –version of what was later labelled ‘ethical intuitionism’ – showing how it escapes familiar objections and misrepresentations of intuitionism – from Mill to Rawls – in grounding its argument on transcendental arguments while carefully avoiding recourse to introspection and psychological evidence, which has been taken as a too easy target by critics of intuitionism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses Whewell’s ‘philosophy of morality’, as opposed to ‘systematic morality’, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such rational truths but requires consideration of the ongoing dialectics between idea and fact in historically given moralities. Whewell’s intuitionism turns out closer to Kantian ethics than commentators have made us believe until now, and quite different from what Sidgwick meant by intuitionism. -/- 17. Adam Smith and the morality of role-switch. The chapter describes first, Hutcheson’s attempt at basing the ‘new science’ of natural law on different bedrock than Pufendorf and the English Platonists, namely a moral sense, a faculty whose existence is assumed to be proved on an empirical basis. The second step is a reconstruction of Hume’s rejoinder in terms of a new science of man including morality on an ‘experimental’ basis, that is, a ‘Newtonian’ hypothetical-deductive approach, distinguished from Hutcheson’s allegedly uncritical descriptive approach to human nature. The third step is a reconstruction of Adam Smith theory of morality understood as emerging from a spontaneous interplay of exchanges of situations (the most basic meaning of the word ‘sympathy’ as construed by this author). -/- 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. The Enlightenment spirit that suggested the idea of a new morality, free from religion, is illustrated. The notion of utility is illustrated as well as the subsequent formulations of the principle of utility. The idea of felicific calculus is discussed, showing how its inner difficulties prompted several reformulations of the principle of utility in order to avoid undesirable implications of proposed formulations. The role of the thesis of spontaneous convergence between interest and duty is discussed, showing how it left numberless questions open, and the distinction between the virtues of prudence, justice and beneficence is described as a way out of the deadlocks of classical utilitarianism. After Bentham, Mill’s reformed utilitarianism is reconstructed, showing how it is a kind of mixed system – as closer to common sense as it gives up Bentham’s claims to consistency and simplicity – resulting as unintended consequences from the controversies in which Mill was too keen to engage. The hidden agenda of the controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image of the battle between Prejudice and Reason, is described, showing how both competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. -/- 19. Immanuel Kant, practical reason and judgment. The chapter argues that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an ‘empirical moral philosophy’ or moral anthropology including treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life. -/- 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the critique of abstract universalism. The chapter describes first the Romantic movement and the implications some of its concerns, rescuing passions, community, tradition, the individual as the bearer of a unique destiny, and the longing for organic unity between the individual, mankind and nature. Hegel’s contribution is discussed then, highlighting how, on the one hand, he shared a number of these concerns and on the other he had more rationalist leanings. The notion of morality is the pivotal point of the reconstruction, highlighting how Hegel construes this notion as a key to his own diagnosis of the malaise of modernity – the separation of individual and Gemeinschaft – and how his attack on Kant turns around this very idea. -/- 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment. The chapter illustrates first the idea of deconstruction of the back-world of values. Nietzsche claims to be legitimate heir of the French moralists, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in so far as he allegedly carries out to its deepest implications their discovery of what lies behind traditional naïve belief in the existence of an objective realm of values just waiting for description by the philosopher. The two exemplars form which genealogy draws inspiration are the classical philologist’s historical reconstructions of lost meanings and the chemist’s decomposition of elements. Then the genealogy of the notions of good and evil carried out in the first dissertation of Genealogy of morals is illustrated with its paradoxical conclusion that will to power is in fact the only ‘genuine’ kind of goodness. The third point illustrated is the dialectic of ascetism and self-realization with its ambiguous outcome. The suggested interpretation of such outcome is that Nietzsche’s normative ethics is a kind of virtue ethics taking an aesthetic ideal as a normative standard -/- 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism. The chapter discusses the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences to reach, also in ethics, the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of the intuitionist philosophers, was what was worth considering as the expression of intuitionist ethics. In spite of a naïve positivist starting-point, Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus, Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a “new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. Then it reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, should be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. -/- 23. Edmund Husserl and the a-priori of action. The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl’s project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the a priori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy carried out in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach’s theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that basically sketches the very ideas ‘discovered’ later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section is dedicated to Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of ‘values’ – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler who claimed to Husserl’s legitimate heirs. -/- 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism. The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of ‘good’, its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with ‘emotive’ meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell’s ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of a rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson’s theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. Last of all, the discussion from the Forties about Hume’s law is described, mentioning Karl Popper’s argument and Richard Hare’s early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics. The chapter discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. A short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current is given trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot’s and Peter Geach’s critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre’s grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism. The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick’s and Moore’s fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine definitely refuted. A glimpse at this uproarious process is given through two examples. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of Utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This results in preference utilitarianism combined with a ‘Kantian’ version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare’s two-level preference utilitarianism where act utilitarianism plays the function of eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of action-guiding practical device. -/- 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy. The post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named ‘Rehabilitation of practical philosophy’ is described. Among the actors of such rehabilitation there were a few of Heidegger’s most brilliant disciples, and Hans-Georg Gadamer is chosen as a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle’s lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger’s lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the central role of the notion of phronesis. -/- 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics. Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This started, instead than the rehabilitation of prudence, with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. An examination of his argument is some detail is offered, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas’s elaboration on Apel’s theory. -/- 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics. Rawls’s distinction between a “political” and a “metaphysical” approach to one central part of ethical theory, namely the theory of justice, is interpreted as a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and neo-casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter, namely that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls’ view never will be close – on the basic criteria for judgment. -/- 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics. The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin’s new casuistry. -/- . (shrink)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed task was (...) that of describing the human condition as consisting of choices, as unavoidable as arbitrary, without any attempt at providing criteria for making such choices. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the heir of ethics was a philosophy of morality, that is, an analysis of the language of morality that intended to clarify valuations without trying to justify them. 1958 was the year of the normative turn that led to the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, a turn followed by decades of controversies between distinct kinds of normative ethics: utilitarian, Kantian, virtue ethics. While the controversy was raging, a quiet revolution took place, that of applied ethics which surprisingly dissolved the controversy's very subject matter by providing methods for making convergence possible on intermediate principles even when no agreement was available about first principles. The normative turn and the revolution of applied ethics have led us, at the turn of the century, to a goal that was quite far from the starting point. Instead of scepticism and relativism that was the fashion at the beginning of the century, at the beginning of the third millennium impartial and universal moral arguments seem to hold the spot being supported, if not by a final rational foundation, at least by reasonableness, the most precious legacy of the Enlightenment. -/- ● TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- ● I Anglo-Saxon philosophy: naturalism 1. Dewey beyond evolutionism and utilitarianism 2. Dewey and anti-essentialist moral epistemology 3. Dewey and naturalist moral ontology 4. Dewey and normative ethics of conduct and function 5. Perry and semantic naturalism -/- ● II Anglo-Saxon philosophy: ideal utilitarianism and neo-intuitionism 1. Moore's critique of utilitarian empiricism 2. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy 3. Moore on the nature of intrinsic value 4. Moore on ideal utilitarianism 5. Prichard on the priority of the right over the good 6. Ross's coherentist moral epistemology 7. Ross's moral ontology: realism, pluralism, and non-naturalism 8. Ross's normative ethics of prima facie duties -/- The chapter reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore's early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. It stresses the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. It argues that PE is more a patchwork of somewhat diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. -/- ●III Anglo-Saxon philosophy: non-cognitivism 1. The Scandinavian School, the Vienna circle and proto-emotivism 2. Wittgenstein and the ineffability of ethics 3. Russell's and Ayer's radical emotivism 4. Stevenson and moderate emotivism 5. Stevenson and the pragmatics of moral language 6. Stevenson and the methods for solving ethical disagreement 7. Hare and prescriptivism The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of 'good', its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with 'emotive' meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell's ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson's theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. A section reconstructs the discussion from the Forties about Hume's law, mentioning Karl Popper's argument and Richard Hare's early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- ●IV Anglo-Saxon philosophy: critics of non-cognitivism 1. Neo-naturalism and its objections to the naturalistic fallacy argument 2. Objections to Hume's law 3. Clarence Lewis and the pragmatic contradiction 4. Toulmin and the good reasons approach 5. Baier and moral reasons 5. Baier, social moralities and the absolute morality 6. Baier and the moral point of view 7. Baier and the contents of absolute ethics -/- ● V Continental philosophy: the philosophy of values 1. Max Weber and the polytheism of values 2. Phenomenology against psychologism and rationalism 3. Reinach and the theory of social acts 4. Scheler and the material ethics of values 5. Hartmann and the ontology of values 6. Plessner, Gehlen and the Philosophische Anthropologie -/- The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl's project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the apriori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy conducted in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach's theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that sketches the ideas 'discovered' later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section discusses Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of 'values' – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler, who claimed to be Husserl's legitimate heirs. -/- ● VI Continental philosophy: the critics of the philosophy of values 1. Freud, the Superego and Civilization 2. Heidegger on original ethos against ethics 3. Sartre and de Beauvoir on authenticity and ambiguity 4. Adorno and Horkheimer on emancipation and immoralism -/- ●VII Post-liberal theologians and religious thinkers 1. Barth on the autonomy of faith from ethics 2. Developments of Reformed moral theology after Barth 3. Bonhoeffer on the concrete divine command and ethics of penultimate realities 4. Developments of Reformed and Catholic moral theology after world war II 5. Baeck and the transformation of liberal Judaism 6. Rosenzweig against liberal Judaism 7. Buber and religion as the vital lymph of morality 8. Heschel and Judaism as a science of actions -/- The chapter examines the main protagonists of Christian theology and Jewish religious thinking in the twentieth century. It stresses how the main dilemmas of contemporary philosophical ethics lie at the root of the various path of inquiry taken by these thinkers. -/- ● VIII Normative ethics: neo-Utilitarianism 1. The discussion on act and rule utilitarianism 2. Hare on two-tiered preference utilitarianism 3. Harsanyi, Gauthier and rational choice ethics 4. Parfit, utilitarianism and the idea of a person 5. Brandt and indirect conscience utilitarianism -/- The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick's and Moore's fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine refuted. Two examples give the reader a glimpse at this uproarious process. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This transformation results in preference utilitarianism combined with a 'Kantian' version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare's two-level preference utilitarianism, where act utilitarianism plays the function of the eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of an action-guiding practical device. -/- ● IX Normative ethics: neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 1. Hannah Arendt, action and judgement 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer and phronesis 3. Alasdair MacIntyre on practices, virtues, and traditions 5. Stuart Hampshire on deliberation 6. Bernard Williams and moral complexity 7. Feminist ethics -/- Sect 1 reconstructs the post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named 'Rehabilitation of practical philosophy' is described. Heidegger's most brilliant disciples were the promoters of this Rehabilitation. Hans-Georg Gadamer is a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle's lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger's lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the significant role of the notion of phronesis. Sect 3 discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. It argues that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. The chapter gives a short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot's and Peter Geach's critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre's grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- ● X Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based ethics 1. Dialogical constructivism 2. Apel, Habermas and discourse ethics 3. Gewirth and rights-based ethics 4. Nagel on agent-relative reasons 5. Donagan and persons as ends in themselves Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This current started with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. The chapter offers an examination of his argument in some detail, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas's elaboration on Apel's theory. -/- ● XI The applied ethics renaissance 1. Elisabeth Anscombe on the atom bomb 2. From medical ethics to bioethics 3. Rawls and public ethics 3. Nozick, Dworkin and further developments of public ethics 5. Sen and the revival of economic ethics -/- The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin's new casuistry. The chapter argues that Rawls's distinction between a "political" and a "metaphysical" approach to the theory of justice, one central part of ethical theory, is a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and the new casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter. The idea is that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls' view never will be close – on the essential criteria for judgment. -/- ● XII Fin-de-siècle metaethics 1. Deontic logics 2. Anti-realism 3. External realism 4. Internal realism 5. Kantian constructivism -/- The chapter illustrates the fresh start of meta-ethical discussion in the Eighties and Nineties and the resulting new alignments: metaphysical naturalism, internal realism, anti-realism, and constructivism. (shrink)

Este artigo trata das formas de construção e reelaboração identitárias que ocorrem a partir dos processos de adesões religiosas em curso nos contextos urbanos atuais. Através das narrativas midiáticas e dos depoimentos orais de fiéis que aderiram ao neopentecostalismo, busca-se perceber como ocorrem os trânsitos por entre modalidades religiosas. Neste texto discuto os modos de recepção de uma modalidade de narrativa recorrente nos programas televisivos da Igreja Universal - os testemunhos – destacando a força incorporadora desta modalidade narrativa nas mediações (...) culturais de que se utiliza e os processos de reordenamento simbólico e identitário que esta modalidade narrativa provoca. Noções como identidade-diferença, apropriação e recepção propostas por autores do grupo dos Estudos Culturais são utilizadas para compreender, como, mediante a nova adesão religiosa, fiéis reordenam suas identidades, configurando novos modos de compreensão de si mesmos, dos outros, da divindade e do mundo. A metodologia utilizada decorre das análises propostas pela História Oral sobre narrativas televisivas e os depoimentos orais de fiéis e ex-fiéis neopentecostais. Palavras-chave : Neopentecostalismo; Mídia Evangélica; Narrativas Orais; Identidades.This article deals with the ways of construction and reworking of the identity that occurs from the ongoing religious accession processes on the current urban contexts. Through the media narratives and the oral testimonials of the people who joined the neopentecostalism, the way transits between religious modalities occur has been studied. In this text, I discuss the ways of reception of a recurrent narrative modality on television programs of The Universal Church – the testimonials – highlighting the developing power of this narrative modality on the cultural mediations it makes use of, and the processes of symbolic and identity reordering this modality provokes. Notions as identity-difference, appropriation and reception, proposed by authors of the Cultural Studies group are used to comprehend how, by the new religious accession, people reorder their identities, configuring new ways of comprehension of themselves, of the others, of the divinity and of the world. The methodology that was used comes from analysis proposed by the Oral History about the television narratives and the oral testimonials of people who follow, or do not follow anymore, the neopentecostalism. Keywords : Neo-Pentecostalism; Evangelical Media; Oral Narratives; Identities. (shrink)

