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Profile: Nico Orlandi (University of California, Santa Cruz)
  1. Embedded Seeing: Vision in the Natural World.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):727-747.
  2. Visual Switching: The Illusion of Instantaneity and Visual Search.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):469-480.
    This paper questions two prima facie plausible claims concerning switching in the presence of ambiguous figures. The first is the claim that reversing is an instantaneous process. The second is the claim that the ability to reverse demonstrates the interpretive, inferential and constructive nature of visual processing. Empirical studies show that optical and cerebral events related to switching protract in time in a way that clashes with its perceived instantaneity. The studies further suggest an alternative theory of reversing: according to (...)
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  3. Embedded Seeing-As: Multi-Stable Visual Perception Without Interpretation.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):1-19.
    Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different interpretations are said to produce the different percepts. In (...)
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  4. Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):307-323.
    Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous (...)
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  5. The Innocent Eye: Seeing-as Without Concepts.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):17.
    Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing x as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept F to x . Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck figure, for instance, involves applying the concept DUCK to the figure; thus, one cannot see the figure as the figure of a duck unless one has the concept of a duck (...)
     
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  6. Holistic Realism: A Response to Katz on Holism and Intuition.Michael D. Resnik & Nicoletta Orlandi - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):301-315.
  7. Are Sensory Properties Represented in Perceptual Experience?Nicoletta Orlandi - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):721-740.
    Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely (...)
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    Reversing as a Dynamic Process Variability of Ocular and Brain Events in Perceptual Switching.Hironori Nakatani, Nicoletta Orlandi & Cees van Leeuwen - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    We investigated the possible causes of perceptual switching in ambiguous figures. Ambiguous figures are a special class of visual stimuli that can give rise to at least two alternative interpretations. Because the figures themselves stay the same, these stimuli are particularly suitable to study the dynamic changes in our visual apparatus that enable us to see the world in different ways. Recent studies stress the importance of both low-level and high-level processes in switching. We show that these processes lead to (...)
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    Comments on Ingra Shellenberg's “How Paranoid Delusions Support 'Simulation Theory'”.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (2):33-36.
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    Comments on Ingra Shellenberg’s “How Paranoid Delusions Support ‘Simulation Theory’”.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (2):33-36.
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