Although this paper attends to some extent to the question whether the global economy promotes or impedes either justice or sustainability, its main focus is on the relationship between justice and sustainability. Whilst sustainability itself as a normative goal is about sustaining inter alia justice, justice itself requires intergenerationally the sustaining of the conditions of a good life for all. At the heart of this is a conception of justice as realising the basic rights of all–in contrast to a more (...) demanding distributive principle or a less demanding principle of not violating the liberty rights or other basic rights of others. Although Pogges analysis that the global economy causes harm by failing to realise basic rights is seen as a useful challenge to common libertarian assumptions, the acceptance of other positive correlative duties, following Shue, is advocated. Insofar as the global economy fails to realise basic justice, the question is how far can it realistically be changed? and this is a function partly of the moral attitudes of individuals at large. (shrink)

This article surveys the recently established field of enquiry called 'development ethics' - that is, ethical enquiry into the normative basis of socio-economic development. This covers two levels of enquiry. First, it involves enquiry into the nature of human well-being and the social norms within which the conditions of well-being should be promoted, and includes consideration of both the means and the ends of development. Second, it involves the ethical basis of the wider global framework within which the development of (...) countries takes place. This covers both the normative basis of international relations and the global relations between individuals in different parts of the world as expressed in the idea of global responsibility. (shrink)

This article presents global ethics as critical reflection on the nature, justification and application of a global ethic. Much of the article focuses on the nature of a global ethic as the content of global ethics, e.g. whether it is thick or thin, is about universal values or transnational responsibilities, is a set of values justified by a particular thinker, values widely shared or values universally accepted. Global ethics itself as a process is also examined. In the last part the (...) Earth Charter is examined as an example of a global ethic, and a case is made for regarding it, both in respect to its content and in respect to the senses in which it is and is not a global ethic, as an appropriate subject matter for global ethics. (shrink)

This article is premised on the assumption that in order for us adequately to protect our environment, significant adjustments need to be made to the ways we pursue and think about development – adjustments not merely to technologies but also to life-styles. In this respect the emphasis in much recent development literature on human development is to be welcomed as a useful corrective to definitions of development in terms of economic growth, though there is still a danger of anthropocentric assumptions. (...) It is argued that, given suitable interpretations or conceptions of development and environment, environmental care can be, and should be, integrated into authentic human development. Proposals for such conceptual alignment stem both from seeing the relevant community in which development qua desirable change is to take place as the biotic community, and from seeing development as desirable change in the total environment, both natural and artificial, regarded as a social field of significance. Such conceptual adjustments are a significant part, but of course only a part, of what needs to be done to bring public policy more into line with proper care for the environment. (shrink)

This is in part a reflection on issues raised by David Cooper in his paper entitled ‘The Idea of Environment’ , a paper that I have an ambiguous attitude towards. On the one hand it has opened my eyes to a way of thinking about the environment, namely as a field of significance, but on the other hand it seems to be unfortunate in its tone of negative criticism of much of the thinking of deep environmentalists, and wrong in its (...) dismissal of the idea that the environment as a whole should be a field of significance. (shrink)