Results for 'Nonreductive physicalism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  2. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation.Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchil - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. We argue that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, a dependence that Kim does not acknowledge in his official presentations of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckerman, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  5. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure.Sophie Gibb - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.
    Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation.John Ross Churchill - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7.  54
    Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication.Robert Kirk - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
    I have argued that a strong kind of physicalism based on the strict implication thesis can consistently reject both eliminativism and reductionism (in any nontrivial sense). This piece defends that position against objections from Andrew Melnyk, who claims that either my formulation doesn't entail physicalism, or it must be interpreted in such a way that the mental is after all reducible to the physical. His alternatives depend on two interesting assumptions. I argue that both are mistaken, thereby, making (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  8. Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism.Jonathan Barrett - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Kim’s Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ausonio Marras - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):305 - 327.
    The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  10.  47
    Introduction - Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  11.  42
    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism.Paul Raymont - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
    An analysis and rebuttal of Jaegwon Kim's reasons for taking nonreductive physicalism to entail the causal irrelevance of mental features to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13.  5
    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. And Nonreductive Physicalism.Ausonio Marras - unknown
    The aim of this paper is to show that KimÕs ‘supervenience argumentÕ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that KimÕs argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  99
    Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):736-744.
  16. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - De Gruyter.
  17. Natural Properties and the Special Sciences: Nonreductive Physicalism Without Levels of Reality or Multiple Realizability.Matthew C. Haug - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):244-266.
    In this paper, I investigate how different views about the vertical and horizontal structure of reality affect the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalism. This debate is commonly assumed to hinge on whether there are high-level, special-science properties that are distinct from low-level physical properties and whether the alleged multiple realizability of high-level properties establishes this. I defend a metaphysical interpretation of nonreductive physicalismin the absence of both of these assumptions. Adopting an independently motivated, discipline-relative account of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18.  9
    “Downward Causation” in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kim Jaegwon - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter. pp. 119-138.
  19. Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism.Dennis Bielfeldt - 1999 - Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
  20. How Counterpart Theory Saves Nonreductive Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):139-174.
    Nonreductive physicalism faces serious problems regarding causal exclusion, causal heterogeneity, and the nature of realization. In this paper I advance solutions to each of those problems. The proposed solutions all depend crucially on embracing modal counterpart theory. Hence, the paper’s thesis: counterpart theory saves nonreductive physicalism. I take as my inspiration the view that mental tokens are constituted by physical tokens in the same way statues are constituted by lumps of clay. I break from other philosophers (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. "Downward Causation" in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. pp. 119--138.
  22. Convergence on the Problem of Mental Causation: Shoemaker's Strategy for (Nonreductive?) Physicalists.Alyssa Ney - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):438-445.
  23.  35
    Emergence or Reduction?—Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralf Stoecker, Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):701.
    This book collects twelve original articles, arranged in three sections, plus an introduction.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism.JeeLoo Liu - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
    It has been noted in recent literature (e.g., Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, McLaughlin 2006 and Cohen 2005) that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” (Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, Cohen 2005) or “filler functionalism” (McLaughlin 2006). The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism mars the distinction traditionally made between (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism.David Pineda - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  21
    Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism.D. Beilfeldt - 1999 - Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
    This essay examines Nancey Murphy’s commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience’s nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  11
    Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism.David Pineda - 2001 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of serious difficulties. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical account of functional properties and show how this proposal is able to overcome some of these difficulties, in particular, some recent arguments against the causal efficacy of multiply realized properties. However, in the second part of the paper an objection against this proposal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Supervenient Difficulties with Nonreductive Physicalism: A Critical Analysis of Supervenience Physicalism.Ten G. Elshof - 1997 - Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.
  29. Elimination Versus Nonreductive Physicalism.Brian Loar - 1992 - In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30.  6
    Mental Causation and Nonreductive Physicalism, an Unhappy Marriage?Antonella Corradini - 2018 - In Alessandro Giordani & Ciro de Florio (eds.), From Arithmetic to Metaphysics: A Path Through Philosophical Logic. De Gruyter. pp. 89-102.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter. pp. 1-22.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  50
    Consciousness, Self-Organization, and the Process-Substratum Relation: Rethinking Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralph D. Ellis - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):173-190.
    Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. On the Distinction Between Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.Matthew C. Haug - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):451-469.
    Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, while nonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low-level physical properties is natural in both of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  11
    Giving the Nonreductive Physicalist Her Due: A Response to Hasker’s The Emergent Self.Nancey Murphy - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 2 (2):167-174.
  36.  30
    Nonreductive Realization and Nonreductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.Carl Gillett - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 31.
  37.  26
    Fodor on Multiple Realizability and Nonreductive Physicalism: Why the Argument Does Not Work.José Luis Bermúdez & Arnon Cahen - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a “thin” notion of intra-species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there are more (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  4
    Fodor on Multiple Realizability and Nonreductive Physicalism.José Luis Bermúdez & Arnon Cahen - 2020 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (1):59-74.
    This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a “thin” notion of intraspecies multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there are more (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralph D. Ellis - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
    Most versions of the knowledge argument say that, since scientists observing my brain wouldn't know what my consciousness "is like," consciousness isn't describable as a physical process. Although this argument unwarrantedly equates the physical with the empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is nonphysical but that consciousness isn't identical with anything empirically observable. But what kind of mind&endash;body relation would render possible this empirical inaccessibility of consciousness? Even if multiple realizability may allow a distinction between consciousness and its (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  6
    Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism.Paul Raymoimt - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 225.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Supervenience and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action.Nancey C. Murphy - 1999 - In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
  42.  84
    Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):473-482.
    This paper considers the extent to which the notion of truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining physicalism. While a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is prima facie attractive, there is some reason to doubt that truthmaking can do much work when it comes to understanding physicalism, and perhaps austere metaphysical frameworks in general. First, despite promising to dispense with higher-level properties and states, truthmaking appears to make little progress on issues concerning higher-level items and how they (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.Jessica M. Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non- reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  44.  97
    Nonreductive Materialism and the Problem of Causal Exclusion.Olga Markič - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):79-88.
    In this paper I examine nonreductive materialism (physicalism). This is a position that Terry Horgan favors in his papers and is probably the most widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind in recent decades. In contrast to this, I will argue that nonreductive materialism is an unstable position and will suggest that we can show this using Horgan's own work on the concept of superdupervenience.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Physicalism and the Mind.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Supervenient Difficulties with Nonreductive Materialism: A Critical Appraisal of Supervenience-Physicalism.Gregg Ten Elshof - 1997 - Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.
  47.  62
    Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Psychophysical Supervenience and Nonreductive Materialism.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):275-304.
    Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  49. A Defense of Nonreductive Mental Causation.Andrew Russo - 2013 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma
    Mental causation is a problem and not just a problem for the nonphysicalist. One of the many lessons learned from Jaegwon Kim’s writings in the philosophy of mind is that mental causation is a problem for the nonreductive physicalist as well. A central component of the common sense picture we have of ourselves as persons is that our beliefs and desires causally explain our actions. But the completeness of the “brain sciences” threatens this picture. If all of our actions (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50.  54
    Physicalism and Global Supervenience.Paul K. Moser - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.
    This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000