29 found
Order:
  1. Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.
    Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  2. What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  3. On the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance.Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2445-2470.
    Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Entitlement, Value and Rationality.Nikolaj Jang Pedersen - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):443-457.
    In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, secondly, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  5. Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism.Nikolaj Jang Linding Lee Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  6.  92
    Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):259-277.
    This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7.  20
    Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  34
    Non-Rational Action in the Face of Disagreement: An Argument Against Non-Conformism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2935-2966.
    Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking rationality in thought and rationality in action. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? The objective of this paper is to explore these two issues—separately, but also in connection with one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  36
    True Alethic Functionalism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 125-133, February 2012.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  13.  52
    Rational Trust.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1953-1955.
  14.  36
    Pluralist Theories of Truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  15.  62
    The Epistemology of Absence-Based Inference.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2573-2593.
    Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  69
    Open-Endedness, Schemas and Ontological Commitment.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):329-339.
    Second-order axiomatizations of certain important mathematical theories—such as arithmetic and real analysis—can be shown to be categorical. Categoricity implies semantic completeness, and semantic completeness in turn implies determinacy of truth-value. Second-order axiomatizations are thus appealing to realists as they sometimes seem to offer support for the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth-values. The status of second-order logic is a controversial issue, however. Worries about ontological commitment have been influential in the debate. Recently, Vann McGee has argued that one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  58
    Solving the Caesar Problem Without Categorical Sortals.Nikolaj Jang Pedersen - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):141-155.
    The neo-Fregean account of arithmetical knowledge is centered around the abstraction principle known as Hume’s Principle: for any concepts X and Y , the number of X ’s is the same as the number of Y ’s just in case there is a 1–1 correspondence between X and Y . The Caesar Problem, originally raised by Frege in §56 of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik , emerges in the context of the neo-Fregean programme, because, though Hume’s Principle provides a criterion of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  88
    Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.
  19.  93
    Second-Order Knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  64
    All the Things We Know: Extended Knowledge.Jens Christian Bjerring & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):24-38.
    In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  5
    Entitlement in Mathematics.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant – entitlement of cognitive project – as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments, which have been subject to extensive discussion within mainstream epistemology. The central idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. (See Wrigh [2].) The aim of this paper is to provide (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  69
    The Epistemology of Inclusiveness.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Klemens Kappel & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1185-1188.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  51
    From Metaphysical Pluralism to Alethic Pluralism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:201-208.
    Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  23
    Entitlements, Good and Bad.Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen - 2006 - SATS 7 (1):58-82.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. McGee on Open-Ended Schemas.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2007 - In Helen Bohse & Sven Walter (eds.), Selected Contributions to GAP.6: Sixth International Conference of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy, Berlin, 11–14 September 2006. mentis.
    Vann McGee claims that open-ended schemas are more innocuous than ordinary second-order quantification, particularly in terms of ontological commitment. We argue that this is not the case.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Hume's Principle and Entitlement: On the Epistemology of the Neo-Fregean Programme.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - forthcoming - In Philip Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism. Oxford University Press.
  27. Considerations on Neo-Fregean Ontology.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    i.e. for any concepts X and Y, the number of X’s and the number of Y’s are identical if and only if there is a 1-1 correspondence between X and Y.1 The central claim of neo- Fregeanism with respect to arithmetic is that arithmetical knowledge can be obtained a priori through Frege’s Theorem, the result that the axioms of arithmetic are derivable in the system obtained by adding Hume’s Principle to second-order logic.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. McGee on Open-Ended Schemas.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - unknown
    A mathematical theory T is categorical if, and only if, any two models of T are isomorphic. If T is categorical, it can be shown to be semantically complete: for every sentence ϕ in the language of T, either ϕ follows semantically from T or ¬ϕ does. For this reason some authors maintain that categoricity theorems are philosophically significant: they support the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth-values. Second-order arithmetic (PA2) is a case in hand: it can be (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography