It is an old charge against Locke that his commitment to a common substratum for the observable qualities of particular objects and his empiricist theory about the origin of ideas are inconsistent with one another. How could we have an idea of something in which observable qualities inhere if all our ideas are constructed from ideas of observable qualities? In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the crucial passages in Locke, according to which the idea of substratum is formed (...) through an elaborate mental process which he calls “supposition.” It is the same process we use when we form the idea of infinity − another problematic idea for an empiricist. In the end, Locke was more liberal than most empiricists in subscribing to the existence of ideas far removed from experience, because he accepted supposition as a legitimate way of constructing new ideas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 95-102 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Some Initial Reflections on NBAC Eric M. Meslin and Harold T. Shapiro On 3 October 2001, Executive Order 12975 expired, and with it so too did the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Established by President Bill Clinton in 1995, NBAC was the fifth national committee since 1974 created to advise the U.S. (...) government on bioethics policy. In the long political tradition in this country that national bioethics policy advice should use temporary rather than permanent bodies, NBAC followed in the footsteps of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974-78); the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1980-83); the Ethics Advisory Board (1978-80); and the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee (1988-89). Arguably, other distinguished panels could lay claim to recognition as a "national bioethics committee" including the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) (1994-95); the Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (1988); the Human Embryo Research Panel (1994); and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), which continues to function.These committees and commissions form a kind of a continuum, albeit occasionally interrupted by periods during which no such bodies existed. Each arose from a particular confluence of events and circumstances. NBAC was no different; its history can be traced both to a series of discussions within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy beginning in 1993 (NBAC 1998a, p. 3), and to a specific recommendation from ACHRE that called for a national committee to address ethical issues in human subjects research (ACHRE 1995, p. 817). Nbac's Impact In his useful comparison of the accomplishments of the National Commission and the President's Commission, Brad Gray concluded that seven lessons were learned, the sixth of which was that "nothing substitutes for having a perceptible impact on either policy or practice" (Gray 1995, p. 304). Assessing NBAC's [End Page 95] impact on "policy or practice" is difficult, particularly given the fact that it so recently completed its work. More time may be needed before a full assessment can be undertaken of the impact of its six reports (and their total of 120 recommendations). Instead, in this essay we offer some reflections on NBAC's initial impact, using some specific examples of how bioethics gets done Inside the Beltway. Eliciting Reaction If immediate reaction by the White House is any measure of impact, then Cloning Human Beings (NBAC 1997) had a significant one. The day after he received this report in a Rose Garden ceremony, President Clinton submitted a bill to Congress that would have extended the moratorium on federal funding to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer. This bill never passed, nor has any other bill emerged that has enjoyed the support of the House and the Senate. Five states have enacted legislation to date, but these vary in their permissibility from bans on all forms of cloning to bans similar to the one proposed by NBAC, which recommended a time-limited prohibition only on somatic cell transfer to create a child (reproductive cloning).If the Cloning report elicited speedy action from the White House, this paled in comparison to the reaction that led to and, in turn, was created by Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research (NBAC 1999a). Those who believe that government moves slowly need only be reminded of the events of 8-14 November 1998 (and, as we shall mention below, the further events of 14 July 1999). Some will recall that early in the second week of November 1998, James Thomson and his colleagues published in Nature and John Gearhart and his colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that they had isolated and cultured human primordial stem cells and germ cells respectively. Within days of these remarkable reports, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT) announced via an article written by Nicholas Wade in the... (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro's ambition in Vagueness in Context is to develop a comprehensive account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace that the extensions of vague terms vary according to their context: a person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with respect to professional basketball players. The key feature of Shapiro's account is that the extensions of (...) vague terms also vary in the course of conversations and that, in some cases, a competent speaker can go either way without sinning against the meaning of the words or the non-linguistic facts. As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages that humans speak; but vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to communicate features of it to each other. (shrink)

