The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, (...) Is very probably incoherent. (shrink)

Based mainly on unpublished papers this is the first detailed study of the early, neo-Hegelian period of Bertrand Russell's career. It covers his philosophical education at Cambridge, his conversion to neo-Hegelianism, his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it.

Brandom’s inferentialism offers, in many ways, a radically new approach to old issues in semantics and the theory of intentionality. But, in one respect at least, it clings tenaciously to the mainstream philosophical tradition of the middle years of the twentieth century. Against the theory’s natural tendencies, Brandom aligns it with the ’linguistic turn’ that philosophy took in the middle of the last century by insisting, in the face of considerable opposing evidence, that intentionality is the preserve of those who (...) can offer and ask for reasons and thus of language users alone. In this paper, I argue that there is no good reason for giving inferentialism a linguistic twist, and that, in doing so, Brandom is forced to make claims which are implausible in themselves and lead him, in the attempt to mitigate them, to a number of doubtful expedients. (shrink)

The paper describes the evolution of russell's theory of judgment between 1910 and 1913, With especial reference to his recently published "theory of knowledge" (1913). Russell abandoned the book and with it the theory of judgment as a result of wittgenstein's criticisms. These criticisms are examined in detail and found to constitute a refutation of russell's theory. Underlying differences between wittgenstein's and russell's views on logic are broached more sketchily.

This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...) in responding to a variety of different problems relating to the proposition, chose to resolve these problems in ways that continually made concessions to psychologism. (shrink)

This long-awaited second volume of Russell's best letters reveals the inner workings of a philosophical genius and an impassioned campaigner for peace and social reform. The letters, only three of which have been published before, cover most of Russell's adult life, a period in which he wrote over thirty books, including his famous History of Western Philosophy . Richly illustrated with photographs from Russell's life, the collection includes letters to Ho Chi Minh, Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru and Albert Einstein.

Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, (...) viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unhmited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions. (shrink)

The paper defends Meinong's theory of objects against criticism by Reinhardt Grossmann. In particular, it is argued that Grossmann fails to show that non-existent objects may not be constituents of states of affairs and fails to provide an adequate alternative analysis of states of affairs which putatively contain nonexistent items. Grossmann, in fact, is guilty of a pervasive psychologistic misinterpretation of Meinong according to which Meinong believed that objects have all the properties with which they appear before the mind. Once (...) this error is avoided, Meinong's theory not only escapes Grossmann's criticisms but has a highdegree of plausibility. (shrink)

Russell’s rejection in 1898 of the doctrine of internal relations — the view that all relations are grounded in the intrinsic properties of the terms related — was a decisive part of his break with Hegelianism and opened the way for his turn to analytic philosophy. Before rejecting it, Russell had given the doctrine little thought, though it played an essential role in the most intractable of the problems facing his attempt to construct a Hegelian dialectic of the sciences. I (...) argue that it was Russell’s early reading of Leibniz, in preparation for his lectures on Leibniz given at Cambridge in 1899, that most probably alerted him to the role the doctrine was playing in his own philosophy. Leibniz defended a similar doctrine and extricated it from difficulties like those faced by Russell by means of devices that were not open to Russell. Russell would have come across these views of Leibniz in writings by Leibniz that he read in the summer of 1898, just before he rejected the doctrine of internal relations. References F. H. Bradley. Appearance and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Originally published 1893. Nicholas Griffin. Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Nicholas Griffin. Russell and Leibniz on the Classification of Propositions. In Ralf Krömer and Yannick Chin-Drian, editors, New Essays on Leibniz Reception. Basel, Birkhäuser, pp. 85–127, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0346-0504-5 G. W. Leibniz. Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz, 7 Volumes. Edited by C.I. Gerhardt. Berlin, Weidman, 1875–90. G. W. Leibniz. The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz. Edited by G.M. Duncan. New Haven, Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1890. G. W. Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Translated by A.G. Langley. London, Macmillan, 1896. G. W. Leibniz. The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings. Edited by R. Latta. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1898. G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2 Volumes. Edited by L.E. Loemker. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956. G. W. Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Translated and Edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. Massimo Mugnai. Leibniz’ Theory of Relations. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992. Massimo Mugnai. Leibniz’s Ontology of Relations: A Last Word?. In Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume IV. Edited by Daniel Garber and Donald Rutherford. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.001.0001 Walter H. O’Briant. Russell on Leibniz. Studia Leibniziana, 11: 159–222, 1979. B. Russell. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. New York, Dover, 1956. B. Russell. My Philosophical Development. London, Allen and Unwin, 1959. B. Russell. The Principles of Mathematics. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964. B. Russell. The Monistic Theory of Truth. In Philosophical Essays New York, Simon and Schuster, pages 131–46, 1968. B. Russell. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London, Allen and Unwin, 1975. B. Russell, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1, Cambridge Essays, 1888–99, edited by Kenneth Blackwell, et al. London, Allen and Unwin, 1983. B. Russell. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, Philosophical Papers, 1896–99, edited by Nicholas Grif?n and Albert C. Lewis. London, Routledge, 1989a. B. Russell. On the Relations of Number and Quantity (1897). In Russell [1989a], pages 70–82, 1989b. B. Russell. An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning (1898). In Russell [1989a], pages 163–241, 1989c. B. Russell. The Classification of Relations (1899), in Russell [1989a], pages 138–46, 1989d. B. Russell. The Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics (1899). In Russell [1989a], pages 265–305, 1989e. B. Russell. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 3, Towards “The Principles of Mathematics”, 1900–02, edited by Gregory H. Moore. London, Routledge, 1993a. B. Russell. The Principles of Mathematics, 1899–1900 Draft. In Russell [1993a], pages 13–180, 1993b. B. Russell. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 11, Last Philosophical Testament, 1943–68. Edited by John G. Slater. London, Routledge, 1997. (shrink)

A reply to Risjord's defense of the view that there is no conflict between non-Euclidean geometry and Kant's philosophy of geometry because, while the form of intuition restricts which systems of concepts may be accepted as a geometry, it does not do so uniquely ("Stud Hist Phil Sci, 21", 1990). I argue that under these circumstances it is difficult to sustain the synthetic "a priori" status of geometrical propositions. Two broad ways of attempting to do so are considered and criticized.

A review of R Bradley's 'The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's\nModal Atomism'. Bradley argues that Wittgenstein's modal commitments\nin the 'Tractatus' are more extensive than usually appreciated. I\nargue that, nonetheless, Bradley's attempt to see Wittgenstein as\na major contributor to modal 'logic' is hard to square with Wittgenstein's\npervasive conflation of modal issues with significance ones.

For a long time it was widely believed that meinong held that every object of reference had being. this has since come to be recognized as a 'horrible travesty' (findlay's phrase) of meinong's position. however, a new horrible travesty has grown up: namely, that the original misinterpretation of meinong was due to russell's early discussions of his work. while it is conceded that russell's later writings contained travesties of meinong, it is shown (using unpublished documents in the bertrand russell archives (...) as well as russell's published writings) that, in his early critical discussions of meinong, russell was fully aware that for meinong some objects had no kind of being at all. (shrink)

The paper defends Meinong's theory of objects against criticism by Reinhardt Grossmann. In particular, it is argued that Grossmann fails to show that non-existent objects may not be constituents of states of affairs and fails to provide an adequate alternative analysis of states of affairs which putatively contain nonexistent items. Grossmann, in fact, is guilty of a pervasive psychologistic misinterpretation of Meinong according to which Meinong believed that objects have all the properties with which they appear before the mind. Once (...) this error is avoided, Meinong's theory not only escapes Grossmann's criticisms but has a highdegree of plausibility. (shrink)