Results for 'Neutral'

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  1. Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of (...)
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  2. Agent-Neutral Deontology.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook (...)
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  3. The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant.Pauline Kleingeld - 1993 - Philosophical Forum 25:134-150.
    The increasingly common use of inclusive language (e.g., "he or she") in representing past philosophers' views is often inappropriate. Using Immanuel Kant's work as an example, I compare his use of terms such as "human race" and "human being" with his views on women to show that his use of generic terms does not prove that he includes women. I then discuss three different approaches to this issue, found in recent Kant-literature, and show why each of them is insufficient. I (...)
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    Panentheism, Neutral Monism, and Advaita Vedanta.Michael Silberstein - 2017 - Zygon 52 (4):1123-1145.
    It is argued that when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness neutral monism beats out the competition. It is further argued that neutral monism provides a unique route to a novel type of panentheism via Advaita Vedanta Hinduism.
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  5.  70
    Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; (...)
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  6. McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction.Douglas W. Portmore - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (3):350-356.
    In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem.
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  7.  3
    The Self-­World Dualism and Neutral Monism.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    The claim to be defended may be called phenomenological neutral monism: phenomenological neutral monism about perception (or selfless perception): ordinary perception does not intrinsically present us with the distinction between itself and its objects, that is, with the fact that its objects exist (or seem to exist) independently of the perceptual act.
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  8.  80
    Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality.Vaughn E. Huckfeldt - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):23-41.
    The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of (...)
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    Neutral Monism and the Social Character of Consciousness.John Harvey - 2007 - Philosophy Today 51 (1):52-59.
    After thousands of years of work, the mind-body problem endures as one of the most tantalizing issues in metaphysics. For my purposes I formulate the question as: What is the relation between consciousness and matter? The solution to the mind-body problem that I offer is a version of neutral monism, the view that mental and physical events are both to be derived from some stuff that in itself is neither physical nor mental. This paper specifies the conditions under which (...)
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  10.  37
    Discount-Neutral Utility Models for Denumerable Time Streams.Peter Fishburn & Ward Edwards - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (2):139-166.
    This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability distributions on (...)
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  11.  27
    Potential Infinite Models and Ontologically Neutral Logic.Theodore Hailperin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (1):79-96.
    The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.
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    Ostensive Learnability as a Test Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation Concepts.Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):139-153.
    In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: realistic content, guidance function of theories, perception as cognitive construction, expectation-dependence of perception, theory-dependence of scientific data, continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, language-dependence, and meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second (...)
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  13. The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived.Erik C. Banks - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  14.  61
    Neutral Theory, Biased World.William Bausman - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    The ecologist today finds scarce ground safe from controversy. Decisions must be made about what combination of data, goals, methods, and theories offers them the foundations and tools they need to construct and defend their research. When push comes to shove, ecologists often turn to philosophy to justify why it is their approach that is scientific. Karl Popper’s image of science as bold conjectures and heroic refutations is routinely enlisted to justify testing hypotheses over merely confirming them. One of the (...)
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  15. Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System.Robert N. McCauley & J. Henrich - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):79-101.
    Jerry Fodor has consistently cited the persistence of illusions--especially the M.
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  16. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - forthcoming - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  17.  5
    Does Constructive Neutral Evolution Play an Important Role in the Origin of Cellular Complexity?Dave Speijer - 2011 - Bioessays 33 (5):344-349.
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  18. Is Agent-Neutral Deontology Possible?Matthew Hammerton - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3).
  19.  2
    How Neutral Networks Influence Evolvability.Marc Ebner, Mark Shackleton & Rob Shipman - 2001 - Complexity 7 (2):19-33.
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  20.  83
    Russell's Neutral Monism.Robert Tully - 1988 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 8 (1):209-224.
  21.  22
    Speciation and the Neutral Theory of Biodiversity.Michael Kopp - 2010 - Bioessays 32 (7):564-570.
  22.  11
    Neutral Color Concepts.G. Kliewer - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):21-41.
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  23. Neutral Relations Revisited.Fraser MacBride - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):25–56.
    Do non‐symmetric relations apply to the objects they relate in an order? According to the standard view of relations, the difference between aRb and bRa obtaining, where R is non‐symmetric, corresponds to a difference in the order in which the non‐symmetric relation R applies to a and b. Recently Kit Fine has challenged the standard view in his important paper ‘Neutral Relations’ arguing that non‐symmetric relations are neutral, lacking direction or order. In this paper I argue that Fine (...)
