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  1. Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):259-277.
    This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present (...)
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  2. Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...)
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  3. What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
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  4. On the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance.Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2445-2470.
    Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In (...)
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  5.  24
    Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...)
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  6. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  7.  38
    True Alethic Functionalism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 125-133, February 2012.
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  8.  8
    On the Normative Variability of Truth and Logic.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the normativity of truth and logic. The paper has three objectives. First, I argue that logic is normative for thought in the sense of underwriting instrumental rationality. Logic is a good instrument for achieving truth, the goal of cognition. In recent work, Filippo Ferrari has argued that the normative nature of truth may vary across domains. My second aim is to extend this idea to logic, against the background of the idea that logic serves to underwrite instrumental (...)
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  9. Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
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  10.  40
    Pluralist Theories of Truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  11. Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  12.  91
    Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
  13.  75
    Open-Endedness, Schemas and Ontological Commitment.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):329-339.
    Second-order axiomatizations of certain important mathematical theories—such as arithmetic and real analysis—can be shown to be categorical. Categoricity implies semantic completeness, and semantic completeness in turn implies determinacy of truth-value. Second-order axiomatizations are thus appealing to realists as they sometimes seem to offer support for the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth-values. The status of second-order logic is a controversial issue, however. Worries about ontological commitment have been influential in the debate. Recently, Vann McGee has argued that one (...)
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  14.  61
    Rational Trust.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1953-1955.
  15.  69
    The Epistemology of Absence-Based Inference.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2573-2593.
    Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The (...)
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  16. Hume's Principle and Entitlement: On the Epistemology of the Neo-Fregean Programme.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - forthcoming - In Philip Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism. Oxford University Press.
  17. Second-Order Knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
  18.  9
    Entitlement in Mathematics.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant – entitlement of cognitive project – as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments, which have been subject to extensive discussion within mainstream epistemology. The central idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. (See Wrigh [2].) The aim of this paper is to provide (...)
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  19.  86
    All the Things We Know: Extended Knowledge.Jens Christian Bjerring & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):24-38.
    In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to (...)
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  20.  76
    The Epistemology of Inclusiveness.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Klemens Kappel & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1185-1188.
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  21.  58
    From Metaphysical Pluralism to Alethic Pluralism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:201-208.
    Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively (...)
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  22.  3
    Correction To: Non-Rational Action in the Face of Disagreement: An Argument Against Non-Conformism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-1.
    The Acknowledgements are missing from the original publication.
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  23. McGee on Open-Ended Schemas.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2007 - In Helen Bohse & Sven Walter (eds.), Selected Contributions to GAP.6: Sixth International Conference of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy, Berlin, 11–14 September 2006. mentis.
    Vann McGee claims that open-ended schemas are more innocuous than ordinary second-order quantification, particularly in terms of ontological commitment. We argue that this is not the case.
     
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  24. Considerations on Neo-Fregean Ontology.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    i.e. for any concepts X and Y, the number of X’s and the number of Y’s are identical if and only if there is a 1-1 correspondence between X and Y.1 The central claim of neo- Fregeanism with respect to arithmetic is that arithmetical knowledge can be obtained a priori through Frege’s Theorem, the result that the axioms of arithmetic are derivable in the system obtained by adding Hume’s Principle to second-order logic.
     
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  25. McGee on Open-Ended Schemas.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    A mathematical theory T is categorical if, and only if, any two models of T are isomorphic. If T is categorical, it can be shown to be semantically complete: for every sentence ϕ in the language of T, either ϕ follows semantically from T or ¬ϕ does. For this reason some authors maintain that categoricity theorems are philosophically significant: they support the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth-values. Second-order arithmetic (PA2) is a case in hand: it can be (...)
     
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  26. Non-Evidentialist Epistemology.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.) - forthcoming - Brill.
  27. The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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