Eighteenth-century Epicureanism is often viewed as radical, anti-religious, and politically dangerous. But to what extent does this simplify the ancient philosophy and underestimate its significance to the Enlightenment? Through a pan-European analysis of Enlightenment centres from Scotland to Russia via the Netherlands, France and Germany, contributors argue that elements of classical Epicureanism were appropriated by radical and conservative writers alike. They move beyond literature and political theory to examine the application of Epicurean ideas in domains as diverse as physics, natural (...) law, and the philosophy of language, drawing on the work of both major figures (Diderot, Helvétius, Smith and Hume) and of lesser-known but important thinkers (Johann Jacob Schmauss and Dmitrii Anichkov). -/- Table of Contents -/- Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz, Epicurus in the Enlightenment: an introduction -/- Elodie Argaud, Bayle’s defence of Epicurus: the use and abuse of Malebranche’s Méditations chrétiennes -/- Hans W. Blom, The Epicurean motif in Dutch notions of sociability in the seventeenth century -/- Thomas Ahnert, Epicureanism and the transformation of natural law in the early German Enlightenment -/- Charles T. Wolfe, A happiness fit for organic bodies: La Mettrie’s medical Epicureanism -/- Natania Meeker, Sexing Epicurean materialism in Diderot -/- Pierre Force, Helvétius as an Epicurean political theorist -/- Andrew Kahn, Epicureanism in the Russian Enlightenment: Dmitrii Anichkov and atomic theory -/- Matthew Niblett, Man, morals and matter: Epicurus and materialist thought in England from John Toland to Joseph Priestley -/- James A. Harris, The Epicurean in Hume -/- Neven Leddy, Adam Smith’s critique of Enlightenment Epicureanism -/- Avi S. Lifschitz, The Enlightenment revival of the Epicurean history of language and civilisation -/- Bibliography -/- Index. (shrink)

The article focuses on prosecutor's fallacy and interrogator's fallacy, the two kinds of reasoning in inferring a suspect's guilt. The prosecutor's fallacy is a combination of two conditional probabilities that lead to unfortunate commission of error in the process due to the inclination of the prosecutor in the establishment of strong evidence that will indict the defendant. It provides a comprehensive discussion of Gerd Gigerenzer's discourse on a criminal case in Germany explaining the perils of prosecutor's fallacy in his application (...) of probability to practical problems. It also discusses the interrogator's fallacy which was introduced by Robert A. J. Matthews as the error on the assumption that confessional evidence can never reduce the probability of guilt. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers usually emphasize the importance of logic, clarity and reason. Therefore when they address political issues one would expect that they would usually inject a dose of rationality in these discussions. But this book gives a lot of examples showing the unexpected level of political irrationality among leading contemporary philosophers.

Önsöz -- Giriş -- Osmanlı modernleşmesi -- Osmanlı gazeteciliği -- Edebiyat -- Kısaltmalar -- Dizin.

This article traces the institutional context for the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith in the 1960s and 1970s. It explores the origins of the stoicization thesis advanced by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie in their introductory essay to the TMS. Using the correspondence between the editors held at Glasgow University Special Collections, this article presents the development of editorial positions that would shape the twentieth-century reception of Smith's works.

It is nowadays a dominant opinion in a number of disciplines (anthropology, genetics, psychology, philosophy of science) that the taxonomy of human races does not make much biological sense. My aim is to challenge the arguments that are usually thought to invalidate the biological concept of race. I will try to show that the way “race” was defined by biologists several decades ago (by Dobzhansky and others) is in no way discredited by conceptual criticisms that are now fashionable and widely (...) regarded as cogent. These criticisms often arbitrarily burden the biological category of race with some implausible connotations, which then opens the path for a quick eliminative move. However, when properly understood, the biological notion of race proves remarkably resistant to these deconstructive attempts. Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation. (shrink)

One of the central theses of egalitarian liberals in the domain of distributive justice is that talented individuals should not be allowed to keep their entire market-income even if it flows solely from their greater abilities. This claim is usually supported by one of several arguments or some mixture of them, but in the present paper, I want to concentrate on the version that invokes equality of opportunity as its starting point. Namely, it is claimed that every human being should (...) enjoy an equal starting point in the life-race but that this is not secured insofar as some have greater natural talents than others. Therefore, egalitarians hold that results that arise from such an unfair situation are unjust and should be corrected by a redistributive taxation. I want to criticize this argument by hoping to show that it presupposes an untenable view about identity of persons. (shrink)