This book tells the story of modern ethics, namely the story of a discourse that, after the Renaissance, went through a methodological revolution giving birth to Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s new science of natural law, leaving room for two centuries of explorations of the possible developments and implications of this new paradigm, up to the crisis of the Eighties of the eighteenth century, a crisis that carried a kind of mitosis, the act of birth of both basic paradigms of the two (...) following centuries: Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. The new science of natural law carried a fresh start for ethics, resulting from a mixture of the Old and the New. It was, as suggested by Schneewind, an attempt at rescuing the content of Scholastic and Stoic doctrines on a new methodological basis. The former was the claim of existence of objective and universal moral laws; the latter was the self-aware attempt at justifying a minimal kernel of such laws facing skeptical doubt. What Bentham and Kant did was precisely carrying this strategy further on, even if restructuring it each of them around one out of two alternative basic claims. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of the Enlightenment attacked both not on their alleged failure in carrying out their own projects, but precisely on having adopted Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project. What counter-enlightenment has been unable to spell out is which alternative project could be carried out facing the modern condition of pluralism, while on the contrary, if we takes a closer look at developments in twentieth-century ethics or at on-going discussions on practical issues, we might feel inclined to believe that Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project is as up-to-date as ever. -/- Table of Contents -/- Preface I. Fathers of the Reformation and Schoolmen 1.1. Luther: passive justice and the good deeds; 1.2. Calvin: voluntarism and predestination; 1.3. Baroque Scholasticism; 1.4. Casuistry and Institutiones morales -/- II Neo-Platonists, neo-Stoics, neo-Sceptics 2.1. Aristotelian, neo-Platonic, neo-Epicurean and neo-Cynic Humanists; 2.2. Oeconomica and the art of living; 2.3. Neo-Stoics; 2.4. Neo-Sceptics; 2.5. Moralistic literature -/- III Neo-Augustinians 3.l. The Jansenists on natura lapsa, sufficient grace, pure love; 3.2. Nicole on the impossibility of self-knowledge; 3.3. Nicole on self-love and charity; 3.4. Nicole against civic virtue, for Christian civility; 3.5. Malebranche on general laws and necessary evil; 3.6. Malebranche on Neo-Augustinianism and Platonism. -/- IV Grotius, Pufendorf and the new moral science 4.1. Grotius against Aristotle and the sceptics; 4.2. Mersenne and Gassendi; 4.3. Descartes on ethics as the last branch of philosophy’s tree; 4.4. Hobbes on scepticism and the new moral science; 4.5. Spinoza on the new moral science as a descriptive science;4.6. Locke on voluntarism and probabilism; 4.7. Pufendorf on natural law as an exact science; 4.8. Pufendorf on physical and moral entities; 10. Pufendorf on self-preservation -/- V The empiricist version of the new moral science: from Cumberland to Paley 5.1. Cumberland against Hobbesian voluntarism; 5.2. Cumberland and theological consequentialism; 5.3. Cumberland on universal benevolence and self-love; 5.4. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 5.5. Hutcheson on natural law and moral faculties; 5.6. Gay, Brown, Paley and theological consequentialism. -/- VI The rationalist version of the new moral science: from Cudworth to Price 6.1. The Cambridge Platonists; 6.2. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 6.3. Butler and a third way between voluntarism and scepticism; 6.4. Price and the rational character of moral truths; -/- VII Leibniz’s compromise between the new moral science and Aristotelianism 1.Leibniz against voluntarism; 2.Leibniz against the division between the physical and the moral good; 3.Leibniz on la place d’autrui and theological consequentialism; 4.Thomasius, Wolff, Crusius -/- VIII French eighteenth-century philosophers without the new moral science 8.1. The genealogy of our ideas of virtue and vice; 8.2. Maupertuis and moral arithmetic 8.3. The philosophes and the harmony of interests; 8.4. Rousseau on corruption, self-love, and virtue; 8.5. Sade on the merits of vice -/- IX Experimental moral science: Hume and Adam Smith 9.1. Mandeville’s paradox; 9.2. Hutcheson on the law of nature and moral faculties; 9.3. Hume on experimental moral philosophy and the intermediate principles; 9.4. Hume’s Law; 9.5. Hume on the fellow-feeling; 9.6. Hume on natural and artificial virtues and disinterested pleasure for utility; 9.7. Adam Smith’s anti-realist metaethics; 9.8. Adam Smith on self-deception and the paradox of happiness; 9.9. Adam Smith on sympathy and the impartial spectator; 9.10. Adam Smith on the twofold criterion for moral judgement and its paradox; 9.11. Reid on the refutation of scepticism and the self-evidence of duty -/- X Kantian ethics 10.1. Kantian metaethics: moral epistemology; 10.2. Kantian metaethics: moral ontology; 10.3. Kantian metaethics: moral psychology; 10.4. Kantian normative ethics; 10.5. Kant on the impracticability of applied ethics; 10.6. Kantian moral anthropology; 10.7. Civilisation and moralisation; 10.8. Theology on a moral basis and the origins of evil; 10.9. Fichte and the transformation of theoretical philosophy into practical philosophy XI Bentham and utilitarianism 11.1. Bentham’s linguistic theory; 11.2. Bentham’s moral ontology, psychology, and theory of action; 11.3. The principle of greatest happiness; 11.4. The critique of religious ethics; 11.5. The new morality; 11.6. Interest and duty; 11.7. Virtues; 11.8. Private ethics and legislation -/- XII Followers of the Enlightenment: liberal Judaism and Liberal Theology 12.1. Mendelssohn; 12.2. Salomon Maimon; 12.3. Haskalā and liberal Judaism; 12.4. Liberal Theology. -/- XIII Counter-Enlighteners 13.1.Romanticism and the fulfilment of individuality as the Summum Bonum; 13.2. Hegel on history as the making of liberty; 13.3. Hegel on the unhappy consciousness and the beautiful soul; 13.4. Hegel on Morality and Sittlichkeit; 13.5. Marx on ideology, alienation, and praxis; 13.6. Schopenhauer on compassion; 13.7. Kierkegaard on faith beyond ethics. -/- XIV Followers of the Enlightenment: intuitionists and utilitarian 14.1 Whewell‘s criticism of utilitarianism; 14.2 Whewell on morality and the philosophy of morality; 14.3 Whewell on the Supreme Norm; 14.4 Whewell on the conflict between duties; 14.5 Mill and the proof of the principle of utility; 14.6 Mill’s eudemonistic utilitarianism; 14.7 Mill on rules -/- XV Followers of the Enlightenment: neo-Kantians and positivists 15.1. French spiritualism; 15.2. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.3. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.4. Comte’s positivism and the invention of altruism; 15.5. Social Darwinism; 15.6. Wundt and an ethic of humankind -/- XVI Post-enlighteners: Sidgwick 16.1. Criticism of intuitionism; 16.2. On ethical egoism; 16.3. Criticism of utilitarianism -/- XVII Post-enlighteners: Durkheim 17.1. Sociology as physics of customs; 17.2. Morality as physics of customs and as practical science; 17.3. On Kantian ethics and utilitarianism; 17.4. The variability of moralities;17.5. Social solidarity as end and justification of morality; 17.6. Secular morality as “sociodicy”; XVIII Post-enlighteners: Nietzsche 18.1. On the Dionysian; 18.2. On the deconstruction of the world of values 18.3 On the twofold genealogy of moralities; 18.4. On ascetics and nihilism; 18.5. Normative ethics of self-fulfilment -/- Bibliography / Index of names / Index of concepts -/- . (shrink)

RESUMEN Se explora la relación entre las dimensiones proposicional y no proposicional de la creencia religiosa para mostrar que la última dirige el proceso de justificación y representa su límite. Se defiende que la no proposicional también tiene valor cognitivo, porque constituye una suerte de elección epistémica preteórica que no es exclusiva de la fe religiosa. Se explora la noción de ambigüedad religiosa, tanto a nivel intelectual como experiencial, y se sostiene que la relación entre la dimensión proposicional y la (...) no-proposicional de la fe está mediada por la función directiva de las presuposiciones metafísicas instauradas por la experiencia religiosa. ABSTRACT The article explores the relation between the propositional and non-propositional dimensions of religious belief in order to show that the latter guides the process of justification and represents its limit. It argues that the non-propositional dimension also has cognitive value because it constitutes a sort of pre-theoretical epistemic election that does not pertain exclusively to religious faith. The article also delves into the notion of religious ambiguity, both in its intellectual and experiential interpretations, and argues that the relationship between the propositional and the non-propositional dimensions of faith is mediated by the guiding role of the metaphysical presuppositions established by religious experience. (shrink)

This is a response to the recent essay by Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker on “Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field of Study.” I clarify my earlier positions on method and virtue in comparative religious ethics and try to respond to some of the issues that Bucar and Stalnaker raise in regard to my arguments specifically and the field more generally. I argue that while we need not measure the practical impact of scholarly work in comparative religious ethics purely (...) in terms of political or social action, I nevertheless worry that defining the goals of comparative inquiry in terms of the production of bewilderment, intellectual vertigo, or skeptical questions can lead to impressionistic or therapeutic methodological norms. In a similar vein, I refine my earlier position on externalism that acknowledges the impossibility of a purely externalist approach but also notes the desirability of coming to understand others “in their own terms” prior to engaging in the process of transmutation. I also question Bucar and Stalnaker's pessimism about the potential of producing “rigorously convincing ethical theory from the lived experience of regular folk,” suggesting that perhaps we are working with different conceptions of the sociology of knowledge. Finally, I consider whether we are currently in the midst of an epistemological crisis and conclude with some reflections on the rationality of the craft of comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

John Tillson concludes the symposium on his Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence by replying to his five respondents. The reply focusses on Michael Hand’s defence of parental rights to raise their children in their faith; Ruth Wareham’s suggestion that the value of autonomy rules out a wider range of impermissible religious influences than Tillson’s account is able to; David Lewin’s alternative criteria for ethical influence and scepticism about rationality’s objectivity; Anca Gheaus’ proposal that initiation into multiple contradictory (...) religious faiths is permissible; and Matthew Clayton’s rejection of the book’s perfectionist political morality. (shrink)

O cristianismo introduzido no Brasil no século XVI, afirmando-se em oposição a religiões anteriores, evidenciou marcas de exclusivismo, intolerância, estigmatização. Com estas marcas o cristianismo buscou reduzir a si indígenas, cristãos novos e negros, negando-lhes em sua alteridade. No século XIX, com a introdução do protestantismo, e no século XX, com o aparecimento do pentecostalismo e neopentecostalismo podem-se verificar marcas semelhantes de exclusivismo e negação mútua no âmbito intra-cristão Uma análise da história das religiões no Brasil evidencia que as identidades (...) religiosas formam construídas na tensão dinâmica da negação mútua. Disso se poderá concluir que as religiões não construíram suas identidades no isolamento, mas nas relações, por vezes marcadas pela dinâmica de contrastes, diferenciações e estigmatizações mútuas. Isso se evidencia pelo estabelecimento de fronteiras, caracterizadas não raramente por discursos bipolares e maniqueístas, no intuito de produzir exclusões ao nominar o outro de infiel, ateu, herético. O resultado pode ser verificado no caráter anti-ecumênico destas religiões. Palavras-chave : Religiões. Identidades. Exclusivismo. EstigmatizaçãoThe Christianity which was introduced in the 16th century in Brazil affirmed itself in opposition to prior religions, showing traits of exclusiveness and intolerance. With these traits Christianity sought to denigrate the indigenous peoples, the new Christians and the Blacks by do not accepting them in their otherness. In the 19th century, with the introduction of Protestantism, and, in the 20th century, with the appearance of Pentecostalism and Neo-Pentecostalism, similar traits of mutual exclusiveness and negation can be verified in the intra-Christian realm. An analysis of the history of religions in Brazil shows that the religious identities were constructed through the dynamic of mutual negation. From this one can conclude that the identities of religions were not build in isolation but through the relations, sometimes marked by the dynamic of contrasts, differentiations and mutual stigmatizations. This is seen by the establishment of boundaries, which commonly are characterized by bipolar discourses, with the intent of producing exclusions by naming the other by unfaithful, atheist and heretical. The result can be verified by the anti-ecumenical characteristic of these religions. Keywords : Religions. Identities. Exclusiveness. Stigmatization. (shrink)

This chapter takes inspiration from Wittgenstein’s thinking to formulate a non-reductive toolbox for the study of religion associated with generative modelling, specifically as applied in complex adaptive systems theory. It converges on a communal perspective on religion as multiscale active inference that contrasts starkly with common ‘straw person’ perspectives on religion that reduce it to ‘erroneous’ theorising generated by the brain. In contrast, we argue, religious practices at the enculturated level of description involve implicit and explicit meanings, experienced both individually (...) and collectively. Firstly, we characterise these in terms of Wittgenstein’s notions of rule-following and language games. Secondly, we discuss how the collective and perspectival aspects of religion in enculturation with morals, doctrines, rituals, and expressions can be formalised in terms of deep active inference in multi-agent systems. This approach describes how religions are incommensurable with scientific methods due to the epistemic separation between the different kinds of language games of religious and scientific practices. Their touchpoints tend to give rise to perpetual confusion and unproductive discussions, requiring perspicuous presentations that can be formulated with our toolbox. In this sense, our account has implications for tackling complex societal challenges such as ethical policy-making. (shrink)

