Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), a student of canon law who became a Catholic cardinal, was widely considered the most important original philosopher of the Renaissance. He wrote principally on theology, philosophy, and church politics. This volume makes most of Nicholas's other writings on Church and reform available in English for the first time.

Given the significance of Nicholas of Cusa’s ecclesiastical career, it is no surprise that a good deal of academic attention on Nicholas has focused on his role in the history of the church. Nevertheless, it would also be fair to say that a good deal of the attention that is focused on the life and thought of Nicholas of Cusa is the legacy of prior generations of scholars who saw in his theoretical work an opportunity (...) to define the most salient features of transformations in the habits of thinking leading from the Middle Ages into the epoch of modernity. Thus, although contemporary scholars have not been able to achieve any clear consensus on the question of whether Nicholas belongs to the Middle Ages or to modernity, the field of Cusanus studies has become much more attentive to the possibility that the uniqueness and significance of Nicholas’s vision is a function of his ability to synthesize and redeploy a variety of strands in the Catholic intellectual tradition—strands that are as apt to involve practical matters of canon law and church reform as they are to hinge on a unique and richly developed mystical theology. Given the flourishing of the attention devoted to Nicholas in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the choices about which texts to include in this article were difficult ones. The rationale for this article’s predominant focus on scholarship of the late 20th and early 21st centuries is that, insofar as the recent studies listed here enter into the debates that have been shaped by their predecessors, the sources mentioned here will point readers to the prior work in the field not acknowledged here. (shrink)

In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by (...) its own meta-exclusivism. (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was active during the Renaissance, developing adventurous ideas even while serving as a churchman. The religious issues with which he engaged – spiritual, apocalyptic and institutional – were to play out in the Reformation. These essays reflect the interests of Cusanus but also those of Gerald Christianson, who has studied church history, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The book places Nicholas into his times but also looks at his later reception. The first part (...) addresses institutional issues, including Schism, conciliarism, indulgences and the possibility of dialogue with Muslims. The second treats theological and philosophical themes, including nominalism, time, faith, religious metaphor, and prediction of the end times. (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa In the 21st century, Nicholas of Cusa or Cusanus is variously appreciated as a Christian disciple of the burgeoning Italian humanism of the 15th century, one of the great mystical theologians and reforming bishops of the late Middle Ages, and a dialogical religious thinker whose philosophical and political ideas peacefully contemplate … Continue reading Nicholas of Cusa →.

An analysis of Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of the power of judgment that shows it enables morality as well as cognition.

I argue that Nicholas of Cusa agrees with Thomas Aquinas on the metaphysics of analogy in God, but differs on epistemology, taking a Platonic position against Aquinas’ Aristotelianism. As a result Cusa has to rethink Thomas’ solution to the problem of discourse about God. In De docta ignorantia he uses the mathematics of the infinite as a clue to the relations between a thing and its Measure and this allows him, he thinks, to adapt Aquinas’ approach to (...) the problem of his own epistemology. The resulting approach, I maintain, is coherent and reasonable if the metaphysical views behind it are. (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was one of the most original thinkers of the Renaissance. This collection examines, from several viewpoints, his speculative thought and reviews his ideas on dialogue with non- Christians in the light of his theories. The articles originated in papers presented at several conferences sponsored by the American Cusanus Society, 1981-1988. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This article discusses how Nicholas of Cusa’s speculative philosophy harbors an ecumenical spirit that is deeply entwined and in tension with his commitment to incarnational mystical theology. On the basis of my discussion of this tension, I intend to show that Nicholas understands “faith” as a poietic activity whose legitimacy is rooted less in the independent veracity of the beliefs in question than in the potential of particular religious conventions to aid intellectual processes of self-interpretation. In undertaking (...) this analysis, the paper will use Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei—whose overt intention is to show that all forms of religious practice presuppose the same universal faith—as an interpretive lens to explore implications of the philosophical anthropology that Nicholas offers in treatises such as De ludo globi and De venatione sapientiae. Thus, I will argue that Nicholas’ appreciation of the inevitability of religious diversity in the temporal world funds the consistently favored view in his speculative works that “faith” is a virtue only insofar as its adherent genuinely remains in search of understanding and that, consequently, religious beliefs should function as nothing more than tools for creative activity, interpretation, and inquiry. (shrink)