Old age is not normally associated with innovativeness and technical prowess. To the contrary, when treating age as a distinct category, policy makers, innovation scholars, and companies typically regard younger people as drivers of innovation, and the early adoption of new technology. In this paper, we critically investigate this link between age, ineptness, and technology adoption using a case study of the diffusion of electric bikes in the Netherlands. We demonstrate how, during the first wave of e-bike acceptance, old age (...) was constructed as an arena in which important learning processes took place, and where older persons became early adopters of e-bikes. Theoretically, this paper speaks critically to the prolific literature on innovation diffusion and its treatment of adopter categories as generic concepts. Using age as a central dimension, our research highlights the situated and constructed nature of adopter categories, and thus challenges age-based assumptions about innovation and technology use by younger and older persons. These insights about what we term the rejuvenation of e-bikes help us rectify existing biases of older persons as an inherently problematic group of technology users. (shrink)

Rad se bavi umiješanošću promatrača kao ograničenjem u racionalnom spoznavanju svijeta i otvaranjem prostora za druge oblike spoznaje. U velikoj mjeri ta se problematika tiče odnosa znanosti i vjere, pa se u uvodnom dijelu rada polazi od odnosa vjere i znanosti, a koji je kroz povijest prolazio kroz različite faze. U prvom poglavlju analiziraju se upravo etape kroz koje je prolazio odnos vjere, odnosno religije i znanosti: jedinstvo u srednjovjekovnoj sintezi, razilaženje i sukob, dijalog i komplementarnost. Za ostvarenje dijaloga između (...) vjere i znanosti ponajprije je zaslužan papa Pio XII. svojom enciklikom Humani generis . Ipak, najveći doprinos dijaloškom odnosu vjere i znanosti dao je papa Ivan Pavao II. koji je smatrao da jedna drugoj može biti od velike koristi te da samo dinamički odnos između teologije i znanosti može otkriti granice koje čuvaju cjelovitost obiju disciplina. Na jednak način, veliki doprinos uspostavi dijaloga vjere i znanosti dali su i znanstvenici, kako sa strane teološko-filozofske misli, tako i sa strane prirodoslovnih znanosti, osobito fizičari.U ovom radu se čini jedan iskorak u pogledu određenosti i konkretnog sadržaja granice koju znanosti ne mogu prijeći i preko koje se nalazi prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i za vjeru. Polazi se od stava da je za proučavanje bilo koga predmeta taj predmet potrebno odvojiti od promatrača, kako bi ga ovaj mogao podvrgnuti objektivnom proučavanju. Sam po sebi, taj je stav opće prihvaćen u svim znanostima i filozofiji, ali je suviše uopćen da bi eliminirao sve oblike umiješanosti i rafinirane pogreške pri zaključivanju.Pokazuje se da se u termodinamici i u Newtonovoj mehanici može točno definirati takvo stajalište promatrača, kojim je on potpuno odvojen od pojave koju promatra i iz kojega je u stanju da promatranu pojavu objektivno ispita. Takvo se stajalište onda količinski razlikuje od drugih stajališta s kojima bi bio »umiješan« u pojavu koju proučava. U znanostima u kojima se to može učiniti eksperimentalno se osnivaju, nalaze i koriste zakoni koji se mogu zvati »objektivnima«. No i u takvim znanostima ima oblika umiješanosti koji mogu ostati skriveni desetljećima i duže. U radu se ukazuje na tri takva oblika diskretne umiješanosti u termodinamici i mehanici. Za znanosti u kojima se točno količinsko razdvajanje objektivnih i umiješanih stajališta promatrača nije moglo učiniti, ili se načelno ne može učiniti, ne može biti ni sigurnosti od umiješanosti i time od rafiniranih pogrešaka u racionalnom zaključivanju. Odatle se sa znatnom heurističkom snagom izvodi zaključak da se u područjima spoznaje kojima se bave znanosti i filozofija racionalnim zaključivanjem može učiniti rafinirana pogreška i da postoji prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i vjeru.The introductory part of the work deals with the relation between science and other forms of cognition which has undergone various phases throughout history. The first chapter analyses the stages through which the relation between faith, i.e. religion, and science has passed: unity in medieval synthesis, divergence and conflict, dialogue and complementarity. Much credit goes to Pope Pius XII with his encyclical Humani Generis for the development of dialogue between religion and science. However, Pope John Paul II made the greatest contribution to the dialogical relation between faith and science. He believed that their relation could be of great value and that only the dynamic relation between religion and science could discover the limits that hold the integrity of both disciplines. In the same way, scientists, those of the theological-philosophical thought as well as those of natural sciences, especially physicists, have made a great contribution to setting up a dialogue between religion and science.This work is a step forward regarding the determinateness and concrete content of the limit that sciences cannot cross and beyond which is a space for other forms of cognition and for faith. The starting point is a standpoint that if one wants to study a subject, that subject has to be set apart from the observer, so that it can be objectively studied. In itself, that standpoint has been universally accepted in all sciences and in philosophy too, but it is too generalized to eliminate all the forms of interference and refined errors when drawing conclusions.It is established that in thermodynamics and in Newton’s mechanics one can precisely define such a standpoint of the observer, by which he/she is completely detached from the phenomenon he/she is observing and from which he/she is able to research the observed phenomenon objectively. Such a standpoint quantitatively differs from other standpoints, by which he/she would be “involved” with the phenomenon he/she is investigating. In the sciences in which it is possible to do that, laws that can be called “objective” are experimentally passed and adopted. But even in such sciences there are forms of involvement that may remain hidden for decades and longer. This work points at such three forms of discrete involvement in thermodynamics and mechanics. For the sciences in which a precise quantitative separation between the observer’s objective and involved standpoints was not possible, or is not principally possible, there cannot be safety of involvement and consequently of refined errors in rational concluding. Hence, with considerable heuristic strength, the following conclusion is drawn: All sciences, including philosophy, should explicitly take and put forward a view that, by rational conclusions, it is possible to make a refined mistake in their areas of cognition and that there is room for other forms of cognition and for religion. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to construct a new approach to and narrative of early Ottoman conquests in Thrace in the 1360s and 1370s. It argues that the so-called second capital of the Ottomans, Adrianople (Edirne), was conquered three times through a detailed evaluation of known, neglected, or unknow sources. The second conquest was almost certainly by frontier lords who conquered the city for their own interests. At the same time, the article challenges the unilinear rise paradigm within the Ottoman (...) studies. It showcases that, in the given period, the political arena between Ottomans, Byzantines, and other Turkish lords was open to various contingencies and dominated through constant negotiations among various parties. The practices of conquest, loss, and reconquest by those various parties determined the color of struggles not only in the case of Adrianople but also various other Thracian towns. The article finally sheds light on the role of a suppressed group of frontier lords who had their own political claims and agenda, betimes contrary to the Ottoman center. In the final analysis, this is an attempt to understand how new historical reconstructions may open up ways to conceptualize the political and social nature of the region in this period. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the acceleration of the history we are witnessing in our time, which is evident in a series of events and crises that mark the world we live in, especially after the start of the war in Ukraine, which have not occurred in such significant intensity and frequency since the end of the Second World War. Considering these events and crises, the paper discusses the thesis of a historian Eric Hobsbawm that the “short” 20th century that had lasted (...) as “the age of extremes” since the First World War ended with the fall of “communism” and the Berlin Wall, after which we in fact entered the 21st century. Contrary to this thesis and to the well-known thesis on the “end of history”, our paper presents the view that we are still “politically” in the 20th century, because in our time there are similar tensions between the great powers that marked the 20th century and which in general mark the modern world since Westphalian peace in the 17th century. This general thesis is explained by the observation of the most basic lines of the dialectics of modern European and world history. The paper concludes that we are not only “politically” living in the “long” 20th century, but we are still “politically” living in the “longest” classical Westphalian age, which has been lasting for three and a half centuries in the same dialectical contradictions of world politics. Ultimately, the paper also discusses the task of philosophy in the times of the so-called “acceleration of history”, such as ours, and concludes that philosophy as a discipline in these times is obligated to offer, with theoretical creativity, a fresh philosophy of history, explaining in wider perspective a series of actual international occurrences. (shrink)

In this book, Neven Sesardic defends the view that it is both possible and useful to measure the separate contributions of heredity and environment to the explanation of human psychological differences. He critically examines the view - very widely accepted by scientists, social scientists and philosophers of science - that heritability estimates have no causal implications and are devoid of any interest. In a series of clearly written chapters he introduces the reader to the problems and subjects the arguments (...) to close philosophical scrutiny. His conclusion is that anti-heritability arguments are based on conceptual confusions and misunderstandings of behavioural genetics. His book is a fresh and compelling intervention in a very contentious debate. (shrink)

This article critically explores John Rawls’s contention that the personal assets of individuals, i.e. their mental and bodily powers, should not determine the size of their holdings. Since such an argument may have several forms, the first task is to establish which of them Rawls himself advocates. He relies, it is argued, on a version that attempts to convince us that personal assets should not play a decisive distributive role because they are undeserved. This account is then formally reconstructed, making (...) all the relevant premises visible and preparing the ground for a critique that concentrates on the argument’s separate steps. Coming under attack first is the claim that everything should be deserved. The discussion examines next the premise urging us to find an ultimate, indisputable ground for desert-claims. Debate about this issue reveals some fundamental weaknesses in Rawls’s position: that he demands too much and is inconsistent; that some strong counter-intuitive consequences follow from his demands; and that his entire project, were such a criterion taken seriously, is undermined. Final comments are directed against the assertion that the community should own everything an individual does not deserve, showing that this does not remove moral arbitrariness, allows for the use of some persons as resources for others, and cannot plausibly limit its range of application. Most of these criticisms are not original, but are in accord with this paper’s main intention of combining as many good points against Rawls as possible. (shrink)

Rad se bavi konstituisanjem tzv. postideoloske politike u novijoj evropskoj istoriji kao specificne politicke linije koja se suprostavlja svim ideologizacijama politike koje stupaju na snagu posle Francuske revolucije. Termin 'postideoloska politika' se objasnjava i prakticno se potkrepljuje analizom lika i dela trojice znacajnih evropskih drzavnika - Bizmarka Cercila i De Gola koji su prepoznati kao najsnaznije ispoljavanje onoga sto smo nazvali postideoloskom politikom, a koju pre svega karakterise kreativnost, fleksibilnost i izbegavanje svih rigidnih politickih formula. Koncept tzv. postideoloske politike pociva (...) na definiciji politike kao 'umetnosti moguceg' sto je zasticuje od bilo kakvog preteranog ideologizovanja. (shrink)

U radu se razmatra 'vladavina' tzv. postgradjanskog politickog centra koji korespondira sa poznatim konceptom otvorenog drustva, te se ispituju kako dobre, tako i rdjave strane te 'vladavine'. Istrazuje se pre svega stabilnost globalnog otvorenog drustva i paznja se posvecuje njegovim savremenim neprijateljima - od terorizma, preko organizovanog kriminala, sve do tzv. lokalnih legitimnosti koje se suprostavljaju univerzalnoj i globalnoj legitimnosti koju zastupaju pristalice otvorenog drustva iz prostora postgradjanskog politickog centra. Rad predstavlja polemiku sa Fukujaminom tezom o 'kraju istorije' buduci da (...) otvoreno drustvo, tj. globalni postgradjanski politicki centar, ima vidljive neprijatelje koji ne dozvoljavaju da dijalektika istorije miruje kao sto je smatrao Fukujama. Mesto Fukujaminog 'kraja istorije' rad zakljucuje da trenutnu globalnu situaciju obelezava postmoderni opozit liberalno-demokratskog postgradjanskog centra i ekstremnih antigradjanskih margina, odnosno opozit otvorenog drustva i njegovih neprijatelja, sto ce usloviti dalji hod istorije ka novim sociolosko-istorijskim oblicima. (shrink)

Rad se bavi konstituisanjem tzv. postideoloske politike u novijoj evropskoj istoriji kao specificne politicke linije koja se suprostavlja svim ideologizacijama politike koje stupaju na snagu posle Francuske revolucije. Termin 'postideoloska politika' se objasnjava i prakticno se potkrepljuje analizom lika i dela trojice znacajnih evropskih drzavnika - Bizmarka Cercila i De Gola koji su prepoznati kao najsnaznije ispoljavanje onoga sto smo nazvali postideoloskom politikom, a koju pre svega karakterise kreativnost, fleksibilnost i izbegavanje svih rigidnih politickih formula. Koncept tzv. postideoloske politike pociva (...) na definiciji politike kao 'umetnosti moguceg' sto je zasticuje od bilo kakvog preteranog ideologizovanja. (shrink)

The Essay is describing one of the most important structural changes that are brought by post modern age comparing the classical modernism. That structural change is recognised in eruption of so called post materialistic values that are obvious in the fact that in post modern age major requirement becomes the requirement for recognising and identity, what results creating new post modern identities as specific combination of traditional forms of identities and some new forms discovered in the meantime. The eruption of (...) post materialistic values is witnessed by the peace between civil (democratic) society and conventional religions after The World War II, which gives the new post modern identity to the epoch. The promotion of post materialistic values is among the social movements contributed also by research results of so called positive, related to natural sciences, and that new specific reality of science in practice will be recognised in two new modern paradigms – general relativity and quant mechanics. Finally, the Essay is coming to conclusion that in the phenomenon of post materialistic values the era of new post modern «enchantment» is visible and is opposite to the Weber’s modernistic «un enchantment» (Entzauberung) of reality. (shrink)

U radu se razmatra 'vladavina' tzv. postgradjanskog politickog centra koji korespondira sa poznatim konceptom otvorenog drustva, te se ispituju kako dobre, tako i rdjave strane te 'vladavine'. Istrazuje se pre svega stabilnost globalnog otvorenog drustva i paznja se posvecuje njegovim savremenim neprijateljima - od terorizma, preko organizovanog kriminala, sve do tzv. lokalnih legitimnosti koje se suprostavljaju univerzalnoj i globalnoj legitimnosti koju zastupaju pristalice otvorenog drustva iz prostora postgradjanskog politickog centra. Rad predstavlja polemiku sa Fukujaminom tezom o 'kraju istorije' buduci da (...) otvoreno drustvo, tj. globalni postgradjanski politicki centar, ima vidljive neprijatelje koji ne dozvoljavaju da dijalektika istorije miruje kao sto je smatrao Fukujama. Mesto Fukujaminog 'kraja istorije' rad zakljucuje da trenutnu globalnu situaciju obelezava postmoderni opozit liberalno-demokratskog postgradjanskog centra i ekstremnih antigradjanskih margina, odnosno opozit otvorenog drustva i njegovih neprijatelja, sto ce usloviti dalji hod istorije ka novim sociolosko-istorijskim oblicima. (shrink)

Evidentno je postojanje veceg broja filozofsko politickih paradigmi u savremenoj politickoj teoriji i praksi. Svaka od njih (liberalna, radikalna konzervativna, socijalisticka) poseduje odredjene prednosti, ali je i bremenita - odredjenim opasnostima. Autor je misljenja daje neophodna njihova sinteza u pokusaju da se one primene na aktuelni drustveni trenutak u Srbiji. Proces transformacije drustva u svakoj drzavi je specifican i svaka mora da nadje sopstveni model za pristup pomenutom procesu. Clanak namerava da istrazi mogucu sintezu politickih paradigmi i da predlozi nacin (...) njihovog spajanja. U obzir ce se uzeti. pre svega, liberalna, ali i konzervativna i savremeno-socijalisticka (socijaldemokratska) filozofsko-politicka paradigma i promisljati ce se o mogucnosti njihovog ukrstanja. (shrink)

Racial profiling has come under intense public scrutiny especially since the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. This article discusses two questions: whether racial profiling is sometimes rational, and whether it can be morally permissible. It is argued that under certain circumstances the affirmative answer to both questions is justified.

