Results for 'Non-conceptual content'

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  1. Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space.Lucy Allais - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.
    :Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me , thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is (...)
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  2. The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on (...)
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  3.  51
    Formative Non-Conceptual Content.Benjamin D. Young - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6):201-214.
    The olfactory system processes smells in a structural manner that is unlike the composition of thoughts or language, suggesting that some of the content of our olfactory experiences are represented in a format that does not involve concepts. Consequently, formative non-conceptual content is offered as an alternative theory of non-conceptual content according to which the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual states is simply a matter of the format of their structural parts and relations (...)
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  4. Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to (...)
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  5. Non-Conceptual Content, Experience and the Self.Peter Poellner - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2):32-57.
    Traditionally the intentionality of consciousness has been understood as the idea that many conscious states are about something, that they have objects in a broad sense - including states of affairs - which they represent, and it is on account of being representational that they are said to have contents. It has also been claimed, more controversially, that conscious intentional contents must be available to the subject as reasons for her judgments or actions, and that they are therefore necessarily (...). This paper challenges the assumptions that all conscious intentional contents are representations of objects, and that they are essentially conceptual. Both assumptions will be shown to be intimately connected. The first main part of the paper offers an account of conscious intentionality that is not prejudicial on the issue of whether all intentional contents of conscious mental states represent objects which the mental state can be said to be about. The author then shows that many personal-level perceptual contents, including those involved in our evaluative stance towards aspects of the world, have non-conceptual components even on a wide construal of the conceptual sphere , allowing for demonstrative concepts. In the second main part of the paper it is argued that experiences themselves, as contrasted with what they are experiences of, are non-conceptual contents. To this purpose the author reconstructs and develops some suggestive observations found in the phenomenology of Husserl to the effect that experiences as directly presented or 'lived through' are not objects of consciousness. It is argued that this thesis, properly understood, is true and that it entails that experiences as directly presented in consciousness are themselves non-conceptual intentional contents. Husserl's thesis is illuminating and important, allowing among other things a more satisfactory account of the elusive phenomenon of depth we normally attribute to the conscious self - the idea that there is always more to our experienced selves at any moment than what we are capable of articulating at the time. (shrink)
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  6. Non‐Conceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales and Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):419-430.
  7. Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content.Katalin Balog - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. (...)
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  8.  14
    Non‐Conceptual Content and the Sound of Music.Michael Luntley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.
    : I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual representational content. The argument is compatible with McDowell's defence of conceptualism against those arguments for nonconceptual content that draw upon claims about the fine‐grainedness of experience. I present a case for nonconceptual content that concentrates on the idea that experience can possess representational content that cannot perform the function of conceptual content, namely figure in the subject's reasons for belief and action. This sort of (...)
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  9. Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the 'Second Step' of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2012 - Kant Studies Online (1):51-92.
  10. On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese:1-25.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding (...)
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  11.  74
    Non-Conceptual Content: The Richness Argument and Early Visual Processing.Timothy Fuller - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):143-154.
    In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument, (...)
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  12.  25
    On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding (...)
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  13. Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2017 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6 (1):58-78.
    Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does (...)
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  14. Kant and Non-Conceptual Content.Dietmar H. Heidemann (ed.) - 2012 - Routledge.
    Conceptualism is the view that cognizers can have mental representations of the world only if they possess the adequate concepts by means of which they can specify what they represent. By contrast, non-conceptualism is the view that mental representations of the world do not necessarily presuppose concepts by means of which the content of these representations can be specified, thus cognizers can have mental representations of the world that are non-conceptual. Consequently, if conceptualism is true then non-conceptualism must (...)
     