One of the basic elements of Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy of mathematics is his theory of mathematical objects as “entities-of-reason” (entia rationis). He refers to these as being “abstracted from sensible things”. That is why it is possible to assume that Nicholas bases his theory of mathematics on Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. Aristotle too describes mathematical objects as coming into being through abstraction (ex aphaireseos). The author analyses Cusa's understanding of abstraction in De docta ignorantia and (...) De mente and tries to show that – according to Nicholas of Cusa – the abstraction, which is ens rationis, simultaneously stimulates the human mind to produce mathematical objects from within itself. The author attempts to show how Cusa's philosophy of mathematics is not directly based on Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics – Aristotle is not an abstractionist and does not ascribe the existence of mathematical objects to the mind of the mathematician – but on the abstractionist interpretation of Aristotle by Alexander of Aphodisias, who was followed by the predominantly neoplatonist commentators of Aristotle. These commentators did not see any important differences in the metaphysical or epistemological underpinnings of abstractionism and the so-called projectionism, i.e. the theory according to which mathematical objects pre-exist in the soul. (shrink)

Considering the historical background and the transmission of the manuscripts, the paper discusses the relations between Nicholas of Cusa and the so-called “Cologne School” – Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strasbourg, Ugo Ripelin of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg. In this context are highlighted a few moments of the biography of Nicholas of Cusa, especially the friendship with Heymeric de Campo between 1425 and 1429, the debate with Johannes Wenck and the (...) meeting with Dionysius the Carthusian in 1451. (shrink)

In this far-reaching essay, historian Michael Edward Moore examines modernity as an historical epoch following the end of the medieval period -- and as a "messianic concept of time." In the early twentieth century, a debate over the meaning and origins of modernity unfolded among the philosophers Ernst Cassirer, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Blumenberg. These thinkers tried to resolve the puzzle of the fifteenth-century master Nicholas of Cusa. Was Cusanus the last great medieval thinker, his ideas a summa (...) of medieval tradition? Or was he a mysterious epochal figure, seated at one end of the bridge leading to modern thought? Nicholas of Cusa lived during a time of historical and existential crisis, or kairos, when medieval governments and cherished sources of unity were shaken. Likewise, the debate over his significance took place during a later phase of crisis for Europe, in the decades before and after the Second World War, when the collapse of European civilization was witnessed. Moore argues that modernity, so intently examined as an historical and spiritual problem, has significance for our contemporary sense of crisis. (shrink)

By permission of The Gale Group, this article is reprinted (here on-line) from “Nicholas of Cusa,” pp. 122-125, Volume 9 of the Dictionary of the Middle Ages, edited by Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1987 ). The short bibliography at the end of the original article has been omitted; and the page numbers of the article are here changed.

This volume commemorates the 6th centennial of the birth of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), a Renaissance polymath whose interests included law, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, theology, mysticism and relations between Christians and non-Christian peoples. The contributors to this volume reflect Cusanus' multiple interests; and, by doing so they commemorate three deceased luminaries of the American Cusanus Society: F. Edward Cranz, Thomas P. McTighe and Charles Trinkaus. Contributors include: Christopher M. Bellitto, H. Lawrence Bond, Elizabeth Brient, Louis Dupré, Wilhelm Dupré, (...) Walter Andreas Euler, Lawrence Hundersmarck, Thomas M. Izbicki, Dennis D. Martin, Yelena Matusevich, Bernard McGinn, Clyde Lee Miller, Thomas E. Morrissey, Brian A. Pavlac, and Morimichi Watanabe. Publications by Charles Trinkaus: - Edited by C. Trinkaus and H.A. Oberman, The pursuit of holiness in late medieval and renaissance religion, ISBN: 978 90 04 03791 5 (Out of print). (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa, 15. yy. felsefesinde önemli bir kavşağı temsil eder. Orta Çağ’da Skolastik düşüncenin tahakkümü altındaki bilim ve felsefenin âlem tasavvurunun Rönesans’la birlikte farklılaşmasında Cusa’nın eklemlendiği felsefe geleneğinin etkisinin bulunduğu söylenebilir. Cusa, Platon felsefesi temelinde ortaya koyduğu teolojik varlık anlayışıyla sonlu ile sonsuz arasında net bir ayırıma gitmiştir. Tanrı’nın birliği fikrini merkeze alarak şekillendirdiği teolojisinde, bu birlik perspektifinde geliştirdiği Tanrı- âlem ilişkisini diyalektik bir yaklaşımla aynılık ve gayrılık kavrayışı içerisinde ele almıştır. Cusa, Tanrı’yı ve (...) varlığının devamını Tanrı’ya borçlu olduğundan dolayı âlemi bir açıdan ayniyet içerisinde görerek, onların mahiyetçe bilinemez olduğunu savunmuş ve bu sahadaki bilgisizliği Tanrısal bir idrake bağlı kılarak olumlamıştır. Diğer yandan içinde yaşadığı dönemin ruhuna uygun olarak geliştirdiği hümanist, septik ve bilimsel bilginin imkânlarını göz ardı etmeyen bakış açısıyla, âlemin bilgisini elde edeceğini düşündüğü matematiksel yöntemle adeta modern bilim ve felsefenin haberciliğini yapmıştır. Bu çalışma, Nicholas of Cusa’nın felsefesinde yer alan varlık anlayışını Tanrı-âlem ilişkisi çerçevesinde incelemek için yapılmıştır. (shrink)