In his criticism of my paper on the concept of race (Sesardic, 2010), Adam Hochman raises many issues that deserve further clarification. First, I will comment on Hochman’s claim that I attack a straw man version of racial constructionism. Second, I will try to correct what I see as a distorted historical picture of the debate between racial naturalists and racial constructionists. Third, I will point out the main weaknesses in Hochman’s own defense of constructionism about race. And fourth, I (...) will briefly comment on why I think that Hochman unjustifiably dismisses one of the potential sources of racial differentiation that were suggested in my paper. Before I start, though, a preliminary clarification is in order. Hochman kindly calls my article ‘‘one of the strongest defenses of racial naturalism in recent times’’, which might suggest to the reader that my goal was to offer a full-fledged biological explication of the concept of race. But in fact my ambition was more limited. As I explained: My aim in this paper was not to prove the biological reality of race. Rather, more modestly, I have tried to show that typical attempts to disconnect the concept of race from genetics have too quickly and too uncritically been accepted by many ‘‘race critics’’. (Sesardic, 2010, p. 160; italics added) I will continue defending the same position in this article. (shrink)

A number of philosophers attribute the underrepresentation of women in philosophy largely to bias against women or some kind of wrongful discrimination. They cite six sources of evidence to support their contention: (1) gender disparities that increase along the path from undergraduate student to full time faculty member; (2) anecdotal accounts of discrimination in philosophy; (3) research on gender bias in the evaluation of manuscripts, grants, and curricula vitae in other academic disciplines; (4) psychological research on implicit bias; (5) psychological (...) research on stereotype threat; and (6) the relatively small number of articles written from a feminist perspective in leading philosophy journals. In each case, we find that proponents of the discrimination hypothesis have tended to present evidence selectively. Occasionally they have even presented as evidence what appears to be something more dubious. (shrink)

Philosophers of science widely believe that the hereditarian theory about racial differences in IQ is based on methodological mistakes and confusions involving the concept of heritability. I argue that this "received view" is wrong: methodological criticisms popular among philosophers are seriously misconceived, and the discussion in philosophy of science about these matters is largely disconnected from the real, empirically complex issues debated in science.

The critics of "hereditarianism" often claim that any attempt to explain human behavior by invoking genes is confronted with insurmountable methodological difficulties. They reject the idea that heritability estimates could lead to genetic explanations by pointing out that these estimates are strictly valid only for a given population and that they are exposed to the irremovable confounding effects of genotype-environment interaction and genotype-environment correlation. I argue that these difficulties are greatly exaggerated, and that we would be wrong to regard them (...) as presenting a fundamental obstacle to the search for genetic explanations. I also show that, to the extent they are cogent, these objections may prove to be even more damaging to the "environmentalist" standpoint. (shrink)

To operationalize the methodological assessment of evolutionary psychology, three requirements are proposed that, if satisfied, would show that a hypothesis is not a just-so story: (1) theoretical entrenchment (i.e., that the hypothesis under consideration is a consequence of a more fundamental theory that is empirically well-confirmed across a very wide range of phenomena), (2) predictive success (i.e., that the hypothesis generates concrete predictions that make it testable and eventually to a certain extent corroborated), and (3) failure of rival explanations (i.e., (...) that crucial and successful predictions attributed to the hypothesis in question cannot be derived from alternative hypotheses). The author argues that the hypothesis about evolutionary sex differences in human jealousy satisfies all three requirements. Key Words: evolutionary psychology • adaptationism • philosophy of science • testability. (shrink)

Genetic differences can lead to phenotypic differences either directly or indirectly (via causing differences in external environments, which then affect phenotype). This possibility of genetic effects being mediated by environmental influences is often used by scientists and philosophers to argue that heritability is not a very helpful causal or explanatory notion. In this paper it is shown that these criticisms are based on serious misconceptions about methods of behavior genetics.

Political imputations in science are notoriously a tricky business. I addressed this issue in the context of the nature–nurture debate in the penultimate chapter of my book Making Sense of Heritability (Cambridge U. P. 2005). Although the book mainly dealt with the logic of how one should think about heritability of psychological differences, it also discussed the role of politics in our efforts to understand the dynamics of that controversy. I first argued that if a scholar publicly defends a certain (...) view (say, hereditarianism) in the debate about IQ, race and genetics this fact alone cannot justify attributing a political motivation to that person. But then later I suggested that the pressure of political correctness could explain some peculiarities of the contemporary controversy about the heritability of group differences in IQ. Several reviewers of my book raised a tu quoque objection. Am I not doing here the same thing that I condemn others for? (shrink)

According to Kant, the universalization of the maxim of false promising leads to a contradiction, namely, to everyone adopting the maxim of false promising which would in effect make promising impossible. I first propose a reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning in four steps and then show that each of these steps is highly problematic. In the second part I argue that attempts by several prominent contemporary philosophers to defend Kant fail because they encounter similar difficulties.