Thomas L. Carson: Lying and Deception. Theory and Practice, Oxford Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9320-9 Authors NorbertAnwander, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.
Eva Buddeberg: Verantwortung im Diskurs: Grundlinien einer rekonstruktiv-hermeneutischen Konzeption moralischer Verantwortung im Anschluss an Hans Jonas, Karl-Otto Apel und Emmanuel Lévinas Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9366-3 Authors NorbertAnwander, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.
Anwander questions "the role that Pogge assigns to benefiting from injustice in the determination of our duties toward the victims of injustice... challenging his claim that there is a negative duty not to benefit from injustice.".
Actions are intelligible to the extent that their agents know what they are doing and are able to make sense of their own behaviour. It is widely held, both in tradition as well as in current philosophical debate about practical reasons, that this requires people to act for reasons they consider normative: Agents must see something good about their actions. This article argues against such a conceptual restriction on intelligibility. Not only can people act intentionally without acting for normative reasons (...) as they would be mentioned in contexts of justification. It is also possible for us to understand our own actions without believing that they are supported by good reasons. The constitutive aim of intentional action, which is intelligibility, is distinct from the ideal of being able to consider one's actions as right and good. It is desirable, however, that we can understand our own actions not merely by reference to any reasons but to reasons that we regard as good ones. (shrink)
Los patios interiores de la democracia de Norbert Lechner además de los contenidos específicos de cada artículo que convocan con inteligencia a la reflexión y al estudio de temas particulares actuales –la revolución, la democracia, la vida cotidiana, el realismo político, el miedo, la cultura posmoderna, etc–, es sugerente a lo menos en tres aspectos generales: el primero, tiene que ver con el discernimiento de la «situación epistemológica» del investigador contemporáneo latinoamericano despu..
El argumento general que presenta el texto de Lechner está bastante bien resumido por el propio autor, así que no vamos a intentar mejorarlo: “Nuestra sociedad se encuentra atravesada por la lucha que enfrenta la reivindicación de la auto-determinación democrática a la naturalización de lo social. En su lucha por ‘ser sujeto’ (tanto individual y colectivo) de su destino, los hombres se topan con múltiples problemas (pág. 99). Lo que se produce en la sociedad chilena es una autonomía de los (...) si.. (shrink)
The article introduces the pedagogical background and impact of Grue-Sørensen. Knud Grue-Sørensen came to educational science from philosophy and was infl uenced by Kantian philosopher Leonard Nelson. Grue-Sørensen became the first professor of education at the University of Copenhagen. During an era in which research in the fi eld of education became more and more infl uenced by empirical research, Grue- Sørensen held on to a theoretically and historically rooted pedagogy. Among other works he authored a threevolume account of the (...) history of education and the encyclopaedia “Almen Pædagogik”. (shrink)
Artiklen vil diskutere det pædagogiske paradoks primært ud fra D. Benner. Artiklen hævder, at det pædagogiske paradoks hviler på en forståelse af frihed, der hos Benner er underbelyst, og en idé om autenticitet, der ender i det isolerede Selv. Jeg foreslår her over for at studere appellens fænomen m.h.p. at indkredse en idé om frihed, der ikke udelukker enhver ydre indflydelse.
En analyse af de videns- og forskningsformer der bestemmer pædagogikens karakter. Der sondres mellem tre 1. forskning om hver der virker, 2. forskning med henblik på at forklare og forstå - dvs. udvikle teorier og 3. forskning der søger anvendelse af teorier i et nødvendigt samspil med filosofisk antropologi og etik.
Artiklen perspektiverer på den almene pædagogiks aktuelle, pressede tilstand, i lyset af de centrale, transnationale udviklingstendenser inden for uddannelsesstyring der har gjort sig gældende de sidste ca. 25-30 år. Dette gøres, ved at tage afsæt i de såkaldte antinomier, som en række pædagogiske forskere har forholdt sig til som definerende for moderne pædagogik. Denne tematik blevet sat på dagsordenen af aktuelle uddannelsesforskere som bl.a. Alexander von Oettingen; Michael Uljens; Lars Løvlie; Gert Biesta, Birgit Schaffar og Dietrich Benner. Oettingen ser nærmere (...) bestemt spørgsmålet om pædagogisk professionalitet som spaltet i fire antinomiske paradokser, der angår Rationalisering ; Pluralisering ; Individualisering og Civilisering. Disse pædagogiske paradoksaliteter har en rod bl.a. hos Kant, Rousseau og Herbart. Artiklen søger gennem fokusering af sådanne pædagogiske antinomier eller paradokser at vise, hvorledes den transnationale uddannelsesrevolution de sidste 25-30 år har udtyndet den almenpædagogiske undermuring af begreberne: I. professionalitet, II. læring, III. autenticitet og IV. dannelse. Dermed fokuseres de almenpædagogiske problemstillinger der kendetegner disse fire begreber. Dette gøres for at vise, hvorledes den transnationale uddannelsesstyring i dette lys udgør en bekymrende afvikling eller sammenklapning af pædagogikkens almene grundtræk. (shrink)
DOI: 10.1080/00031305.2018.1564697 When the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology effectively banned the use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) from articles published in their journal, it set off a fire-storm of discussions both supporting the decision and defending the utility of NHST in scientific research. At the heart of NHST is the p-value which is the probability of obtaining an effect equal to or more extreme than the one observed in the sample data, given the null hypothesis and (...) other model assumptions. Although this is conceptually different from the probability of the null hypothesis being true, given the sample, p-values nonetheless can provide evidential information, toward making an inference about a parameter. Applying a 10,000-case simulation described in this article, the authors found that p-values’ inferential signals to either reject or not reject a null hypothesis about the mean (α = 0.05) were consistent for almost 70% of the cases with the parameter’s true location for the sampled-from population. Success increases if a hybrid decision criterion, minimum effect size plus p-value (MESP), is used. Here, rejecting the null also requires the difference of the observed statistic from the exact null to be meaningfully large or practically significant, in the researcher’s judgment and experience. The simulation compares performances of several methods: from p-value and/or effect size-based, to confidence-interval based, under various conditions of true location of the mean, test power, and comparative sizes of the meaningful distance and population variability. For any inference procedure that outputs a binary indicator, like flagging whether a p-value is significant, the output of one single experiment is not sufficient evidence for a definitive conclusion. Yet, if a tool like MESP generates a relatively reliable signal and is used knowledgeably as part of a research process, it can provide useful information. (shrink)
This is a transcript of a conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans in 1973, filmed for The Open University. Under the title 'Truth', Strawson and Evans discuss the question as to whether the distinction between genuinely fact-stating uses of language and other uses can be grounded on a theory of truth, especially a 'thin' notion of truth in the tradition of F P Ramsey.
Psychologists are increasingly interested in embodiment based on the assumption that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are grounded in bodily interaction with the environment. We examine how embodiment is used in social psychology, and we explore the ways in which embodied approaches enrich traditional theories. Although research in this area is burgeoning, much of it has been more descriptive than explanatory. We provide a critical discussion of the trajectory of embodiment research in social psychology. We contend that future researchers should engage (...) in a phenomenon-based approach, highlight the theoretical boundary conditions and mediators involved, explore novel action-relevant outcome measures, and address the role of individual differences broadly defined. Such research will likely provide a more explanatory account of the role of embodiment in general terms as well as how it expands the knowledge base in social psychology. (shrink)
_ Source: _Page Count 27 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the (...) core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and free will skepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have free will. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken. (shrink)
Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. (...) Strawson himself was an externalist. I believe that Ciurria's reading of Strawson is problematic. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Strawson's position with regard to the internalism-externalism issue against the background of Ciurria's reading of him. I conclude that Strawson was neither an internalist nor an externalist about moral responsibility. I draw extensively upon the whole body of Strawson's work, much of which is sadly neglected in discussions of ‘Freedom and Resentment’, although it illuminates many of the issues discussed there. (shrink)
In , P. Scowcroft and L. van den Dries proved a cell decomposition theorem for p-adically closed fields. We work here with the notion of P-minimal fields defined by D. Haskell and D. Macpherson in . We prove that a P-minimal field K admits cell decomposition if and only if K has definable selection. A preprint version in French of this result appeared as a prepublication .
In this article, we analyse the evidential value of the corpus of experimental philosophy. While experimental philosophers claim that their studies provide insight into philosophical problems, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concerns that the findings from these studies lack evidential value. Barriers to evidential value include selection bias and p-hacking. To find out whether the significant findings in x-phi papers result from selection bias or p-hacking, we applied a p-curve analysis to a corpus of 365 x-phi chapters and articles. (...) Our results suggest that this corpus has evidential value, although there are hints of p-hacking in a few parts of the x-phi corpus. (shrink)