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Nicholas K. Jones
University of Birmingham
  1.  50
    Unrestricted Quantification and the Structure of Type Theory.Nicholas K. Jones & Salvatore Florio - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Semantic theories based on a hierarchy of types have prominently been used to defend the possibility of unrestricted quantification. However, they also pose a prima facie problem for it: each quantifier ranges over at most one level of the hierarchy and is therefore not unrestricted. It is difficult to evaluate this problem without a principled account of what it is for a quantifier to be unrestricted. Drawing on an insight of Russell’s about the relationship between quantification and the structure of (...)
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  2.  57
    How to Unify.Nicholas K. Jones - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper evaluates the argument for the contradictoriness of unity, that be- gins Priest’s recent book One. The argument is seen to fail because it does not adequately differentiate between different forms of unity. This diagnosis of the argument’s failure is used as a basis for two consistent accounts of unity. The paper concludes by arguing that reality contains two absolutely fundamental and unanalysable forms of unity, which are in principle presupposed by any theory of anything. These fundamental forms of (...)
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  3.  23
    Propositions and Cognitive Relations.Nicholas K. Jones - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):157-178.
    There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of (...)
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  4. Nominalist Realism.Nicholas K. Jones - 2018 - Noûs:0-1.
    This paper explores the impact of quantification into predicate position on the metaphysics of properties, arguing that two familiar debates about properties are fundamentally altered by recasting them in a second-order setting. Two theories of properties are outlined, differing over whether the existence of properties is expressed using first-order or second-order quantifiers. It is argued that the second-order theory: provides good reason to regard debate about the locations of properties as contentless; resolves debate about whether properties are particulars or universals (...)
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  5.  53
    A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.
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  6. Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn’T Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...)
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  7.  12
    Multiple Constitution.Nicholas K. Jones - 2015 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmer (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. Oxford: OUP. pp. 217-261.
    This paper outlines a novel solution to the problem of the many and a conception of ordinary objects that implies it. The solution is that many collections of particles can simultaneously constitute a single object. The proposed conception of ordinary objects maintains that they are fundamentally subjects of change: the changes an object is able to survive explain its constitution.
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  8.  23
    The Proper Treatment of Identity in Dialetheic Metaphysics.Nicholas K. Jones - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to one prominent strand of mainstream logic and metaphysics, identity is indistinguishability. Priest has recently argued that this permits counterexamples to the transitivity and substitutivity of identity within dialetheic metaphysics, even in paradigmatically extensional contexts. This paper investigates two alternative regimentations of indistinguishability. Although classically equivalent to the standard regimentation on which Priest focuses, these alternatives are strictly stronger than it in dialetheic settings. Both regimentations are transitive, and one satisfies substitutivity. It is argued that both regimentations provide better (...)
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  9. Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism.Nicholas K. Jones - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (11):633-641.
    Central to discussion of supervaluationist accounts of vagueness is the extent to which they require revisions of classical logic and if so, whether those revisions are objectionable. In an important recent Journal of Philosophy article, J.R.G. Williams presents a powerful challenge to the orthodox view that supervaluationism is objectionably revisionary. Williams argues both that supervaluationism is non-revisionary and that even if it were, those revisions would be unobjectionable. This note shows that his arguments for both claims fail.
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  10.  74
    The Universe As We Find It. By John Heil.Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):839-841.
    This is a review of John Heil's "The Universe as We Find It".
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  11.  59
    The Representational Limits of Possible Worlds Semantics.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):479-503.
    This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the non-representational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ non-representational artefacts does not cohere with his modal metaphysics. Invariance-based analyses of non-representational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds (...)
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  12.  33
    Object as a Determinable.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-151.
    This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception (...)
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  13.  48
    Realism Behind the Veil.Nicholas K. Jones - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):721-730.
    This is a critical notice of Tim Button's book "The Limits of Realism".
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  14.  34
    Review of Fixing Reference By Imogen Dickie. [REVIEW]Nicholas K. Jones - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (1):148-153.
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