4 found
  1.  54
    The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
    The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal (...)
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  2.  17
    Reply to Trehub (2009) “Two Arguments for a Pre-Reflective Core Self: Commentary on Praetorius (2009)”.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):341-341.
  3. Intersubjectivity of cognition and language: Principled reasons why the subject may be Trusted.Nini Praetorius - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214.
    The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and (...)
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    The problems of consciousness and content in theories of perception.Nini Praetorius - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):349-367.
    The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s Sensorimotor Theory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidence from empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidates their theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory of vision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’s and Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutually conflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paper concludes by (...)
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