L'etica, secondo Wittgenstein, ha a che fare con la mostrazione di un modo di vivere, inteso vuoi come disposizione complessiva del soggetto, vuoi come "habitus". In questo libro, Marta Cassina ripercorre le forme di questa mostrazione nell'opera del filosofo, argomentando, in primo luogo, che il modo di vivere indicato nel "Tractatus" come il contrassegno indicibile della vita giusta e felice debba essere compreso, man mano che il pensiero di Wittgenstein matura, come un "fare" e un uso condiviso della vita; che (...) questo uso, inoltre, possa essere letto nelle sue implicazioni teoretiche e nella maniera della sua genesi attraverso le "lenti" della credenza religiosa e della grammatica del voto di fede. (shrink)

A Jamesian defence of a moderate fideism which holds that acceptance of (religious) belief beyond, though not contrary to, the evidence is morally permissible--though only under quite tight conditions, which, I argue, include the requirement that the "passional basis" for such acceptance must itself be morally admirable. The claim that "suprarational" faith is virtuous thus remains open, even though vindicated against the objection that believing beyond the evidence is always vicious. I also explore the extent to which the proposal that (...) what makes a belief religious is that it can be accepted only by suprarational faith imposes constraints on the possible content of religious belief. (shrink)

This study explores Islamic influences on corporate bribery practices in Indonesia. As the dominant religion in Indonesia, Islam substantially influences society in everyday life, including business practices. Although bribery issues in Indonesia have been raised in great numbers for many years, few studies have explored the role of Islamic influences in the ways businesspeople rationalize corporate bribery. This study aims to explore the lived experiences of businesspeople involved in corporate bribery. The authors conducted a phenomenological study to analyze the mindsets (...) of businesspeople who used the Islamic religion to rationalize corporate bribery. To this end, a phenomenological study was conducted based on in-depth interviews with inmates who were imprisoned for their bribery practices in Indonesia. The interview data were subsequently analyzed and revealed several ways that Indonesian businesspeople invoked Islam to rationalize their practices of bribery and render them coherent with their mindsets. The analyses in this study provide insights into how to curb the rationalization of corporate bribery via religious perspectives and point to recommendations for future research. (shrink)

Scholars of African moral thought reject the possibility of an African religious ethics by invoking at least three major reasons. The first objection to ‘ethical supernaturalism’ argues that it is part of those aspects of African culture that are ‘anachronistic’ insofar as they are superstitious rather than rational; as such, they should be jettisoned. The second objection points out that ethical supernaturalism is incompatible with the utilitarian approach to religion that typically characterises some African peoples’ orientation to it. The last (...) objection argues that religious ethics by their very nature require the feature (of revelation), which is generally lacking in African religious experiences. The facet of revelation is crucial for a religious ethics since it solves the epistemological problem of knowing the will of God or the content of morality. In this article, I construct a vitality-based African religious moral theory; and, I argue that it can successfully meet these objections. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to call the separation of reason and religion into question.

This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend (...) to view the justification of moral belief to be a matter of process (that is, discursive social practice) rather than evidence‐possession, thus overlooking crucial differences between the two. They also run the risk of confusing motivating and explanatory reasons with normative reasons for moral belief and action. Consequently, their account of normativity would be insufficient for determining the rationality of moral beliefs and actions as well as for justifying moral beliefs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual TraditionsRonnie LittlejohnRationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual Traditions. By Henry Rosemont, Jr.Chicago: Open Court, 2001. Pp. vii + 106.In April 2000, Henry Rosemont delivered the first Hsuan Hua Memorial Lecture at the Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley. The following year, this lecture—originally titled "Whither the World's Religions?"—was published by Open Court (...) in this small book, Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual Traditions. The volume is divided into four sections: (1) the lecture itself, which has the new title "Rationality and Religious Experience"; (2) a commentary by Huston Smith; (3) response and discussion, in which Rosemont replies to Smith and takes questions from the audience; and (4) an epilogue, in which Rosemont makes revisions and expansions on the lecture based on the comments and discussion.In section 1, Rosemont makes a bold claim: "By urging everyone to approach their own text tradition afresh, and alongside others, I am assuming what many of you might find implausible, namely, that in many basic respects all sacred texts are saying the same things, and contain the same truths we can all come to believe without in any way surrendering our rationality" (p. 11). Having said this, he nonetheless does not mean that we can accept the statements of religious texts as stating factual truths, much less that they are putting forward identical descriptions of the world.Rosemont faces the epistemological difficulties of religion directly, saying that we cannot accept the statements of religious texts as factual accounts of the world. He reminds us that it is not merely the Abrahamic traditions that pose an epistemological problem for us: "It no less flies in the face of modern science to believe that the preserver god Vishnu once incarnated himself as Krishna, not merely to give counsel to the spiritual warrior Arjuna, but also, among many other exploits, to make love to 20,000 milkmaids in a single day" (p. 5). Even so, he holds that there is much truth in the sacred texts and narratives of the world's religions (pp. 31-32). As will become apparent in my later remarks, it is not altogether clear to me what sort of truth Rosemont is talking about, but it seems to be more a matter of a certain ego-reduction and a sort of mystical feeling than anything else.Rosemont recognizes not only the epistemological objections to religion, but also the moral ones. He understands the violence and suffering that has been directly and indirectly associated with religion in human history. Yet, in this connection, he says:[E]fforts to exorcise religion from the human realm because of the mischief that has been committed in its name is to throw out the baby with the bath water, and equally to suggest a third response, that there is no hope for the cross-cultural dialogues necessary for [End Page 404] the creation and maintenance of a more peaceful and just twenty-first century until and unless everyone can come to understand how an intelligent and thoroughly decent human being might come to be, or remain, a subscriber to one or another of the world's faiths.(p. 10)It is the phenomenon of spiritual experience and not the doctrine or ontology of any tradition that Rosemont finds of philosophical interest. He thinks that instead of focusing on some purported factual knowledge about the world that we are to believe directly, we should instead concentrate on the instructions that the traditions offer about how to live purposively in the world and derive nonmaterial nurturance from it. "The basis of such nurturance is religious experience" (p. 17).Rosemont begins his remarks on religious experience with a critique of Kierkegaard the purpose of which is to show that lived experience is of one piece. Rosemont attributes to Kierkegaard the position that there are distinguishable and autonomously separable spheres of existence such as the aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual. Speaking of Kierkegaard's three stages, he says that "Almost all of the world's religious traditions, especially the Asian, affirm... (shrink)

Para além da filiação religiosa: religião, religiosidade e o panorama religioso em Ribeirão das Neves-MG, Brasil (Beyond the religious affiliation: religion, religiosity and the religious panorama in Ribeirão das Neves- MG, Brazil) DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n23p715 Conhecer o panorama religioso no nível nacional e ao longo do tempo pode ser considerado um privilégio do Brasil, cujos censos demográficos coletam informações a este respeito pelo menos desde 1940. No entanto, a literatura sugere que a filiação religiosa não é suficiente para entender o papel (...) da religião na vida dos indivíduos. Sendo assim, o objetivo deste artigo é mostrar, através do exemplo de Ribeirão das Neves, MG-Brasil, a importância da religiosidade no panorama religioso. O estudo combina dados do Censo Demográfico de 2000 com informações sobre estudantes do Ensino Médio da rede pública estadual coletados pela Pesquisa Jovem, levando em consideração não apenas a filiação religiosa, mas também a frequência às cerimônias e da frequência com que se reza/ora fora das cerimônias religiosas. Os resultados do Censo 2000 sugerem que o município de Ribeirão das Neves é distinto de Minas Gerais e do Brasil no que tange à filiação religiosa. A inclusão da frequência às cerimônias e de medida de religiosidade no âmbito doméstico desvenda outros aspectos relativos à religião, sugerindo que ir além da filiação religiosa pode ajudar a compreender melhor a complexidade do panorama religioso. Palavras-chave : Religião. Religiosidade. Ensino Médio. Juventude. Ribeirão das Neves, BrasilKnowledge of the religious landscape over time and at the national level could be considered a privilege of Brazil. Brazilian demographic censuses have collected information related to religion since 1940. However, the literature suggests that religious affiliation is not sufficient for understanding the role of religion in the lives of individuals. Thus, the objective of this article is to show the importance of religiosity in the religious landscape, using the example of Ribeirão das Neves, Minas Gerais. The study combines data from the Demographic Census of 2000 with information about high school students in the state-run, public school system collected by the Pesquisa Jovem (Youth Survey). The study takes into consideration not only religious affiliation, but also attendance at worship services and the frequency with which individuals pray outside of worship services. The results of the 2000 Census suggest that the municipality of Ribeirão das Neves is distinct from Minas Gerais and Brazil in relation to religious affiliation. The inclusion of attendance at worship ceremonies and a measurement of religiosity in the home reveal other aspects related to religion, suggesting that going beyond religious affiliation may help to better understand the complexity of the religious panorama. Key words : Religion. Religiosity. High School. Youth. Ribeirão das Neves, Brazil. (shrink)

In Romania, the debate on the electronic passports has raised controversies having ethical, religious, ideological implications, as well as consequences for the political practice. The debate has as premise the general background of the crisis that modernity brings in the reception of values in Christian communities. The discussions on the consequences of secularization, the metaphor of “cultural wars” and the new perspective brought by modernity to the state and the public policies it requests – all these oblige us to formulate (...) a novel type of humanism that should be found out at the end of this debate. By drawing on a natural concern regarding human freedom, individual security, respect for private life, the debate around passports finally fails into the field of superstitions, radical ideologies, and the gratuitous critique of the implementation of the new technologies in the practice of modernity. For avoiding such sideslips, an important role can be played by the researchers from social and humanist disciplines, who can enter the debate and offer answers that are consonant with their own disciplines. (shrink)

Esta Comunicação objetiva apresentar dois trabalhos acadêmicos de Luis Cláudio Cardoso Bandeira. A dissertação de mestrado, intitulada Entidades africanas em “troca de águas”: diásporas religiosas desde o Ceará, apresenta a pesquisa sobre tradições africanas no Ceará. No doutorado, Bandeira trata de Rotas e raízes itinerantes e destaca veredas desafiadoras do diálogo entre história e religião. Participando das duas bancas, tive a oportunidade de perceber as nuances do caminho acadêmico percorrido por ele. Neste texto , faço memória dessas duas participações, sintetizando (...) brevemente esses trabalhos realizados. Começo destacando, brevemente, uma das fontes importantes de Bandeira no doutorado: as pesquisas que Agenor Sarraf Pacheco tem realizado sobre Memórias, Identidades, Saberes, Religiosidades letradas e de matrizes orais afroindigenas em circuitos da Amazônia . Segundo Pacheco, para se conhecer a presença dos negros na Amazônia é fundamental investigar essa relação com as culturas e sabedorias indígenas. Palavras-chave : Tradições africanas. Diásporas religiosas. Estudos culturais. História da África. Pensamento pós-colonial. (shrink)

This paper is an application of Max Weber’s thesis about the “elective affinity” between Protestant religious impulses and the rise of capitalism, and rationalization of benevolence. Exploring the history of organized philanthropy in the United States, using the life and work of John D. Rockefeller, the paper presents the power of the religious motive in Rockefeller’s commitment to philanthropy, especially towards support for scientific university based research in medicine. Presenting historical evidence, the paper argues against those who see U.S. philanthropists (...) as giving out of guilt or for selfish motivation, and those who critique philanthropic foundations as producers and reproducers of cultural hegemony. (shrink)

Hume’s sceptical attack on the rational theology of his days is closely interwoven with his attempt to develop a wholly naturalistic account of morality. Hume thus explores the possibility to develop an ethics devoid of any reliance on traditional faith or any type of theistic-providential metaphysics. In this article the consequences of this position are examincd. First, two major versions of a theistic-providential underpinning of morality in the tradition of 18th-century British moral philosophy, notably those from Samuel Clarke and Francis (...) Hutcheson, are examined. In the following, a reconstruction is made of Hume’s sceptical attack on the rational theology of his days . In a third move, the consequences of Hume’ s religious scepticism for the positive articulation of his ethical theory are pointed out. In the conclusion it becomes apparent that Hume’s religious scepticism remains strongly influenced by the classical idea of an intrinsic relation between contemplation and moral wisdom: but the contemplative wisdom of Hume’s ‘true religion’ is of a radical anti-teleological kind and implies indeed a breach with the Christian inspired moral metaphysics of his days. (shrink)

Referring to Reichlin’s reflections, the author analyzes the aporias arised in the debate on euthanasia, proposes to establish some general principles (e.g. inviolability of human life, the prohibition of extend unnecessary suffering, the principle of autonomy) and a method of application of them to controversial cases. The combinatorial ethics that emerges can probably solve the aporias and can harmonize the common sense (about the possibility of euthanasia in extreme cases) with Catholic doctrine – specifically referring to the Natural Moral Law (...) theory – in an attempt to integrate the results of combinatorial ethics with the principles established in this doctrine. The conclusions, although admittedly provisional, are translated into indications for an hypothetical legislator, in order to overcome the legislative aporia. In the final part, analyzing the religious aporia, the author proposes to include some forms of euthanasia in a total rethinking of the meaning of death, starting with the teachings of Christian faith. Basandosi sulle riflessioni di Massimo Reichlin e James Rachels, l’Autore intende analizzare le principali aporie che emergono nella riflessione etica sull’eutanasia – quella filosofico-metodologica, deontologica, legislativa e religiosa. Attraverso quest’analisi, l’Autore propone di riprendere alcuni principi generali (tra cui l’indisponibilità della vita, il divieto di prolungare sofferenze inutili e il principio di autonomia), fornendo poi un metodo d’applicazione ai casi concreti. L’etica combinatoria che emerge da questa impostazione, riesce in buona misura a risolvere le aporie analizzate, armonizzando alcune intuizioni comuni (circa la liceità dell’eutanasia in casi particolarissimi ed estremi) con la dottrina cattolica corrente in materia. Nel confronto con la morale cattolica, in particolare, viene analizzata e discussa la teoria della legge morale naturale, nel tentativo di integrare i risultati dell’etica combinatoria con i principi affermati in questa dottrina. Le conclusioni teoretiche, anche se dichiaratamente provvisorie, si traducono poi in indicazioni praticate per un ipotetico legislatore, nel tentativo di superare l’ultima grande aporia, quella legislativa. Nella parte conclusiva, analizzando l’aporia religiosa, l’Autore propone di iscrivere la liceità di alcune forme di eutanasia all’interno di un complessivo ripensamento del significato della morte, partendo dal dato di fede cristiano, nel tentativo di superare la “logica della rimozione” che sembra caratterizzare la nostra contemporaneità. (shrink)

Looking to understand religiosity as a social factor, contributory of constructions of meaning and omnipresent in diverse historical and cultural universes, this article focuses on the ritualistic dimension of religiosity. Adopting as a research problem the religious pilgrimages, take particular note of the shrines as symbolic markers towards the supernatural. This work has a double aim: to carry out a review and critical analysis of the religious pilgrimages and to study the specificity of the pilgrimages to the Shrine of Fatima, (...) located in Portugal. After a brief mention of the dialectic dissidence-coexistence of ancient religious practices in secularized societies, the concepts of worship, rites and sacrifices are revisited. There follows a more in-depth analysis of the theme of pilgrimages to shrines, from the concept and historical review to the particularity of pilgrimages to the Shrine of Fatima, the latter viewed as a geo-symbol of religious tourism in Portugal. The results of a survey of 784 pilgrims to the Shrine of Fátima are presented, focusing on the beliefs, experiences, perceptions, purposes and expectations regarding the pilgrimage, as well as the nature of the requests addressed to the Lady of Fatima and promises fulfilled. Throughout the article the pilgrim character is emphasized, not neglecting the analysis of the active, voluntary and sacrificial behavioral implication as legitimating the benefits already granted or to be granted. (shrink)

Review of Sandu Frunză, Experien ţa religioasă în gîndirea lui Dumitru Stăniloae. O etică relaţională. 2nd edition, București: Eikon, 2016, 262 pag.

To study and to do religious ethics is to be engaged in a three-tieres task which is likened to the process of climbing a three-step ladder. The climber is free to move both up and down depending on the need at hand, depending upon what it is that is to be reached for. The first step refers to the concrete-experiential level where we address conflicting value claims and engage in decision-making procedures; the second refers to the theological-philosophical level where we (...) examine the interpretive framework brought to bear at level one, and the third calls for examination and justification of the epistemological roots of that interpretive framework. The paper argues that concern with reason and the rational processes of justifying actions dominates ethical discussion today, and that although this concern is appropriate, it is also insufficient. The author thus lingers over the often-neglected role of feeling in ethical analysis and argues that feeling as well as reason has epistemological value in the search for ethical insight. (shrink)

In this essay I intend to highlight a wide range of ethical views on killing and war in the world's major religious traditions. I've found that one can learn a lot about a tradition by paying attention to how it answers the question, Is it ever right to kill? What we find when we survey world religions are teachings that are at least paradoxical, and in some cases downright contradictory. Every major religious tradition regards life and especially human life as (...) sacred in some sense, and affirms mercy and compassion as basic human obligations. But influential religious authorities have also taught that it's sometimes right to kill other human beings. Some have gone so far as to rationalize wars of annihilation against heretics and infidels. (shrink)

By appealing to the religious imagination Theology can make a distinctive contribution to business ethics. In the first part of the essay I examine what is entailed by appealing to the imagination to reason in ethics: through converging arguments the imagination enables us rationally to interpret reality and to infer obligations. In the following sections I consider the relevance of the religious imagination for business ethics. In the second part I explain the imagination''s use of religious metaphor to establish its (...) theological distinctiveness in ethical inquiry. Then in the final part I illustrate Theology''s contribution to business ethics by studying the imagination''s use of religious metaphor with regard to profit and to third world debt. (shrink)

O projeto de ética mundial, desenvolvido pelo teólogo ecumênico Hans Küng, propõe que somente por meio de um diálogo inter-religioso é possível estruturar princípios básicos que sejam válidos globalmente e que proporcionem a construção de uma cultura da paz. Essa possibilidade no campo da ética estabelece um amplo diálogo com diferentes autores. No entanto, como o próprio autor assume, o projeto possui limitações, sendo que uma delas é a exclusão de temas que envolvem questões de Bioética que são (...) importantes para as relações em sociedade. Os temas hoje avaliados na área de Bioética são de difícil consenso, entre eles: aborto, uso de embriões, reprodução assistida, questão de gênero. Desse modo, novas frentes de diálogo se fazem necessárias, principalmente no tocante às ciências biológicas, ou seja: a relação entre religião e ciência e cultura e ciência. Para que esse diálogo se torne possível, é necessário reconhecer as possibilidades e os limites do diálogo, numa exigente proposta de transcendência do individualismo, das culturas e da própria religião. Por isso é necessário aprofundar a reflexão começando pela identificação dessas novas questões para se buscar novos espaços de diálogo. Palavras-chave : Ética mundial; Cultura da paz; Bioética; Ética da transcendência.The world ethics project, developed by the ecumenical teologian Hans Küng, indicates that only by a inter-religious dialogue is possible to built basic principles that would be wordly accepted and helpfull in the building of a culture of peace. This possibility on ethics research brings a large dialogue with several thinkers. Although, as the author himself accepts, the project has some limitations, being one of them the exclusion of themes that are discussed in Bioethics and are important to relationship in society. The issues that are studied in Bioethics are of rare consensus, like: abortion, utilization of embryo for research, medically assisted reproduction, gender’s subjects. Thus, new fronts of dialogue are needed, mainly related to biological sciences, it means: relation between religion and sciences, and between culture and sciences. For the dialogue to be possible it is needed to recognize possibilities and limits of it, from an exigent proposal of transcendence of individualism, culture and religion itself. Them, it is needed to deep the thinking starting on identificating this new questions to look for new spaces of dialogue. Key words : World ethics; Culture of peace; Bioethics; Transcendence. (shrink)

