Results for 'Nonreductive physicalism'

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  1.  91
    How Counterpart Theory Saves Nonreductive Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - forthcoming - Mind:fzx034.
    Nonreductive physicalism faces serious problems regarding causal exclusion, causal heterogeneity, and the nature of realization. In this paper I advance solutions to each of those problems. The proposed solutions all depend crucially on embracing modal counterpart theory. Hence, the paper’s thesis: counterpart theory saves nonreductive physicalism. I take as my inspiration the view that mental tokens are constituted by physical tokens in the same way statues are constituted by lumps of clay. I break from other philosophers (...)
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  2. Kim's Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ausonio Marras - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):305 - 327.
    The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a (...)
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  3.  82
    Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism.J. Barrett - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to (...)
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  4.  55
    Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation.Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchil - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. We argue that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, a dependence that Kim does not acknowledge in his official presentations of (...)
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  5.  4
    Index of Volume 79, 2001.Stephen Buckle, Miracles Marvels, Mundane Order, Temporal Solipsism, Robert Kirk, Nonreductive Physicalism, Strict Implication, Donald Mertz Individuation, Instance Ontology & Dale E. Miller - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):594-596.
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  6. On the Distinction Between Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Matthew C. Haug - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):451-469.
    Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, while nonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low-level physical properties is natural in both of (...)
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  7. Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism.Paul Raymont - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
    An analysis and rebuttal of Jaegwon Kim's reasons for taking nonreductive physicalism to entail the causal irrelevance of mental features to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies.
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  8. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  9.  47
    Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication.Robert Kirk - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
    I have argued that a strong kind of physicalism based on the strict implication thesis can consistently reject both eliminativism and reductionism (in any nontrivial sense). This piece defends that position against objections from Andrew Melnyk, who claims that either my formulation doesn't entail physicalism, or it must be interpreted in such a way that the mental is after all reducible to the physical. His alternatives depend on two interesting assumptions. I argue that both are mistaken, thereby, making (...)
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  10. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the (...)
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  11. Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism.David Pineda - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of (...)
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  12.  36
    The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.
    Using the notion of strict implication, Robert Kirk claims to have formulated a version of physicalism which is nonreductive. I argue that, depending on how his notion of strict implication is interpreted, Kirk's formulation either fails to be physicalist or else commits him to reductionism. Either way we do not have nonreductive physicalism. I also suggest that the reductionism to which Kirk is committed, though unfashionable, is unobjectionable.
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  13. Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
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  14.  78
    Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure.Sophie Gibb - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.
    Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for (...)
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  15. Downward Causation in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kim Jaegwon - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter.
     
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  16.  93
    From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism.JeeLoo Liu - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
    It has been noted in recent literature (e.g., Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, McLaughlin 2006 and Cohen 2005) that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” (Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, Cohen 2005) or “filler functionalism” (McLaughlin 2006). The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism mars the distinction traditionally made between (...)
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  17. Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation.John Ross Churchill - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a (...)
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  18. "Downward Causation" in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. pp. 119--138.
     
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  19.  30
    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed (...)
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  20.  12
    Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism.D. Beilfeldt - 1999 - Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
    This essay examines Nancey Murphy’s commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience’s nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at (...)
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  21.  3
    Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism.David Pineda - 2001 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of serious difficulties. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical account of functional properties and show how this proposal is able to overcome some of these difficulties, in particular, some recent arguments against the causal efficacy of multiply realized properties. However, in the second part of the paper an objection against this proposal (...)
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  22. And Nonreductive Physicalism.Ausonio Marras - unknown
    The aim of this paper is to show that KimÕs ‘supervenience argumentÕ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that KimÕs argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of (...)
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  23.  1
    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed (...)
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  24. Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
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  25.  89
    Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism.Dennis D. Bielfeldt - 1999 - Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
  26.  44
    Consciousness, Self-Organization, and the Process-Substratum Relation: Rethinking Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralph D. Ellis - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):173-190.
    Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are (...)
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  27. Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralph D. Ellis - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
    Most versions of the knowledge argument say that, since scientists observing my brain wouldn't know what my consciousness "is like," consciousness isn't describable as a physical process. Although this argument unwarrantedly equates the physical with the empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is nonphysical but that consciousness isn't identical with anything empirically observable. But what kind of mind&endash;body relation would render possible this empirical inaccessibility of consciousness? Even if multiple realizability may allow a distinction between consciousness and its (...)
     
