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Noah Lemos [49]Noah M. Lemos [13]Noah Marcelino Lemos [4]
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Noah Lemos
William & Mary
  1.  82
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Noah Marcelino Lemos - 1994 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence (...)
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  2. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.Noah Marcelino Lemos - 2007 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, and this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to the subject. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, the problem of the criterion, a priori knowledge, and naturalized epistemology. Intended primarily for students taking a first class in epistemology, this lucid and (...)
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  3. Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense.Noah Marcelino Lemos - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory (...)
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  4. Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense.Noah Lemos - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (315):165-170.
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  5. Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus.Noah M. Lemos - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (9):482-496.
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  6. A Defense of Organic Unities.Noah Lemos - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):125-141.
    In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent.
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  7.  93
    Organic unities.Noah Lemos - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):321-337.
    I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.
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  8.  71
    Summation, Variety, and Indeterminate Value.Noah Lemos - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):33-44.
    In this paper, I consider two sorts of objections to summative theories of value. The first objection concerns “indeterminate” value. The second concerns the importance of variety. I argue that both objections pose serious problems for the summative approach. I also argue that if we accept certain plausible views about the value of variety, we should reject certain forms of argument concerning what sorts of states have intrinsic value.
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  9.  17
    Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism.Noah Lemos - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):105-119.
    I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature (...)
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  10. Intrinsic Value and the Partiality Problem.Noah Lemos - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):697-716.
  11.  76
    What Is Basic Intrinsic Value?Noah Lemos - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):33-43.
    The concept of basic intrinsic value is important for axiology. Michael Zimmerman and Timothy Perrine each present necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s having basic intrinsic value. I argue that neither account is satisfactory. I present two objections to Zimmerman’s view. First, I argue that his view cannot accommodate some widely held and plausible views about the intrinsic value of knowledge and true belief. Second, I argue that it cannot accommodate some plausible views about the intrinsic value of states when (...)
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  12. Epistemic circularity again.Noah Lemos - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):254–270.
  13.  31
    Epistemology and ethics.Noah Lemos - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 479--512.
    In ”Epistemology and Ethics,” Noah Lemos suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how we can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. After addressing skeptical arguments, he considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of moral knowledge. Lemos favors a particularist approach whereby we begin with instances of moral knowledge and use these to formulate and evaluate criteria for moral knowledge. After relating his approach to concerns about the nature of (...)
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  14.  43
    Warrant, emotion, and value.Noah M. Lemos - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (2):175 - 192.
  15.  5
    Justification and Considered Moral Judgments.Noah Lemos - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):503-516.
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  16.  56
    Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the bad.Noah Lemos - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):692-705.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  17.  10
    High accessibility and justification.Noah Lemos - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):463-476.
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  18.  45
    Justification and considered moral judgments.Noah Lemos - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):503-516.
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  19. Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge.Noah Lemos - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
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  20.  3
    Self‐Evidence and Principia Ethica.Noah Lemos - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):451-464.
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  21. Moore and Skepticism.Noah Lemos - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 330.
  22.  55
    Defeat, pluralism, and indispensable goods.Noah Lemos - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3039-3053.
    Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretical (...)
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  23.  49
    The Bearers of Intrinsic Value.Noah M. Lemos - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 181--190.
  24.  20
    Commonsensism in ethics and epistemology.Noah Lemos - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--218.
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  25.  37
    High-minded egoism and the problem of priggishness.Noah M. Lemos - 1984 - Mind 93 (372):542-558.
  26.  28
    Self- Evidence and Principia Ethica.Noah Lemos - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):451-464.
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  27.  11
    The highest moral knowledge and internalism: Some comments.Noah Lemos - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):161-165.
  28.  8
    The Highest Moral Knowledge and Internalism: Some Comments.Noah Lemos - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):161-165.
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  29. Hedonism and the good life.Noah Lemos - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):417-423.
  30.  10
    Editorial to Book Symposium.Wim Dubbink & Noah Lemos - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (2):117-117.
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  31.  19
    Objective Value and Requirements.Noah Lemos - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 21--31.
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  32.  37
    Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006.Risto Hilpinen, Leonard Carrier, Howard Pospesel & Noah Lemos - 2006 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5):129 - 130.
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  33. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge 2nd edition (2nd edition).Noah Lemos - 2020 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Noah Lemos.
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  34.  17
    Brandt on rationality, value, and morality.Noah M. Lemos - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (1):79 - 93.
  35.  48
    Coherence and epistemic priority.Noah M. Lemos - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (3):299 - 315.
  36.  57
    Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology.Noah M. Lemos - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):473-487.
    Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our (...)
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  37. Ethical Skepticism.Noah Lemos - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 486.
     
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  38. Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemology.Noah Lemos - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
  39. Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemology.Noah Lemos - forthcoming - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
  40.  21
    Feldman , Fred . What Is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xv+286. $45.00 (cloth).Noah Lemos - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):657-661.
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  41. Love, Beneficence, and the Hedonic Constraint.Noah Lemos - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):259-268.
    In this paper, I present briefly a view about intrinsic value, one connected to the concepts of ethically required attitudes of favor, disfavor, and preference. If lives can have both welfare value and intrinsic value, how are these values related? I defend the view that the welfare value of a life does not track the intrinsic value of that life. Some philosophers, however, deny that anything can have intrinsic value or absolute value. Some argue that to hold that something is (...)
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  42.  23
    Milanich and the structure of omissions.Noah M. Lemos - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):305 - 312.
  43.  45
    Moral goodness, esteem, and acting from duty.Noah M. Lemos - 1991 - Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2):103-117.
    There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions (...)
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  44. Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil.Noah Lemos - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9:165-182.
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  45.  99
    Rational Desire and the Good.Noah Lemos - 2004 - Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2):329-336.
    essay on the theory of value. It is among the best defenses of a rational desire/preference theory of the good. Even those not inclined to accept such theories will profit from reading Carson's discussion. Moreover, it would be worthwhile reading for scholars and students in various areas of applied ethics. The book is divided into two parts. The first half of the book addresses firstorder questions about what things are good and bad. The second half discusses various metaethical questions which (...)
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  46.  13
    Two types of epistemic evaluative cognitivism.Noah M. Lemos - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (3):313 - 327.
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  47.  23
    What’s Wrong With Methodism?Noah M. Lemos - 1998 - Metaphilosophy 29 (1&2):79-94.
    I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that (...)
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  48.  8
    Promising, Intending, and Moral Autonomy.Noah Lemos - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):685-688.
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  49.  8
    Practical Reasoning, by Robert Audi. [REVIEW]Noah Lemos - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):998-1001.
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  50.  19
    Morality and Action. [REVIEW]Noah Lemos - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):729-732.
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