Focusing on the concept of “the moral self” this essay explores relationships between Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and John Dewey’s moral pragmatism and tries to evaluate the extent to which in his work on ethics Aristotle may be considered a pragmatist. Aristotle foreshadows pragmatism, for example, in preferring virtue-based to rule-based ethics, in contending that the moral status of a person’s actions and the nature of the person’s selfhood are interdependent, and in stressing the key role of habits in character formation. (...) Aristotle, however, may seem far from the status of pragmatist when he privileges the life of contemplation and posits a moral self that is more static than the one proposed by Dewey. This essay contends that if more attention is paid to Aristotle’s treatment of friendship and to his highlighting of the need for reciprocity then the moral self that emerges from Nicomachean Ethics becomes more dialectical and more at one with that proposed by the American pragmatist. Aristotle, then, may be regarded as setting Dewey on the path towards a model of moral self that is not only deeply concerned about the lives of others but that is also dependent on others for its own existence. (shrink)
http://www.cla.umn.edu/jhopkins/ Taken together, twenty-four of these works constitute Nicholas of Cusa’s complete philosophical and theological treatises. They must be supplemented by studying his richly conceptual sermons, along with his ecclesiological and exegetical writings such as De Concordantia Catholica and Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus. His mathematical writings are also of interest, even though they are not of lasting importance, as Gottfried Leibniz rightly recognized.
This introduction sets the stage for four papers on Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs , written by Harold Attridge, Oliver O'Donovan, Richard Bernstein, and myself. In his book, Wolterstorff defends an account of human rights. The first section of this introduction distinguishes Wolterstorff's account of rights from the alternative account of rights against which he contends. The alternative account draws much of its power from a historical narrative according to which theory and politics supplanted earlier ways of thinking (...) about justice. The second section sketches that narrative and Wolterstorff's counter-narrative. The third section draws together the main points of Wolterstorff's own account. (shrink)
We show that in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group finite definable extensions of a definable group which is defined in a reduct are already defined in the reduct. A similar result is proved for finite topological extensions of definable groups defined in o-minimal expansions of the ordered set of real numbers.
At the beginning of De Visione Dei, Nicholas of Cusa puts us before an icon of the divine glance and invites us to an experimentation – initially surrounded by the metaphorical reflection – of the mystic contemplation. Working with the metaphor of the glance, the Cusano leaves us before the Creator’s look and the creature’s look. In the De Visione Dei, the divine look is creator and lover. The God’s look sees, creates and loves. This way, the present work (...) will look for to meditate on the importance of the glance, seeking in the De Visione Dei a way to relate the multiplicity of the created look with the unit of the creator look. (shrink)
This response to Justice, Rights and Wrongs argues that Wolterstorff’s defence of rights attaching to human subjects withstands Oliver O’Donovan’s critique; that the concept of multiple rights is compatible with the affirmation of a larger moral order; that there is a problem with rights thought to be determined in advance of moral deliberation; that love should not only recognize rights (with Wolterstorff) but should react to their violation with retribution (against Wolterstorff); that a biblical and theological case can be made (...) for a Christian form of eudaimonism; and that Wolterstorff ’s attempt to ground human worth in the love of God rather than in some capacity or other does not work. (shrink)
The origin of modern christian Aristotelianism founded first, in the positive and negative sense, the Renaissance philological-historical humanism. In the first case it provided hermeneutic methods which ensured a study of authentic Aristotelianism covered by the medieval scholastic syntheses. The application of Renaissance hermeneutics brought forth the revival of Aristotelian studies. They made efforts to read out the authentic heritage of Aristotle, therefore they referred to more literal interpreters, such as Alexander of Aphrodisia or Averroës. This practice aroused anxiety about (...) the conformity of the Aristotelian doctrine to the Christian doctrine and called for some steps to use the interpretations that satisfied this condition, i.e. the times of golden scholasticism in the form of the so-called of via antiqua. At the same time the role of Christianised Aristotelianism was stressed vis-à-vis philosophical pluralism which threatened the unity of Christian theology, especially neo-Platonism involved in various naturalistic trends. They made religion philosophical and threatened its identity through the relativization of the Biblical revelation. The latter was treated as one of the elements of mystic wisdom. On the other hand Renaissance humanism by stressing the role of philological-historical studies reduced the importance of philosophy, treated at most as a praxistic ethical reflection. No wonder then that the reform of the mid-15th century – initiated by Pope Nicholas V, a prominent humanist – made efforts to preserve the unity of the church doctrine in which philosophy would play the role of a rational foundation of religious faith. This reform tended on the one hand to the revival of the philosophical spirit, especially the maximalistically understood philosophy of Aristotelianism, on the other it sought to conform this Aristotelianism to Christianity. (shrink)