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  28. Supervenient Difficulties with Nonreductive Physicalism: A Critical Analysis of Supervenience Physicalism.Ten G. Elshof - 1997 - Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.
  29.  3
    Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism.Paul Raymoimt - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 225.
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  30. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - De Gruyter.
  31.  84
    Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):736-744.
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  32. Natural Properties and the Special Sciences: Nonreductive Physicalism Without Levels of Reality or Multiple Realizability.Matthew C. Haug - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):244-266.
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  33. Emergence or Reduction?--Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralf Stoecker, Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):701.
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  34.  39
    Introduction - Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann - unknown
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  35.  1
    Mental Causation and Nonreductive Physicalism, an Unhappy Marriage?Antonella Corradini - 2018 - In Alessandro Giordani & Ciro de Florio (eds.), From Arithmetic to Metaphysics: A Path Through Philosophical Logic. De Gruyter. pp. 89-102.
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  36.  16
    Emergence or Reduction?—Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralf Stoecker - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):701-706.
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  37. Elimination Versus Nonreductive Physicalism.Brian Loar - 1992 - In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
     
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  38. Giving the Nonreductive Physicalist Her Due: A Response to Hasker’s The Emergent Self.Nancey Murphy - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 2 (2):167-174.
  39. Supervenience and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action.Nancey C. Murphy - 1999 - In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
  40.  22
    Nonreductive Realization and Nonreductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.Carl Gillett - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 31.
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  41. Supervenient Difficulties with Nonreductive Materialism: A Critical Appraisal of Supervenience-Physicalism.Gregg Ten Elshof - 1997 - Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.
  42. Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.Jessica M. Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non- reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees (...)
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  43.  42
    Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems.Kevin Morris - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    This paper considers the extent to which the notion of truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining physicalism. While a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is prima facie attractive, there is some reason to doubt that truthmaking can do much work when it comes to understanding physicalism, and perhaps austere metaphysical frameworks in general. First, despite promising to dispense with higher-level properties and states, truthmaking appears to make little progress on issues concerning higher-level items and how they (...)
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  44. Causal Exclusion and Multiple Realizations.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):525-530.
    A critical analysis of recent interventionist responses to the causal exclusion problem is presented. It is argued that the response can indeed offer a solution to the problem, but one that is based on renouncing the multiple realizability thesis. The account amounts to the rejection of nonreductive physicalism and would thus be unacceptable to many. It is further shown that if the multiple realizability thesis is brought back in and conjoined with the interventionist notion of causation, inter-level causation (...)
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  45. Interventions on Causal Exclusion.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):255-263.
    Two strains of interventionist responses to the causal exclusion argument are reviewed and critically assessed. On the one hand, one can argue that manipulating supervenient mental states is an effective strategy for manipulating the subvenient physical states, and hence should count as genuine causes to the subvenient physical states. But unless the supervenient and subvenient states manifest some difference in their manipulability conditions, there is no reason to treat them as distinct, which in turn goes against the basic assumption of (...)
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  46.  46
    Against Disanalogy-Style Responses to the Exclusion Problem.Kevin Morris - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):435-453.
    This paper focuses on an influential line of response to the exclusion problem for nonreductive physicalism, one defended with the most subtlety by Karen Bennett. According to this line of thought, a successful nonreductive response to the exclusion problem, a response that allows one to maintain each of the core components of nonreductive physicalism, may consist in showing that the manner in which the effects of mental causes also have distinct and sufficient physical causes is (...)
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  47.  92
    Intralevel Mental Causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism (...)
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  48.  85
    Subset Realization and Physical Identification.Kevin Morris - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335.
    According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years,1 my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ which has often (...)
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  49.  35
    Making Sense of Causal Interactions Between Consciousness and Brain.Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):69-95.
    My target article (henceforth referred to as TA) presents evidence for causal interactions between consciousness and brain and some standard ways of accounting for this evidence in clinical practice and neuropsychological theory. I also point out some of the problems of understanding such causal interactions that are not addressed by standard explanations. Most of the residual problems have to do with how to cross the “explanatory gap” from consciousness to brain. I then list some of the reasons why the route (...)
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  50.  72
    Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation.Neil Campbell - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):207-220.
    Ausonio Marras has argued that Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion depends on an implausibly strong interpretation of explanatory realism that should be rejected because it leads to an extensional criterion of individuation for explanations. I examine the role explanatory realism plays in Kim's justification for the exclusion principle and explore two ways in which Kim can respond to Marras's criticism. The first involves separating criteria for explanatory truth from questions of explanatory adequacy, while the second appeals to Kim's fine-grained (...)
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