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  24.  26
    The Case for Ernst Mach's Neutral Monism.Erik C. Banks - manuscript
    This paper, for two upcoming volumes, makes what I consider to be the definitive textual case for finally rejecting the phenomenalist interpretation of Ernst Mach's works, and his customary association with the Vienna Circle, in favor of a stronger realistic neutral monist reading connecting him to James, Russell and the American realist movement and today's neutral monism (for example my 2014). I hope that this reading will eventually supplant the previously mistaken view of Mach's work and that his (...)
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  25. Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
    In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. (...)
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  26.  49
    A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):1-21.
    In this paper, I argue that a definition of paternalism must meet certain methodological constraints. Given the failings of descriptivist and normatively charged definitions of paternalism, I argue that we have good reason to pursue a normatively neutral definition. Archard's 1990 definition is one such account. It is for this reason that I return to Archard's account with a critical eye. I argue that Archard's account is extensionally inadequate, failing to capture some cases which are clear instances of paternalism. (...)
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  27. Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2009 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):91.
    I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of (...)
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  28.  78
    Is Disability a Neutral Condition?Jeffrey M. Brown - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):188-210.
    The issue of whether biological and psychological properties associated with disability can be harmful, beneficial, or neutral brings up an important philosophical question about how we evaluate disability, and disability’s impact on well-being. The debate is usually characterized as between those who argue disability is intrinsically harmful, and disability rights advocates who argue that disability is just another way of being different, in part, because disability can also provide important benefits. I argue that this debate is a false one, (...)
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  29.  25
    Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral.Andrei Marmor - 2006 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (4):683-704.
    It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them (...)
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  30. Non‐Standard Neutral Free Logic, Empty Names and Negative Existentials.Dolf Rami - manuscript
    In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.
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  31.  44
    Normative Reasons Qua Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy: A Response to Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jamie Buckland - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.
    This paper offers a defence of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action from scepticism aired by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. In response it is argued that the Nagelian notion of an agent-neutral reason is not incomprehensible, and that agent-neutral reasons can indeed be understood as obtaining states of affairs that count in favour of anyone and everyone performing the action they favour. Furthermore, I argue that a distinction drawn between agent-neutral and agent-relative reason-statements that express (...)
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  32. Agent-Neutral Consequentialism From the Inside-Out: Concern for Integrity Without Self-Indulgence.Michael Ridge - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (2):236.
    Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses.
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  33. The Role of Causal Processes in the Neutral and Nearly Neutral Theories.Michael R. Dietrich & Roberta L. Millstein - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):548-559.
    The neutral and nearly neutral theories of molecular evolution are sometimes characterized as theories about drift alone, where drift is described solely as an outcome, rather than a process. We argue, however, that both selection and drift, as causal processes, are integral parts of both theories. However, the nearly neutral theory explicitly recognizes alleles and/or molecular substitutions that, while engaging in weakly selected causal processes, exhibit outcomes thought to be characteristic of random drift. A narrow focus on (...)
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  34.  50
    Number-Neutral Bare Plurals and the Multiplicity Implicature.Eytan Zweig - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (4):353-407.
    Bare plurals (dogs) behave in ways that quantified plurals (some dogs) do not. For instance, while the sentence John owns dogs implies that John owns more than one dog, its negation John does not own dogs does not mean “John does not own more than one dog”, but rather “John does not own a dog”. A second puzzling behavior is known as the dependent plural reading; when in the scope of another plural, the ‘more than one’ meaning of the plural (...)
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  35. Consequentialism and the Notion of Agent-Neutral Good.Desheng Zong - manuscript
    This essay argues for three theses. The first is that the notion of agent-neutral value, or more accurately, the promotion of agent-neutral values, is what truly defines consequentialism as a type of moral theory. A state of affairs is of agent-neutral value if it is capable of generating reasons for action for everybody. The second is that the existence of agent-neutral value has never been proven, and no known account of this notion has made clear what (...)
     
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  36. Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?Jeremy Fantl - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument (...)
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  37.  11
    Russell's 1919 "Neutral Monist" Conversion?Erik C. Banks - manuscript
    Bertrand Russell in "My Philosophical Development" claimed he converted to neutral monism in 1919, in the essay "On Propositions." I question whether Russell was really a complete neutral monist in the style of Mach and James and conclude that he was not. Russell's lingering commitment to image propositions and a linguistic theory of meaning and truth and falsity separate him from the more naturalistic causal theory of knowledge and error one finds in James and Mach.