Moving beyond both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics, Shapiro articulates a "structuralist" approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Embodied cognition is one of the foremost areas of study and research in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key philosophers, topics and debates in this exciting subject and essential reading for any student and scholar of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: Historical Underpinnings Perspectives (...) on Embodied Cognition Applied Embodied Cognition: Perception, Language and Reasoning Applied Embodied Cognition: Social and Moral Cognition and Emotion Applied Embodied Cognition: Memory, Attention and Group Cognition Meta-Topics. The early chapters of the Handbook cover empirical and philosophical foundations of embodied cognition, focusing on Gibsonian, phenomenological and cybernetic approaches. Subsequent chapters cover additional, important themes common to work in embodied cognition, incuding embedded , extended and enactive cognition as well as chapters on embodied cognition and empirical research in perception, language, reasoning, social and moral cognition, emotion, consciousness, memory and learning and development. (shrink)

Typically, a logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language is, or corresponds to, a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record which inferences are correct for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions, or possible truth conditions, for at least part of the language.

In The Phenomenology of Religious Belief, the renowned philosopher Michael J. Shapiro investigates how art - and in particular literature and film - can impact upon both traditional interpretations and critical studies of religious beliefs and experiences. In doing so, he examines the work of prolific and award-winning writers such as Toni Morrison, Philip K. Dick and Robert Coover. By placing their work in conjunction with critical analyses of media by the likes of Ingmar Bergman and Pier Paolo Pasolini (...) and combining it with the work of groundbreaking thinkers such as George Canguilhem, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek, Shapiro takes a truly interdisciplinary approach to the question of how life should be lived. His assessment of phenomenological subjectivity also leads him to question the nature of political theology and extend the criticism of Pauline theology. (shrink)

Holding life and death in their hands -- Is this for me? -- The intensive care unit. Personnel ; Rhythms ; Economics -- Actors. Patients ; Friends, family, and significant others ; Health care professionals -- Decisions. Informed consent ; Venues ; Affect ; Conflict -- Prognosis. Evidence ; Timing ; Mixed messages ; Negotiation ; Accuracy ; Prognostic framing -- Decision-making scripts. The legal script ; Cognitive scripts ; Conflicts of interest ; Law at the bedside -- Improvisation: decisions (...) in the real world. The patient should decide ; Reprising patient instructions ; Standing in the patient's shoes ; Beneficence ; It's God's decision ; What we want ; Denial, opting out -- Making a difference? The role of physicians ; Opting for a trajectory ; Outcomes ; I thought the law would take care of this ; Does any of this matter? -- The end. Implications ; Before it's too late ; When it's too late ; When "this" happens to me. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Michael Rescorla has argued that it makes sense to compute directly with numbers, and he faulted Turing for not giving an analysis of number-theoretic computability. However, in line with a later paper of his, it only makes sense to compute directly with syntactic entities, such as strings on a given alphabet. Computing with numbers goes via notation. This raises broader issues involving de re propositional attitudes towards numbers and other non-syntactic abstract entities.

Hofweber (Ontology and the ambitions of metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2016) argues for a thesis he calls “internalism” with respect to natural number discourse: no expressions purporting to refer to natural numbers in fact refer, and no apparent quantification over natural numbers actually involves quantification over natural numbers as objects. He argues that while internalism leaves open the question of whether other kinds of abstracta exist, it precludes the existence of natural numbers, thus establishing what he calls “restricted nominalism” about (...) natural numbers. We argue that Hofweber’s internalism fails to establish restricted nominalism. Not only is his primary argument for restricted nominalism invalid, the analysis of quantification proposed threatens to collapse internalism into either a traditional form of error theory or realism. (shrink)

This philosophical game changer looks critically at the Golden Rule in the context of game theory to see where it works and where it doesn’t, when it is applicable and when it isn’t. It shows you why knowing the difference can offer you a powerful way to transform your life from one driven by fear to one driven by love.

This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.

The purpose of this article is to assess the prospects for a Scottish neo-logicist foundation for a set theory. We show how to reformulate a key aspect of our set theory as a neo-logicist abstraction principle. That puts the enterprise on the neo-logicist map, and allows us to assess its prospects, both as a mathematical theory in its own right and in terms of the foundational role that has been advertised for set theory. On the positive side, we show that (...) our abstraction based theory can be modified to yield much of ordinary mathematics, indeed everything needed to recapture all branches of mathematics short of set theory itself. However, our conclusions are mostly negative. The theory will fall far short of the power of ordinary Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It is consistent that our set theory has models that are relatively small, smaller than the first cardinal with an uncountable index. More important, there is a strong tension between the idea that the iterative hierarchy is somehow ineffable, or indefinitely extensible, and the neo-logicist theme of capturing mathematical theories with abstraction principles. (shrink)

This work "collects the author's work at the intersection between political philosophy and religion. Alongside his influential earlier essays, it includes nine new essays in which Wolterstorff develops original lines of argument and stakes out novel positions regarding the nature of liberal democracy, human rights, and political authority. Taken together, these positions are an attractive alternative to the so-called public reason liberalism defended by thinkers such as John Rawls"--jacket.

Modern science began as natural philosophy, an admixture of philosophy and science. It was then killed off by Newton, as a result of his claim to have derived his law of gravitation from the phenomena by induction. But this post-Newtonian conception of science, which holds that theories are accepted on the basis of evidence, is untenable, as the long-standing insolubility of the problem of induction indicates. Persistent acceptance of unified theories only in physics, when endless equally empirically successful disunified rivals (...) are available, means that physics makes a persistent, problematic metaphysical assumption about the universe: that all disunified theories are false. This assumption, precisely because it is problematic, needs to be explicitly articulated within physics, so that it can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved. The outcome is a new conception of science—aim-oriented empiricism—that puts science and philosophy together again, and amounts to a modern version of natural philosophy. Furthermore, aim-oriented empiricism leads to the solution to the problem of induction. Natural philosophy pursued within the methodological framework of aim-oriented empiricism is shown to meet standards of intellectual rigour that science without metaphysics cannot meet. (shrink)

_A spirited defense of the Enlightenment against assaults from both the left and the right that explains its urgent implications for our contemporary politics_ Ours is an age when optimism about politics is hard to come by. Ian Shapiro explains why this is so and, without minimizing the daunting challenges, spells out an appropriate response. Written in the indomitable spirit exemplified by Tom Paine, _Uncommon Sense_ is a rich source of insight and inspiration in dark political times. The Enlightenment (...) commitments to reason and science are under assault from the Postmodern Left and the Authoritarian Right. Shapiro explains why the attacks are misguided and politically destructive. He agrees with the critics that there are no universal principles of justice that transcend political battles and no fair, impartial rules to govern the distribution of income, wealth, rights, or opportunities. But abandoning the search for them as futile does not mean junking the Enlightenment’s core political goal: to deploy the tools of reason and science to fight domination. Democracy is essential to vindicating that goal, yet citizens in many democracies are profoundly alienated and many democracies are in danger of failing. Shapiro explains what has gone wrong, debunks ill-considered remedies, and spells out better ones—deepening and extending his previous writing on political theory and democratic politics. (shrink)

How is consciousness possible? What biological purpose does it serve? And why do we value it so highly? In Soul Dust, the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, a leading figure in consciousness research, proposes a startling new theory. Consciousness, he argues, is nothing less than a magical-mystery show that we stage for ourselves inside our own heads. This self-made show lights up the world for us and makes us feel special and transcendent. Thus consciousness paves the way for spirituality, and allows (...) us, as human beings, to reap the rewards, and anxieties, of living in what Humphrey calls the "soul niche." Tightly argued, intellectually gripping, and a joy to read, Soul Dust provides answers to the deepest questions. It shows how the problem of consciousness merges with questions that obsess us all--how life should be lived and the fear of death. Resting firmly on neuroscience and evolutionary theory, and drawing a wealth of insights from philosophy and literature..."--Jacket. (shrink)

This chapter wades into the growing discussion surrounding embodied cognition and predictive processing. After surveying a recent debate between Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, it articulates two outstanding issues facing discussions of compatibility. It argues that headway on these issues can be made by drawing on the resources of philosophy of science.

There is an extensive literature on time travel in both philosophy and physics. Part of the great interest of the topic stems from the fact that reasons have been given both for thinking that time travel is physically possible—and for thinking that it is logically impossible! This entry deals primarily with philosophical issues; issues related to the physics of time travel are covered in the separate entries on time travel and modern physics and time machines. We begin with the definitional (...) question: what is time travel? We then turn to the major objection to the possibility of backwards time travel: the Grandfather paradox. Next, issues concerning causation are discussed—and then, issues in the metaphysics of time and change. We end with a discussion of the question why, if backwards time travel will ever occur, we have not been visited by time travellers from the future. (shrink)

Centring on human perception, attunement to others, and a transcendent conception of the good, Iris Murdoch's intervention in moral philosophy remains an insightful and evocative source for ethical theory. Discerning some pervasive dualisms that hamper its coherence and development, I suggest that her work finds a generative conversation partner in the contemporary metaphysician, William Desmond. Desmond's thought offers promising avenues to overcome these dualisms by repositioning the source and nature of value and by theorising an anti-reductive, relational ontology. Staging a (...) constructive encounter between these two thinkers that preserves Murdoch's distinct prioritisation of attention and individuality within a Desmond-inspired metaphysics, I present a synthetic ethical approach that promotes the ideal of attending to an other—in the givenness of its particularity, manifold surplus, and constitutive relationality—as good in itself. (shrink)

Here I show that the one-variable fragment of several first-order relevant logics corresponds to certain S5ish extensions of the underlying propositional relevant logic. In particular, given a fairly standard translation between modal and one-variable languages and a permuting propositional relevant logic L, a formula $$\mathcal {A}$$ A of the one-variable fragment is a theorem of LQ (QL) iff its translation is a theorem of L5 (L.5). The proof is model-theoretic. In one direction, semantics based on the Mares-Goldblatt [15] semantics for (...) quantified L are transformed into ternary (plus two binary) relational semantics for S5-like extensions of L (for a general presentation, see Seki [26, 27]). In the other direction, a valuation is given for the full first-order relevant logic based on L into a model for a suitable S5 extension of L. I also discuss this work’s relation to finding a complete axiomatization of the constant domain, non-general frame ternary relational semantics for which RQ is incomplete [11]. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of which number is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of notation. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...) full Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with a principle of global choice. This advances Boolos's longstanding interest in the foundations of set theory. (shrink)

I propose a revision of Cantor’s account of set size that understands comparisons of set size fundamentally in terms of surjections rather than injections. This revised account is equivalent to Cantor's account if the Axiom of Choice is true, but its consequences differ from those of Cantor’s if the Axiom of Choice is false. I argue that the revised account is an intuitive generalization of Cantor’s account, blocks paradoxes—most notably, that a set can be partitioned into a set that is (...) bigger than it—that can arise from Cantor’s account if the Axiom of Choice is false, illuminates the debate over whether the Axiom of Choice is true, is a mathematically fruitful alternative to Cantor’s account, and sheds philosophical light on one of the oldest unsolved problems in set theory. (shrink)

A doctrine of intelligent design through evolution is not going to find many friends. It is destined to encounter opposition on all sides. Among scientists the backlog of evolution will have little patience for intelligent design. Among religiousists, many who form intelligent design have their doubts about evolution. In the general public s mind there is a diametrical opposition between evolution and intelligent design: one excludes the other. This book will argue that this view of the matter is not correct, (...) and that in actuality one can regard evolution itself as a pathway to intelligent design. We would do well to go beyond The Origin of Species and taking as our guide such works as W. Wentworth Thomson s On Growth and Form acknowledging that evolutionary adaptation can result in solutions of a sort that intelligence could readily ratify. Accordingly, what the present book seeks is a naturalization of Intelligent Design that sees such design as itself the result of natural and evolutionary processes.". (shrink)

Proposes a new model of contractualism based on an interpersonal, deliberative conception of practical reason which answers the twin demands of moral accuracy and explanatory adequacy.

This chapter discusses ontological commitment to properties, understood as ontological correlates of predicates. We examine the issue in four metaontological settings, beginning with an influential Quinean paradigm on which ontology concerns what there is. We argue that this naturally but not inevitably avoids ontological commitment to properties. Our remaining three settings correspond to the most prominent departures from the Quinean paradigm. Firstly, we enrich the Quinean paradigm with a primitive, non-quantificational notion of existence. Ontology then concerns what exists. We argue (...) that this strengthens the Quinean case against ontological commitment to properties while also newly distinguishing between stronger and weaker forms of nominalism. Secondly, we enrich the Quinean paradigm with the ideology of fundamentality. Ontology then centrally concerns what’s fundamental. We argue that this leaves ontological commitment to properties wide open although Bradleyan regress threatens. Thirdly, we enrich the Quinean paradigm with primitive higher-order quantifiers. Ontology then expands to concern what there higher-order is and what there first-order is. We argue that this naturally but not inevitably incurs ontological commitment to properties. (shrink)

Behind the dramas and conflicts, there exists a quiet inner place where meditation and mindfulness can help us reside. This book shares personal insights from visionary leaders -- the Dalai Lama, Jon Kabat-Zinn, and Marianne Williamson among them -- who discuss their methods of maintaining mental health and happiness. Their teaching can help you transform your life from the inside out and discover innate strength, kindness, and courage.

Shapiro knows there are totalitarians on the political Right. But statistically, they represent a fringe movement with little institutional clout. The authoritarian Left, meanwhile, is ascendant in nearly every area of American life. A small number of college-educated, coastal, and uncompromising leftists have not just taken over the Democratic Party but our corporations, our universities, our scientific establishment, our cultural institutions. And they have used their newfound power to silence their opposition. Shapiro lays bare the intolerance and rigidity (...) creeping into all American ideology, and prescribes the solution to ending the authoritarianism that threatens our future. -- adapted from jacket. (shrink)

Pragmatic processes crucially rely on background or contextual information supplied by the hearer, which may significantly affect the outcome of the comprehension process. Construed as a branch of cognitive psychology, pragmatics is the study of the cognitive systems apart from the I‐language and the parser which enable speaker and hearer (or communicator and audience) to co‐ordinate on the intended interpretation, and this is how we propose to treat it here. This chapter considers some of Noam Chomsky's suggestions about how the (...) cognitive systems underlying human abilities might be investigated. It discusses his reasons and consider how far this skepticism may be due to his particular conception of pragmatics. The chapter outlines an approach to pragmatics that seems to be compatible with his general methodology and is based on an alternative conception of pragmatics that we sketch out. (shrink)

Next SectionIntensification of poverty and degradation of health infrastructure over recent decades in countries most affected by HIV/AIDS present formidable challenges to clinical research. This paper addresses the overall standard of health care (SOC) that should be provided to research participants in developing countries, rather than the narrow definition of SOC that has characterised the international debate on standards of health care. It argues that contributing to sustainable improvements in health by progressively ratcheting the standard of care upwards for research (...) participants and their communities is an ethical obligation of those in resource-rich countries who sponsor and implement research in poorer ones. (shrink)

Commentators have shown a steady interest in the role of feeling in Kant’s moral and practical philosophy over the last few decades. Much attention has been given to the notion of ‘moral feeling’ in general, as well as to what Kant calls the ‘feeling of respect’ for the moral law. My focus in this essay is on the role of feeling in practical judgment. My claim in what follows is that the act of judging in the practical domain—i.e., determining what (...) one ought to do, or what action one ought to perform, in a specific case—crucially involves feeling. Put more simply: I argue that practical judgment has an essentially affective dimension. The upshot of the account I will give is that it provides us with a richer and more complex account of moral feeling than has previously been appreciated in the literature. While it is recognized that feeling plays a certain role in moral motivation, what I hope to demonstrate here is that feeling is involved much earlier in the exercise of moral agency. Far from entering only at the point at which we are trying to muster the strength of will to carry out what we know we ought to do, feeling is present the moment we begin to deliberate about what it is that we ought to do. (shrink)