Cultural critics say that 'science is politics by other means,' arguing that the results of scientific inquiry are profoundly shaped by the ideological agendas of powerful elites. Physicist Alan Sokal recently poked fun at these claims, touching off a still-unabated torrent of heated discussion. This hard-hitting collection picks up where Sokal left off, offering crisp, detailed critiques of case studies presented by cultural critics as evidence that scientific results tell us more about social context than they do about the natural (...) world. Comprising new essays by distinguished scholars of history, philosophy, and science, this book raises a lively debate to a new level of seriousness. (shrink)

Popper has provided a model for the scientific explanation of human actions and a metaphysical theory of man which can guide scientific research. In this paper I discuss the problems of the empirical content and nomicity of the Rationality Principle and extend the method of situational analysis to the problem of explaining beliefs. The domain of applicability of the Rationality Principle is bounded on one side by cases in which behavior is determined by processes which can not be influenced by (...) criticism and on the other side by the phenomenon of substantive creativity. However, a large part of human activity lies within its scope. (shrink)

Protagonists in the so-called Science Wars differ most markedly in their views about the role of values in science and what makes science valuable. Scientists and philosophers of science have traditionally considered the principal aims of science to be explanation and application. Only cognitive values should influence what is taken to be explanatory. Social and political values affect the priority assigned to various scientific problems and the ways in which scientific results are applied. Ethical considerations may be brought to bear (...) on the treatment of human and animal subjects, and the manner in which scientific results are communicated. Recent critiques of science allege that the content of scientific explanations reflects the dominant ideology and interests of scientists and their patrons. Instead of calling for more value neutrality, some now urge that science take as a principal aim the emancipation of oppressed subcultures. Not only should progressive political values be allowed to set the problems attempted, they also should be used to constrain the types of answers which are pursued. Since scientific knowledge is constructed by us, we should take responsibility for its content. This paper argues that the project of Emancipationist science is impractical and self-defeating. There is good reason to believe that there would be unresolvable political disputes concerning which kinds of scientific theories are truly emancipiatory. Furthermore, just as placebos cease to work when recognized as such, so would a science known to be constrained by political considerations lose its special epistemic authority. (shrink)

This volume presents the first systematic evaluation of a feminist epistemology of sciences' power to transform both the practice of science and our society. Unlike existing critiques, this book questions the fundamental feminist suggestion that purging science of alleged male biases will advance the cause of both science and by extension, social justice. The book is divided into four sections: the strange status of feminist epistemology, testing feminist claims about scientific practice, philosophical and political critiques of feminist epistemology, and future (...) prospects of feminist epistemology. Each of the essays3/4most of which are original to this text3/4 directly confronts the very idea that there could be a feminist epistemology or philosophy of science. Rather than attempting to deal in detail with all of the philosophical views that fall under the general rubric of feminist epistemology, the contributors focus on positions that provide the most influential perspectives on science. Not all of the authors agree amongst themselves, of course, but each submits feminist theories to careful scrutiny. Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology provides a timely, well-rounded, and much needed examination of the role of gender in scientific research. (shrink)

In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon presented a method of scientific inquiry that he hoped would root out "the idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding" (Aphorism XXXVIII). Bacon argued that these sources of systematic delusion would continue to cause trouble "unless men, being forewarned of the danger, fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults" (Ibid.). As the founders of the Royal Society began to design an institutional base for Bacon's dream (...) of a Great Instauration of the Sciences, they emphasized the importance of excluding discussions of politics, religion and what we today would call ideology from the conduct of the professional affairs of science. (shrink)

This anthology explores the nexus between scientific values and civic virtues, arguing that both scientific norms and scientific institutions can provide badly needed resources for improving the rationality of public deliberation in democratic society. In response to the growing cynicism about corruption and the influence of special interest groups, political scientists have placed more emphasis on the importance to civil society of traditional civic virtues such as justice, fairness, honesty, tolerance, and intellectual pluralism. But where are the good exemplars for (...) such attributes? In this volume, philosophers of science show how the scientific values of truthfulness, trust, candor, integrity, empirical adequacy, and critical thinking are exemplified in scientific research. Essays by historians explore the common roots of science and democracy. Other chapters show how fundamentalist religions and postmodernist critiques of rationality can undermine both science and civil society. (shrink)

In his “A New Program for Philosophy of Science?”, Ronald Giere expresses qualms regarding the critical and political projects I advocate for philosophy of science—that the critical project assumes an underdetermination absent from actual science, and the political project takes us outside the professional pursuit of philosophy of science. In reply I contend that the underdetermination the critical project assumes does occur in actual science, and I provide a variety of examples to support this. And I contend that the political (...) project requires no more than what other academic fields even in science studies are already providing. (shrink)

In this new and expanded edition of their controversial 1994 book, the authors update their analysis of what's gone wrong with Women's Studies programs. Their three new chapters provide a devastating and detailed examination of the routine practices found in feminst teaching and research.

Also available online as part of the Gale Virtual Reference Library under the title Complete dictionary of scientific biography.

Feminist proposals for reforming scientific method often ask that political evaluations be introduced into the context of justification. How might this work in practice? Fausto‐Sterling's alternative conceptualization of biological sex is analyzed and criticized. We then use this case study to comment on recent work on the role of social values in science by Longino and Kitcher.

This chapter argues that new ideas in philosophy can have an impact on other disciplines and help solve social problems. The new field of Research Ethics serves as the primary example.

This paper deals with two questions. First, if all scientists were perfect Popperians, how much influence could their background values and experiences have? It is argued that background can play a role in problem choice and in the constructing and testing of hypotheses. Second, do the ideals of feminism suggest the need for a new methodology and epistemology for science? In answering this question, Harding's paper in this volume is discussed.

Logic is the systematic study of patterns of correct inference. The first treatise on logic is Aristotle's Prior Analytics , written around 350 B.C. and there are remarkable similarities between the way he presented his theory of valid arguments and the way it is still taught today. He analyzes the form of various inferences and then illustrates them with concrete examples. He begins with very simple cases.

Like most philosophers, Laudan [7] believes that by and large science makes cognitive progress and that the development of science is more or less rational. His book deals with two major problems:(a)In what sense does science progress? What is scientific progress?(b)Wherein lies the rationality of the growth of science? What is scientific rationality?In the main body of this paper, I first summarize and evaluate some of Laudan’s criticisms of his predecessors. Then I outline and criticize Laudan’s own theory of scientific (...) progress and scientific rationality. In the Postscript I sketch my own views concerning the issue of changes in the canons of scientific rationality and the problem of using history to evaluate normative theories of scientific rationality. (shrink)

David Hull’s book (1988) provides an evolutionary account of the development of science which pays attention to both the social and conceptual aspects of that process. Unlike most philosophers who only invoke Darwinian metaphors in a casual way, Hull takes the analogy between the biological evolution of species and the growth of scientific knowledge quite seriously and by providing abstract definitions of terms such as replicator, interactor and lineage, he makes it possible for us to see clearly the structural similarities (...) between the two historical processes.Other symposiasts will comment on how tight that analogy really is. I must remark in passing that I have never understood the intense interest which evolutionary epistemologists take in this comparison. Surely our major job is to understand how science works, perhaps by using evolutionary theory as a fallible heuristic, but nothing seems to hinge on the extent of the formal analogy. (shrink)

For a balanced discussion of the main social, medical, and philosophical aspects of homosexuality, here is the ideal book. Written by philosophers of science, each comprehensive chapter takes a critical look at research on the etiology of homosexuality. Read Philosophy and Homosexuality and examine the evidence for both the sociobiological and hormonal explanations of homosexuality and study the definitions of sexual orientation and how they have affected research.

Over the past decade participants in these annual conferences have engaged in a thorough-going analysis of the relationships between science and culture, with special emphasis on the religious components of culture. Today I will focus on a new chapter in the long history of interactions between science and society at large. I want to analyze the antagonistic relations that have developed between science and the complex of ideas and values that can loosely be labelled as “multiculturalism”.

I compare recent work in the sociology of scientific knowledge with other types of sociological research. On this basis I urge a revival of the sociology of science, offer a tentative agenda, and attempt to show how the questions I raise might be addressed.

When Renat and I were preparing for this session we noticed the following irony: Although each of us is dubious about the fruitfulness of trying to explain the development of science in terms of the local sociopolitical scene, we each agreed that when it comes to understanding the development of philosophy of science in the last few decades, then the sorts of factors focused on by “new age” approaches to science studies actually play a major role!