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  38. On the Possibility and Desirability of Constructing a Neutral Conception of Disability.Anita Silvers - 2003 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24 (6):471-487.
    Disagreement about the properattitude toward disability proliferates. Yetlittle attention has been paid to an importantmeta-question, namely, whether ``disability'' isan essentially contested concept. If so, recentdebates between bioethicists and the disabilitymovement leadership cannot be resolved. Inthis essay I identify some of the presumptionsthat make their encounters so contentious. Much more must happen, I argue, for anydiscussions about disability policy andpolitics to be productive. Progress depends onconstructing a neutral conception ofdisability, one that neither devaluesdisability nor implies that persons withdisabilities are inadequate. (...)
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  39.  36
    Information is Intrinsically Semantic but Alethically Neutral.Bruce Raymond Long - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3447-3467.
    In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic (...)
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  40. Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind.Emmett Holman - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a (...)
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  41.  53
    Perspective-Neutral Intrinsic Value.Justin Klocksiem - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337.
    Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of (...)
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  42.  14
    Neutral and Relative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose Jonas Olson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 96-116.
    This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value; whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction; whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory; and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. (...)
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  43.  10
    The Experimental Roots of the Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution.Edna Suárez & Ana Barahona - 1996 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 18 (1):55 - 81.
    The historical reconstruction of the origins of the Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution (NTME) has been seen purely as an extension of a long-held theoretical debate between the classical and balance schools of Population Genetics. In this perspective, the NTME is but a different interpretation of the then recently published data on high intrapopulation genetic variability. In this paper we try to show that this thesis is deficient and partially incorrect. We show that the sources for the construction and (...)
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  44.  39
    Is Science Metaphysically Neutral?Iris Fry - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (3):665-673.
    This paper challenges the claim that science is metaphysically neutral upheld by contenders of the separation of peacefully co-existent science and religion and by evolutionary theists. True, naturalistic metaphysical claims can neither be refuted nor proved and are thus distinct from empirical hypotheses. However, metaphysical assumptions not only regulate the theoretical and empirical study of nature, but are increasingly supported by the growing empirical body of science. This historically evolving interaction has contributed to the development of a naturalistic worldview (...)
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  45. The Neutral: Lecture Course at the College de France.Roland Barthes (ed.) - 2005 - Columbia University Press.
    "I define the Neutral as that which outplays the paradigm, or rather I call Neutral everything that baffles paradigm." With these words, Roland Barthes describes a concept that profoundly shaped his work and was the subject of a landmark series of lectures delivered in 1978 at the Collège de France, just two years before his death. Not published in France until 2002, and appearing in English for the first time, these creative and engaging lectures deepen our understanding of (...)
     
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  46.  25
    From the Neutral Theory to a Comprehensive and Multiscale Theory of Ecological Equivalence.François Munoz & Philippe Huneman - unknown
    The neutral theory of biodiversity assumes that coexisting organisms are equally able to survive, reproduce and disperse, but predicts that stochastic fluctuations of these abilities drive diversity dynamics. It predicts remarkably well many biodiversity patterns, although substantial evidence for the role of niche variation across organisms seems contradictory. Here, we discuss this apparent paradox by exploring the meaning and implications of ecological equivalence. We address the question whether neutral theory provides an explanation for biodiversity patterns and acknowledges causal (...)
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    Trauma-Related and Neutral False Memories in War-Induced Posttraumatic Stress Disorder☆.T. Brennen, R. Dybdahl & A. KApidzic - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):877-885.
    Recent models of cognition in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder predict that trauma-related, but not neutral, processing should be differentially affected in these patients, compared to trauma-exposed controls. This study compared a group of 50 patients with PTSD related to the war in Bosnia and a group of 50 controls without PTSD but exposed to trauma from the war, using the DRM method to induce false memories for war-related and neutral critical lures. While the groups were equally susceptible to (...) critical lures, the PTSD group mistakenly recalled more war-related lures. Both false and correct recall were related more to depression than to self-rated trauma. Implications for accounts of false memories in terms of source-monitoring are discussed. (shrink)
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  48. Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
    This is an introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction as it pertains to utilitarianism.
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  49. Agent-Relative Vs. Agent-Neutral.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This is a general introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.
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  50.  59
    On Two Arguments for Temporally Neutral Propositions.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):329-337.
    Tsompanidis, Vasilis_On Two Arguments for Temporally Neutral Propositions.
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