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  1. The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559-582.
    An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of (...)
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  2. Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Rik Peels - 2013 - In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 230-250.
    Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts count (...)
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  3.  92
    The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Reassessment.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.
    This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position (...)
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  4.  17
    Is Radical Millianism Worth its Methodological Costs? A Critique of Jonathan Berg’s Theory of Direct Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):73-100.
    This article focuses on Jonathan Berg’s Theory of Direct Belief as presented in his 2012 book Direct Belief. An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. After regimenting Berg’s key theses and discussing the sources of their general unpopularity, I proceed to reconstruct Berg’s book-length argument for his conclusions. I here make explicit that Berg relies on a range of strong meta-semantic principles and assumptions. I conclude that even if Berg has brought considerable methodological rigor to the on-going (...)
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  5. The Present and Future State of Epistemic Deontologism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  6.  33
    Against a Descriptive Vindication of Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2721-2744.
    In this paper, I examine whether doxastic voluntarism should be taken seriously within normative doxastic ethics. First, I show that currently the psychological evidence does not positively support doxastic voluntarism, even if I accept recent conclusions by Matthias Steup that the relevant evidence does not decisively undermine voluntarism either. Thus, it would seem that normative doxastic ethics could not justifiedly appeal directly to voluntarist assumptions. Second, I attempt to bring out how doxastic voluntarists may nevertheless hope to stir methodological worries (...)
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  7.  54
    Belief-Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  8. Foresight and Blameworthiness for Action Consequences.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2004 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39.
  9.  24
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: Belief-Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
    This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...)
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  10.  6
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: Belief‐Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
    This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...)
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  11.  7
    All in One, or Almost So: The Contemporary State of a Universal Debate.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):141-146.
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  12. A Critique of Laurence BonJour's Central Arguments for a Priori Fallibilism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2010 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 45:89-105.
     
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  13.  2
    All in One, or Almost So: The Contemporary State of a Universal Debate.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2007 - SATS 8 (2).
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  14.  1
    Belief‐Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief‐desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief‐desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  15. Against Overconfidence in Radical A Priori Fallibilism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
     
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  16. New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content.Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.) - forthcoming
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