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Profile: Nicholas Georgalis (East Carolina University)
  1.  20
    The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study (...)
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  2. The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  3.  45
    First-Person Methodologies: A View From Outside the Phenomenological Tradition.Nicholas Georgalis - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):93-112.
    It is argued that results from first-person methodologies are unacceptable for incorporation into a fundamental philosophical theory of the mind unless they satisfy a necessary condition, which I introduce and defend. I also describe a narrow, nonphenomenal, first-person concept that I call minimal content that satisfies this condition. Minimal content is irreducible to third-person concepts, but it is required for an adequate account of intentionality, representation, and language. Consequently, consciousness is implicated in these as strongly—but differently—than it is in our (...)
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  4.  89
    Burge's Thought Experiment: Still in Need of Defense. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.
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  5.  15
    Intentionality and Representation.Nicholas Georgalis - 1986 - International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):45-58.
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  6.  23
    PostScript.Nicholas Georgalis - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):121-126.
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  7.  2
    Intentionality and Representation.Nicholas Georgalis - 1986 - International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):45-58.
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  8.  23
    Ontology Downgraded All the Way.Nicholas Georgalis - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):238–256.
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  9.  19
    Reference Remains Inscrutable.Nicholas Georgalis - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):123–129.
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  10.  18
    Review. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (6):745-748.
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  11.  8
    Review: A Realist's Teleological View of Belief. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):85 - 88.
  12. Mind, Language and Subjectivity: Minimal Content and the Theory of Thought.Nicholas Georgalis - 2014 - Routledge.
    In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of (...)
     
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