The volume focuses on the relation between Cusanus and Aristotle or the Aristotelian tradition - an issue addressed by recent scholarship only with partial or provisional results. Through a general survey, the essays included in the book aim at systematically verifying how Cusanus received Aristotle's thought and its different sciences, and how he dealt with Aristotelianism in its philosophical and theological implications."-- Back cover.

Despite being one of the major figures in late medieval thought and being the subject of numerous studies, certain topics concerning the Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa remain in need of further investigation. One of these is an aspect of his theory of cognition: his account of sense perception. It is our aim in this study to systematically look at his scattered remarks on the topic and make a number of suggestions as to the nature of his thought on (...) how we come to know external things. It is not our purpose to offer a comprehensive account of his theory of cognition. Our focus in this article is on his account of perception and the specific claim that Nicholas develops a model whereby reason operates together with the senses in perceptual experience. Despite being tentative our claim is grounded on suggestions found in the scholarship on Cusanus; but these suggestions remain quite vague and in need of exploration. In this article, we closely examine the textual evidence and develop our claim based o... (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to analyze Nicholas of Cusa’s reading on the dispute of Mystical Theology through Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. To do this, first of all, we will address the analyses offered by Jean-Luc Marion on the problem of affectivity. Secondly, we examine Nicholas’ interpretation of Mystical Theology through the aenigma of the eicona dei in De visione dei. Thirdly, we present Jean-Luc Marion’s interpretation of Cusanus eicona dei as an antecedent of (...) his phenomenological conception of Icone as “saturated phenomenon.” Finally, we suggest that Cusanus eicona dei appears in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology as a precedent of his strategy when approaching the field of affectivity. Both authors try to show an instance preceding the distinction between affectivity and rationality. (shrink)

The article compares for the first time Luther‘s reflections on Islam with Cusanus‘s. Both thinkers didn‘t engage in Islam on their own initiative, but because they were prompted by political developments. Luther‘s writings on Islam are mostly authored in German. He addresses the public in the empire and tries to encourage Christians challenged in their Christians faith, especially those who are in Turkish captivity. Nicholas of Cusa addresses also Islamic receivers in his Cribratio Alkorani. Luther stresses the contrast (...) between the gospel of Jesus Christ and the message of Muhammad, whereas Cusanus tries to build theological bridges between Christianity and Islam. (shrink)

The authors focus on four major thematic areas – the reform of church, the reform of theology, the reform of perspective, and the reform of method – which together encompasses the breadth and depth of Cusanus’ own reform initiatives.

