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  1.  28
    On Arthāpatti.Nirmalya Guha - 2016 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (4):757-776.
    Arthāpatti does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background (...)
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  2.  48
    No Black Scorpion is Falling: An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence. [REVIEW]Nirmalya Guha - 2013 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (2):111-131.
    An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one’s knowledge of (...)
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  3.  32
    Lakṣaṇā as a Creative Function of Language.Nirmalya Guha - 2012 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (5):489-509.
    When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lakṣaṇā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gaṅgeśa claims that lakṣaṇā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, (...)
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  4.  10
    The Inferential Model of Meaning: An Abandoned Route.Nirmalya Guha - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (4):641-655.
    A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument that generates the semantic connection between the meaning of x and the meaning of y is testimony. This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic (...)
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  5.  13
    The Identity That Doesn’T Deny Difference: A Non-Dualist Argument.Nirmalya Guha - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):257-289.
    Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators. The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’. This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the (...)
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  6.  37
    Tarka as Cognitive Validator.Nirmalya Guha - 2012 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (1):47-66.
    The meaning of the term ‘tarka’ is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this term and try to show that what the Nyāyasūtra and its classical commentaries called a ‘tarka’ should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating its logical unfitness. (...)
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  7.  3
    God and the World's Arrangement: Readings From Vedanta and Nyaya Philosophy of Religion.Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti & Stephen Phillips - 2021 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    The work of three present-day Sankritist-philosophers, _God and the World's Arrangement_ allows readers to engage directly with writings of the classical Indian philosophers Śaṅkara and Vācaspati, as well as some of their most acute critics, on the question of whether the existence of a creator God can be known by reason alone. Carefully selected and annotated with the needs of students foremost in mind, these new translations will be of interest to anyone wishing to see up close a newly set (...)
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  8.  8
    Through the Logician’s Strainer: A Nyāya Technique.Nirmalya Guha - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (3):385-400.
    The strainer tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the definition D is stated in terms of an absence, and x is a definiendum of D. The strainer collects each x-token or x-individual that dissatisfies D in a specific case. Then, all the x-individuals put together would be equivalent to the type x. Hence—one would be forced to conclude that—in a sense, x dissatisfies D. This is a case of under-application of D, since, despite being a (...)
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  9.  16
    A Monstrous Inference Called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument.Nirmalya Guha - 2016 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (3):557-579.
    A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason is normally an omnipresent property. Its Target is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an (...)
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  10.  9
    A Monstrous Inference Called Mahāvidyānumāna.Nirmalya Guha - 2016 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (3):557-579.
    A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason is normally an omnipresent property. Its Target is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an (...)
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