35 found
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  1. Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...)
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  2. Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
    We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus (...)
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  3. Love as Valuing a Relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.
    At first glance, love seems to be a psychological state for which there are normative reasons: a state that, if all goes well, is an appropriate or fitting response to something independent of itself. Love for one’s parent, child, or friend is fitting, one wants to say, if anything is. On reflection, however, it is elusive what reasons for love might be. It is natural to assume that they would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her (...)
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  4. The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
    Niko Kolodny It is often said that there is a special class of norms, ‘rational requirements’, that demand that our attitudes be related one another in certain ways, whatever else may be the case.1 In recent work, a special class of these rational requirements has attracted particular attention: what I will call ‘requirements of formal coherence as such’, which require just that our attitudes be formally coherent.2 For example, we are rationally required, if we believe something, to believe what it (...)
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  5. How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
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  6. State or Process Requirements?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):371-385.
    rational requirements are narrow scope. The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational requirements govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow- and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not violating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there (...)
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  7.  77
    Instrumental Reasons.Niko Kolodny - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxord Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    Often our reason for doing something is an "instrumental reason": that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this "instrumental transmission" of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, "General Transmission," which answers to two intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are "probabilizing" and "nonsuperfluous" with respect to (...)
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  8. Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.
    My subject is what I will call the “Myth of Formal Coherence.” In its normative telling, the Myth is that there are “requirements of formal coherence as such,” which demand just that our beliefs and intentions be formally coherent.1 Some examples are.
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  9.  79
    Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy.Niko Kolodny - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):287-336.
  10. Why Be Rational&Quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
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  11.  9
    What Makes Threats Wrong?Niko Kolodny - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):87-118.
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  12.  58
    Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children.Niko Kolodny - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (1):37-75.
  13. Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases.Niko Kolodny - 2010 - In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press.
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  14.  92
    Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  15. Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?Niko Kolodny - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (3):195-229.
  16. Promises and Practices Revisited.Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119-154.
    Promising is clearly a social practice or convention. By uttering the formula, “I hereby promise to do X,” we can raise in others the expectation that we will in fact do X. But this succeeds only because there is a social practice that consists (inter alia) in a disposition on the part of promisers to do what they promise, and an expectation on the part of promisees that promisers will so behave. It is equally clear that, barring special circumstances of (...)
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  17. Scanlon's Investigation: The Relevance of Intent to Permissibility1.Niko Kolodny - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):100-123.
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  18. Death and the Afterlife.Niko Kolodny (ed.) - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    We normally take it for granted that other people will live on after we ourselves have died. Even if we do not believe in a personal afterlife in which we survive our own deaths, we assume that there will be a "collective afterlife" in which humanity survives long after we are gone. Samuel Scheffler maintains that this assumption plays a surprising - indeed astonishing - role in our lives.
     
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  19.  62
    Reply to Bridges.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):369-376.
    Bridges argues that the ‘Transparency Account’ of Kolodny 2005 has a hidden flaw. The TA does not, after all, account for the fact that in our ordinary, engaged thought and talk about rationality, we believe that, when it would be irrational of one of us to refuse to A, he has, because of this, conclusive reason to A. My reply is that this was the point. For reasons given in Kolodny 2005, is false. The aim of the TA is to (...)
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  20.  22
    Dynamics of Affirmation.Niko Kolodny - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):771-777.
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  21.  36
    Aims as Reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2011 - In Samuel Freeman, Rahul Kumar & R. Jay Wallace (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-78.
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  22.  70
    Do Associative Duties Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2002 - Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (3):250–266.
  23.  71
    Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity.George Pavlakos, Niko Kolodny, Ulrike Heuer & Douglas Lavin - 2011 - Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 2 (2):329-378.
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.
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  24.  78
    Which Relationships Justify.Niko Kolodny - unknown
    We have, or at least we take ourselves to have, reason for patterns of action and emotion toward our parents, siblings, friends, spouses, children, and others with whom we have significant ties.1 This partiality involves seeing to it that both these relatives and our relationships to them fare well, as well as respecting both in our decisions. It also involves feeling certain positive emotions (e.g., joy, relief, gratitude) when they fare well or are properly regarded, and feeling certain negative emotions (...)
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  25.  75
    The Explanation of Amour-Propre.Niko Kolodny - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):165-200.
    Rousseau's thought is marked by an optimism and a pessimism that each evoke, at least in the right mood, a feeling of recognition difficult to suppress. We have an innate capacity for virtue, and with it freedom and happiness. Yet our present social conditions instill in us a restless craving for superiority, which leads to vice, and with it bondage and misery. Call this the "thesis of possible goodness": that while human psychology is such that men become wicked under the (...)
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  26.  38
    The Reasons of Love. [REVIEW]Niko Kolodny - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):43-50.
  27.  43
    Encyclopedia of Philosophy Review Sheet.Niko Kolodny - manuscript
    Scope: New entry. The analogue of the article on Noncognitivism. Contrast to subjectivist views of..
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  28.  39
    Comment on Munoz-Dardé's'liberty's Chains'.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):197-212.
    Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's 'liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each 'nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the 'legitimacy' of social arrangements. I (...)
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  29.  38
    The Ethics of Cryptonormativism: A Defense of Foucault's Evasions.Niko Kolodny - 1996 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (5):63-84.
    In his later work, Foucault was more skeptical of theory than he was of norms. His apparent evasion of normative theory was not meant to suggest, as some interpreters have thought, that norm ative theory is useless or oppressive, but rather that it is fragile and uncertain, that it depends for its practical effect on something essen tially untheorizable: character, or what Foucault alternately called 'ethos' and 'philosophical life'. This conception of ethos suggests a way to make sense of Foucault's (...)
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  30.  1
    Love as Valuing a Relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.
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  31.  44
    The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud.Bridges Jason, Kolodny Niko & Wong Wai-Hung (eds.) - 2011 - Oup Usa.
    Barry Stroud's work has had a profound impact on a very wide array of philosophical topics, but there has heretofore been no book-length treatment of his work. The current collection aims to redress this gap, with 13 essays on Stroud's work, all but one new to this volume.
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  32. IX—How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229-263.
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
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  33. II—Niko Kolodny: Comment on Munoz-Dardé's‘Liberty's Chains’.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):197-212.
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  34. II—C Omment on M Unoz-D Ardé's‘L Iberty's C Hains’.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):197-212.
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  35. II—C Omment on M Unoz-D Ardé's‘L Iberty's C Hains’.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):197-212.
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