I argue that Nicholas of Cusa agrees with Thomas Aquinas on the metaphysics of analogy in God, but differs on epistemology, taking a Platonic position against Aquinas’ Aristotelianism. As a result Cusa has to rethink Thomas’ solution to the problem of discourse about God. In De docta ignorantia he uses the mathematics of the infinite as a clue to the relations between a thing and its Measure and this allows him, he thinks, to adapt Aquinas’ approach to (...) the problem of his own epistemology. The resulting approach, I maintain, is coherent and reasonable if the metaphysical views behind it are. (shrink)

With the English translation of the two Latin works contained in this present book, which is a sequel to Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One],1 I have now translated all2 of the major treatises and dialogues of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), except for De Concordantia Catholica.3 My plans call for collecting, in the near future, these translations into a two-volume paperback edition—i.e., into a Reader—that will serve, more generally, students of the history of philosophy and (...) theology. Reasons of economy dictate that footnotes and introductory analyses be left aside, so that the prospective Reader cannot be thought of as a replacement for the more scholarly previously published volumes. (shrink)

Ever since Ernst Cassirer in his epochal book Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance1 labeled Nicholas of Cusa “the first modern thinker,” interest in Cusa’s thought has burgeoned. At various times, both before and after Cassirer, Nicholas has been viewed as a forerunner of Leibniz,2 a harbinger of Kant,3 a prefigurer of Hegel,4 indeed, as an anticipator of the whole of..

This book uncovers the lost history of Christianity's encounters with Pythagorean ideas before the Renaissance. David Albertson skillfully examines ancient and medieval theologians, particularly Thierry of Chartres and Nicholas of Cusa, who successfully reconceived the Trinity and the Incarnation within the framework of Greek number theory. David Albertson challenges modern assumptions about the complex relationship between religion and science.

A. Historical Context. The ancient philosophers regarded wisdom (sofiva) as an excellence (ajrethv). Plato devoted much of the Pro- tagoras to a “proof” that holiness (oJsiovth"), courage (ajndreiva), justice (dikaiosuvnh), and self-control (swfrosuvvnh) are but variants of wisdom, which he there also sometimes referred to as knowledge (ejpisthvmh). In not distinguishing explicitly between either various notions of wisdom or various notions of knowledge, Plato—or, at least, the Platonic Socrates—found himself troubled as to whether moral excellence, i.e., moral virtue, could be (...) taught. Is it really teachable, really knowledge, or is it, instead, a special gift of the gods to some men but not to others?, he asked in the Meno. As we witness from the Laws, but also from the Republic, Plato came to favor the view that moral virtue is indeed teachable and is indeed a kind of knowledge. In general, he depicted the philosopher—the lover of wisdom—as desirous, foremostly, of knowing the Good. This pursuit of Goodness was thought to have both a contemplative1 and a noncontemplative dimension to it, so that the philosopher was characterized both as someone given to reflecting upon the eternal Form of the Good and as someone knowing how to behave well. Although in the Phaedrus the gods alone are said to be wise (278D), with the philosopher being described as striving to become ever more godlike as he draws intellectually nearer to wisdom, none of the other Platonic dialogues insist upon this exclusivistic use of the epithet “wise”. (shrink)

regions of Constantinople, was inflamed with zeal for God as a result of those deeds that were reported to have been perpetrated at Constantinople most recently and most cruelly by the King of the Turks.2 Consequently, with many groanings he beseeched the Creator of all, because of His kindness, to restrain the persecution that was raging more fiercely than usual on account of the difference of rite between the [two] religions. It came to pass that after a number of days—perhaps (...) because of his prolonged, incessant meditation—a vision was shown to this same zealous man. Therefrom he educed the following: the few wise men who are rich in the experiential knowledge of all such differences as are observed throughout the world in the [different] religions can find a single, readily-available harmony ; and through this harmony there can be constituted, by a suitable and true means, perpetual peace within [the domain of ] religion. Hence, in order that this vision might one day become known to those who have a say in these especially important matters, he wrote down plainly, in what follows, as much of it as he recalled. For he had been caught up to an intellectual height where, as it. (shrink)

Although the dimness of my intelligence is already known to Your Paternity,1 nonetheless by careful scrutiny you have endeavored to find in my intelligence a light. For when during the gathering of herbs there came to mind the apostolic text in which James indicates that every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, from the Father of lights,2 you entreated me to write down my conjecture about the interpretation of this text. I know, Father, that you have a (...) firm grasp of that which has been written by the most learned theologians but that I have read very little of their writings. Thus, I would rightly be ashamed were I to be unaware of the soundness of your mind. Read, then, with a suitable interpretation what my view is. (shrink)