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  15.  46
    Non-Conceptually Contentful Attitudes in Interpretation.Daniel Laurier - 2001 - Sorites 13 (October):6-22.
    Brandom's book Making It Explicit defends Davidson's claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes. In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as (...)
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  16. Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content.David W. Hamlyn - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical (...)
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  17. The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Perception.Michael K. Shim - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  18. Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content.Michael D. Barber - 2008 - Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.
    John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means (...)
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  19. The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.Clinton Tolley - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.
    There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of ‘content’ in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of ‘sense ’, understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. (...)
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  20. Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):323 - 398.
    In this essay I argue that a broadly Kantian strategy for demonstrating and explaining the existence, semantic structure, and psychological function of essentially non-conceptual content can also provide an intelligible and defensible bottom-up theory of the foundations of rationality in minded animals. Otherwise put, if I am correct, then essentially non-conceptual content constitutes the semantic and psychological substructure, or matrix, out of which the categorically normative a priori superstructure of epistemic rationality and practical rationality - Sellars's (...)
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  21.  65
    Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):185-213.
    In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...)
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  22. Phenomenology and Non-Conceptual Content[REVIEW]Corijn van Mazijk - 2015 - Metodo 2 (2).
  23.  40
    Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore - 2007 - In Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on "Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence: Theoretical foundations and current approaches". AAAI.
    Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of (...)
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  24. Non-Rational Grounds and Non-Conceptual Content.Mark A. Wrathall - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):265-278.
  25.  81
    Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  26. Kant, Husserl, and the Case for Non-Conceptual Content.Jacob Rump - 2014 - In Faustino Fabbianelli & Sebastian Luft (eds.), Husserl and Classical German Philosophy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
    In recent debates about the nature of non-conceptual content, the Kantian account of intuition in the first Critique has been seen as a sort of founding doctrine for both conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions. In this paper, I begin by examining recent representative versions of the Kantian conceptualist (John McDowell) and Kantian non-conceptualist (Robert Hanna) positions, and suggest that the way the debate is commonly construed by those on both sides misses a much broader and more important conception of (...)
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  27. Learning and the Necessity of Non-Conceptual Content in Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.David Forman - 2006 - In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. pp. 115-145.
    For Sellars, the possibility of empirical knowledge presupposes the existence of "sense impressions" in the perceiver, i.e., non-conceptual states of perceptual consciousness. But this role for sense impressions does not implicate Sellars' account in the Myth of the Given: sense impressions do not stand in a justificatory relation to instances of perceptual knowledge; their existence is rather a condition for the possibility of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Sellars suggests that learning empirical concepts presupposes that we can remember certain (...)
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    Non Conceptual Content And Observable, In Realism Debate.Petros Damianos - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiry 41 (4):60-79.
    In this article, I try to present some effects of the acceptance of nonconceptual content of perception in the realism problem. After having enhancement as main the problem of discrimination observable - unobservable into the conflict of realism with the constructive empiricism, I criticize a particular aspect, that nonconceptual content of perception strengthens the realistic position. Arguing that, while the starting point of the realist position is the existence of entities of common sense, there is nothing that assures (...)
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    Non-Conceptual Content, Subject-Centered Information and the Naturalistic Demand.Juan Jose Acero - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:359-367.
  30.  73
    Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content From Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57.
  31.  21
    Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2013 - Hegel Bulletin 34 (1):1-32.
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  32. Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving.Hemdat Lerman - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing (...)
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  33. In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that (...)
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    The Debate About Non-Conceptual Content Revisited: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, by Corijn van Mazijk, London, Routledge, 2020, Xviii + 174 Pp., $128.00 (Hbk), ISBN: 978-0-367-44180-7.Robert Hanna - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (1):90-115.
    Philosophical discussions, especially in professional academic philosophy, all-too-often are, or anyhow quickly devolve into, nothing but essentially humanly irrelevant, esoteric, logic-chopping, t...
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    The Debate About Non-Conceptual Content Revisited: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, by Corijn van Mazijk, London, Routledge, 2020, Xviii + 174 Pp., $128.00 (Hbk), ISBN: 978-0-367-44180-7. [REVIEW]Robert Hanna - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (1):90-115.
    Philosophical discussions, especially in professional academic philosophy, all-too-often are, or anyhow quickly devolve into, nothing but essentially humanly irrelevant, esoteric, logic-chopping, t...
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  36. Kant and Non-Conceptual Content.Dietmar H. Heidemann (ed.) - 2012 - Routledge.
    Conceptualism is the view that cognizers can have mental representations of the world only if they possess the adequate concepts by means of which they can specify what they represent. By contrast, non-conceptualism is the view that mental representations of the world do not necessarily presuppose concepts by means of which the content of these representations can be specified, thus cognizers can have mental representations of the world that are non-conceptual. Consequently, if conceptualism is true then non-conceptualism must (...)
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  37. Non-Conceptual Psychological Explanation: Content and Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1996 - Dissertation, Oxford
    2.4 The Example: Infants and object-(im)permanence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17 2.4.1 Why a contentful account is warranted: Perspectival sensitivity : : : 17 2.4.2 The \searching under a cloth" and \AB" data : : : : : : : : : : : : 24 2.4.3 Two constraints on objectuality : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (...)
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  38.  40
    Misrepresentation and Non-Conceptual Content.Michael Fleming - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):557-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Une thèse sousjacente au présent article est que la reconnaissance de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde devrait jouer un rôle significatif dans les explications de la genèse de la connaissance empirique. Je recours à cette contrainte explicative pour évaluer le tableau proposé par John McDowell dans Mind and World et, en particulier, ses arguments contre l’idée que le contenu de l’expérience est non conceptuel. McDowell considère Gareth Evans comme un représentant de cette conception et soutient que le (...)
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  39.  6
    Misrepresentation and Non-Conceptual Content.Michael Fleming - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):557-578.
    RÉSUMÉ: Une thèse sousjacente au présent article est que la reconnaissance de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde devrait jouer un rôle significatif dans les explications de la genèse de la connaissance empirique. Je recours à cette contrainte explicative pour évaluer le tableau proposé par John McDowell dans Mind and World et, en particulier, ses arguments contre l’idée que le contenu de l’expérience est non conceptuel. McDowell considère Gareth Evans comme un représentant de cette conception et soutient que le (...)
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  40. Perception, Apperception and Non-Conceptual Content.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2003 - In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
  41.  31
    Kant and Non-Conceptual Content[REVIEW]Andrea Faggion - 2013 - Manuscrito 36 (2):343-354.
  42. Lecture III: Non-Conceptual Content.John McDowell - 1994 - In Mind and World. Harvard University Press.
  43.  5
    An Approach to the Non-Conceptual Content of Emotions.Alejandro Murillo-Lara & Carlos Andrés Muñoz-Serna - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).
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  44. Taking Embodiment Seriously Non-Conceptual Content and Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1992 - School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex.
  45.  35
    The Varieties of Perception Non-Conceptual Content in Kant, Cassirer, and McDowell.Guido Kreis - 2015 - In Sebastian Luft & J. Tyler Friedman (eds.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment. De Gruyter. pp. 313-338.
  46. Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that (...)
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  47. What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual?Sean D. Kelly - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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  48.  77
    The Argument From the Finer‐Grained Content of Colour Experiences A Redefinition of its Role Within the Debate Between McDowell and Non‐Conceptual Theorists.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.
    In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience (...)
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  49. Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1):173-196.
    I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars so famously (...)
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  50. Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?Huang Xiang - 2013 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (3):485-497.
     
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