Order:
  1. The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Nikola Kompa - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):1-18.
    According to contextualist accounts, the truth value of a given knowledge ascription may vary with features of the ascriber's context. As a result, the following may be true: "X doesn't know that P but Y says something true in asserting 'X knows that P'". The contextualist must defend his theory in the light of this unpleasant but inevitable consequence. The best way of doing this is to construe the context sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions not as deriving from an alleged indexicality (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  2.  70
    Contextualism and Disagreement.Nikola Kompa - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):137-152.
    My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consist in and what speakers disagree over when they faultlessly do so. To that end, I will first look at various examples of faultless disagreement. Since I will eventually claim that different forms of faultless disagreement can be modeled semantically on different forms of context-sensitivity I will, in a second step, discuss three different semantic accounts that all promise to successfully accommodate certain forms of context-sensitivity: (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Nikola Kompa - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):16-28.
    The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative adjectives such as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4. Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little.Nikola Kompa - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):457-467.
    Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  6
    Review: Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean. [REVIEW]Nikola Kompa - 2008 - ProtoSociology 25:215-224.
  6.  3
    The Myth of Embodied Metaphor.Nikola Kompa - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):195-210.
    According to a traditionally infl uential idea metaphors have mostly ornamental value. Current research, on the other hand, stresses the cognitive purposes metaphors serve. According to the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor, e.g., expressions are commonly used metaphorically in order to conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. More specifically, proponents of CTM claim that abstract terms are understood by means of metaphors and that metaphor comprehension, in turn, is embodied. In this paper, I will argue that CTM fails on both counts.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Handbuch Sprachphilosophie.Nikola Kompa (ed.) - 2015 - Metzler.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Knowledge in Context.Nikola Kompa - 2014 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 5 (1):58-71.
    My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, that is, of what came to be called attributor or ascriber contextualism. I will begin by outlining, in the first part, what I take to be the basic idea of and motivation behind the version of epistemic contextualism that I favor. In the second part, a couple of examples will be presented in order to illustrate the contextualist point. Since epistemic contextualists commonly claim (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark