22 found
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  1. The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559-582.
    An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of (...)
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  2. The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Reassessment.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.
    This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position (...)
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  3. Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Rik Peels - 2013 - In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 230-250.
    Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts count (...)
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  4.  38
    Honesty and Inquiry: W.K. Clifford’s Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Patrick Fessenbecker - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):797-818.
    ABSTRACTW.K. Clifford is widely known for his emphatic motto that it is wrong, always everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. In fact, that dictum and Clifford’s...
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  5.  66
    Against a Descriptive Vindication of Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2721-2744.
    In this paper, I examine whether doxastic voluntarism should be taken seriously within normative doxastic ethics. First, I show that currently the psychological evidence does not positively support doxastic voluntarism, even if I accept recent conclusions by Matthias Steup that the relevant evidence does not decisively undermine voluntarism either. Thus, it would seem that normative doxastic ethics could not justifiedly appeal directly to voluntarist assumptions. Second, I attempt to bring out how doxastic voluntarists may nevertheless hope to stir methodological worries (...)
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  6. The Present and Future State of Epistemic Deontologism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  7. Weighing the Costs: The Epistemic Dilemma of No-Platforming.Uwe Peters & Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7231-7253.
    ‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, (...)
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  8.  9
    Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense. While we employ the methods of experimental philosophy, our (...)
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  9.  74
    Is Radical Millianism Worth its Methodological Costs? A Critique of Jonathan Berg’s Theory of Direct Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):73-100.
    This article focuses on Jonathan Berg’s Theory of Direct Belief as presented in his 2012 book Direct Belief. An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. After regimenting Berg’s key theses and discussing the sources of their general unpopularity, I proceed to reconstruct Berg’s book-length argument for his conclusions. I here make explicit that Berg relies on a range of strong meta-semantic principles and assumptions. I conclude that even if Berg has brought considerable methodological rigor to the on-going (...)
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  10.  45
    Against Normative Defeat.Nikolaj Nottelmann - forthcoming - Mind.
    Several epistemologists have advanced the idea that a subject’s epistemic status can be weakened by evidence she does not possess but should have possessed, or, alternatively, by beliefs or doubts she should have had under her evidential circumstances but does not have. This alleged phenomenon is known as normative defeat and its adherents have typically reported intuitions that it obtains under mundane circumstances. Some epistemologists have analyzed normative defeat in terms of breached epistemic obligations, while others have preferred an analysis (...)
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  11.  20
    New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure.Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.) - 2013 - Palgrave.
    What are beliefs and what roles do they play in our behavioral and cognitive economies? Those questions are central issues not only for epistemology, but also for philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and philosophy of religion, to mention only a few fields. The authors in this volume of specially commissioned essays address them from a variety of perspectives, drawing on important classical and contemporary work on mental content, the nature of intentionality, the psychology of delusions, the (...)
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  12.  87
    Belief-Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  13.  24
    Scaffolded practical knowledge: a problem for intellectualism.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Kári Thorsson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):577-595.
    Roughly speaking, intellectualists contend that practical knowledge is always a matter of having the right kind of propositional knowledge. This article argues that intellectualism faces a serious explanatory challenge when practical knowledge crucially relies on ecological information, i.e. when know-how is scaffolded. More precisely, intellectualists struggle to provide a satisfactory explanation of seeming know-how contrasts in structurally similar cases of scaffolded ability manifestation. In contrast, even if anti-intellectualism is similarly challenged, at least some varieties of anti-intellectualism seemingly hold resources to (...)
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  14.  65
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: Belief‐Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
    This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...)
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  15.  23
    Impermissible Self-Rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):257-274.
    We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.
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  16. Against Overconfidence in Radical A Priori Fallibilism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
     
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  17.  11
    Dire Straits for Dennett. How Not to Talk Your Way Past Huamn Intentionality.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2011 - Res Cogitans 8 (2).
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  18.  5
    Belief‐Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief‐desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief‐desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  19. Foresight and Blameworthiness for Action Consequences.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2004 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39 (1):67-74.
  20.  6
    A Critique of Laurence Bonjour’s Central Arguments for a Priori Fallibilism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2010 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 45 (1):89-105.
    This paper urges that Laurence BonJour fails to make the case for an all-out a priori fallibilism “as clear as anything philosophical could be.” Firstly, the paper introduces a number of distinctions of vital importance to the relevant debate. On the basis of those distinctions, it is argued that several interesting a priori infallibilist claims are not targeted by BonJour’s central a priori fallibilist arguments. After this, the paper confronts BonJour’s arguments on their own terms, attempts to fairly regiment them, (...)
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  21.  8
    All in One, or Almost So: The Contemporary State of a Universal Debate.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2007 - SATS 8 (2):141-146.
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  22.  6
    All in One, or Almost So: The Contemporary State of a Universal Debate.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2007 - SATS 8 (2).
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