The principal question of this paper is: Why are religious values special in refusal of lifesaving medical treatment? This question is approached through a critical examination of a common kind of refusal of treatment case, one involving a rational adult. The central value cited in defence of honouring such a patient's refusal is autonomy. Once autonomy is isolated from other justificatory factors, however, possible cases can be imagined which cast doubt on the great valuational weight assigned it by strong anti-paternalists. (...) This weight is sufficient, in their estimation, to justify honouring the patient's refusal. There is thus a tension between the strong anti-paternalist's commitment to the sufficiency of autonomy and our intuitions respecting such cases. Attempts can be made to relieve this tension, such as arguing that patients aren't really rational in the circumstances envisaged, or that other values, such as privacy or bodily integrity, if added to autonomy, are sufficient to justify an anti-paternalistic stance. All such attempts fail, however. But what does not fail is the addition of religious freedom, freedom respecting a patient's religious beliefs and values. Why religious freedom reduces the tension is then explained, and the specialness of religious beliefs and values examined. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive and unique text and reference in medical ethics. By far the most inclusive set of primary documents and articles in the field ever published, it contains over 100 selections. Virtually all pieces appear in their entirety, and a significant number would be difficult to obtain elsewhere. The volume draws upon the literature of history, medicine, philosophical and religious ethics, economics, and sociology. A wide range of topics and issues are covered, such as law and medicine, (...) truth-telling by the physician, research, population policy, genetics, abortion, dying, and individual rights in medical care. The selections span the centuries, beginning with material from the works of Hippocrates, continuing through Thomas Percival, John Stuart Mill, and Claude Bernard, down to modern commentators like Henry K. Beecher, Walsh McDermott, David L. Bazelon, Paul Freund, H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Paul Ramsey, Richard McCormick, Rashi Fein, and Bernard Barber. The text has eight major divisions, beginning with sections on the ethical dimensions of the physician-patient relationship in history; the moral bases of medical ethics; and regulation, compulsion, and protection of the consumer in clinical medicine and public health. Each of these sections includes key essays that appear for the first time. All of the book's major divisions contain primary documents: codes such as the Hippocratic Oath, Medieval Law for the Regulation of Medicine, and the first as well as the most recent code of the American Medical Association; court decisions, including those on Karen Quinlan and on abortion in the United States and West Germany; government documents such as the statement of the National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects, the Tuskegee Syphilis Report, the British Parliamentary debate on euthanasia, and the Council of Europe on rights of the sick and dying; and various published guidelines such as the Harvard Medical School brain death criteria, the American Hospital Association on patient's rights, and Pope Pius XII on the prolongation of life. Cases that illustrate moral dilemmas are provided for discussion purposes. Each section is preceded by a succinct editor's introduction. The documents and essays are of practical value for practitioners and students in medicine, law, ethics, and counselling, and for individual patients and groups concerned with medical care. Through encompassing divergent viewpoints, the essays and primary documents were selected to encourage humane practices and deepen understanding of the multiple traditions that shaped and do shape the development of medicine. (shrink)

Today, in a Western secular context, the affective phenomenon of religious zeal is often associated, or even identified, with religious intolerance, violence, and fanaticism. Even if the zealots’ devotion remains restricted to their private lives, “we” as Western secularists still suspect them of a lack of reason, rationality, and autonomy. However, closer consideration reveals that religious zeal is an ethically and politically ambiguous phenomenon. In this article, I explore the question of how this ambiguity can be explained. I do (...) so by drawing on Paul Ricœur’s theory of affective fragility and tracing back the ambiguity of religious zeal to a dialectic inherent to human affectivity and existence itself. According to Ricœur, human affectivity is constituted by the two poles of vital and spiritual desires which are mediated by the thymos. As I show, this theory helps us to understand that religious zeal as a spiritual desire is neither plainly good nor plainly bad, but ambiguous. Moreover, it enables us to acknowledge the entanglement of abstraction and concretion that is inherent to the phenomenon of religious zeal. Finally, this theory helps us to understand why religious zeal, as one possible expression of the human quest for the infinite, is both a promise and a threat. In conclusion, human existence is tragic not in that we necessarily fail, but in that no matter which path we take with regard to our spiritual desires—that of affirmation, rejection, or moderation—we are and remain fallible. (shrink)

It is reasonable to expect, with regard to any traditional academic subject, that it should be capable of being made good sense of as a rational form of knowledge or enquiry focused upon the discernment of truths of one sort or another concerning the world or human affairs. One curriculum area which has generally been held to be problematic in this respect, for a mixture of epistemological, social, ethical and pedagogical reasons, is that of religious education. In the first place, (...) then, this paper is concerned to expose some of the confusions which have been allowed to obscure the nature of religious enquiry as a viable rational enterprise, Second, however, the paper also attempts to develop a coherent und workable account of the nature and operations of knowledge and truth in religious enquiry. (shrink)

Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the dead' and other propositions? (...) Professor Rizzieri also examines whether or not knowledge and justification norms of belief and action undermine the pragmatic grounds for religious belief suggested by William James. Rizzieri argues that such norms favor an attitude of hope, as opposed to belief, under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Rizzieri argues the connections between knowledge and rational action undermine radically externalist accounts of religious knowledge and proposes an alternative account of the justification of religious beliefs. (shrink)

It is reasonable to expect, with regard to any traditional academic subject, that it should be capable of being made good sense of as a rational form of knowledge or enquiry focused upon the discernment of truths of one sort or another concerning the world or human affairs. One curriculum area which has generally been held to be problematic in this respect, for a mixture of epistemological, social, ethical and pedagogical reasons, is that of religious education. In the first place, (...) then, this paper is concerned to expose some of the confusions which have been allowed to obscure the nature of religious enquiry as a viable rational enterprise, Second, however, the paper also attempts to develop a coherent und workable account of the nature and operations of knowledge and truth in religious enquiry. (shrink)

This chapter surveys recent work on philosophical issues raised by religious diversity or pluralism. It focuses on four topics. The first is the epistemological challenge of religious diversity. The rationality of commitment to any particular religious tradition seems to be threatened by the existence of rival traditions. The second is the political problem of religious toleration. Religious conflict throughout the world suggests a need for better arguments against religious intolerance than those currently available. The third is the task of (...) understanding the concept of religion. Religious pluralism fuels debate about whether the concept of religion can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or, if it cannot, whether it must be analyzed in terms of family resemblances. And the fourth is the enterprise of making constructive comparisons in religious ethics. Similarities and differences between the virtue theories of diverse religious traditions illuminate strengths and weaknesses in the ethical thought of the religions subjected to comparison. The chapter argues from these examples to the conclusion that religious diversity gives rise to several exciting and important problems that ought to be high on the agenda of philosophy of religion. (shrink)