Originally published in 1966 and now recognized as a classic, Norman O. Brown's meditation on the condition of humanity and its long fall from the grace of a natural, instinctual innocence is available once more for a new generation of readers. Love's Body is a continuation of the explorations begun in Brown's famous Life Against Death . Rounding out the trilogy is Brown's brilliant Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis.

In this article, we report the results of a survey of North American adults (n= 1,215) conducted between March 24 and 30, 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondents completed the COVID-TIS (Transitional Impact Scale-Pandemic version) and the 21-item Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS), indicated their level of COVID-infection concern for themselves and close others, and provided demographic information. The results indicated: (a) during its early stage, the pandemic produced only moderate levels of material and psychological change; (...) (b) the pandemic produced mild to moderate levels of psychological distress; (c) respondents who lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic experienced more change and more psychological distress than those who did not, and (d) younger respondents and less well-educated ones experienced more psychological distress than older respondents. Unexpectedly, (e) respondents indicated that they were more concerned that friends and family members would become infected with COVID-19 than that they would be. We conclude by speculating that these results are driven less by the immediate changes brought about by the pandemic and more by uncertainty concerning its long-term economic and social impact. (shrink)

Here is the final volume of Norman O. Brown's trilogy on civilization and its discontents, on humanity's long struggle to master its instincts and the perils that attend that denial of human nature. Following on his famous books _Life Against Death_ and _Love's Body_, this collection of eleven essays brings Brown's thinking up to 1990 and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Brown writes that "the prophetic tradition is an attempt to give direction to the social structure precipitated by (...) the urban revolution; to resolve its inherent contradictions; to put an end to its injustice, inequality, anomie, the state of war... that has been its history from start to finish." Affiliating himself with prophets from Muhammad to Blake and Emerson, Brown offers further meditations on what's wrong with Western civilization and what we might do about it. Thus the duality in his title: crisis and the hope for change. In pieces both poetic and philosophical, Brown's attention ranges over Greek mythology, Islam, Spinoza, and _Finnegan's Wake_. The collection includes an autobiographical essay musing on Brown's own intellectual development. The final piece, "Dionysus in 1990," draws on Freud and the work of Georges Bataille to link the recent changes in the world's economies with mankind's primordial drive to accumulation, waste, and death. (shrink)

Psychological egoism is, I suppose, regarded by most philosophers as one of the more simple-minded fallacies in the history of philosophy, and dangerous and seductive too, contriving as it does to combine cynicism about human ideals and a vague sense of scientific method, both of which make the ordinary reader feel sophisticated, with conceptual confusion, which he cannot resist. For all of these reasons it springs eternal, in one form or another, in the breasts of first-year students, and offers excellent (...) material for their philosophy instructors, who like nothing better than an edifice of sturdy appearance but with rotten foundations on which to display their skill as demolition experts. (shrink)

Originally published in 1966 and now recognized as a classic, Norman O. Brown's meditation on the condition of humanity and its long fall from the grace of a natural, instinctual innocence is available once more for a new generation of readers. _Love's Body_ is a continuation of the explorations begun in Brown's famous _Life Against Death_. Rounding out the trilogy is Brown's brilliant _Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis_.

In what sense can we not help thinking that every event has a cause? One answer is, that this begs the question: we can think of events as uncaused. Well, we can think of events in isolation from causes, and we can formulate the proposition that some events have no cause, or that no event needs a cause. But the first of these does not constitute thinking of an event as not caused, but thinking of an event not-as-caused ; while (...) the implications of the second, forming anti-causal propositions, are obscure. I can verbally formulate the proposition ‘some events are uncaused’; the question is, whether it makes sense to affirm it. Now I can verbally formulate the proposition ‘some triangles are quadrilateral’, and we must not say that this does not make sense; for I know the criteria for being a triangle, and I know the criteria for being quadrilateral; and the proposition simply asserts that there are some figures which satisfy both sets of criteria. That this is logically impossible is true, but it is not unintelligible. It does not, however, make sense to affirm a logical impossibility, simply because I cannot meaningfully affirm what I do not understand and believe to be possible, and if I understand what it means to be both triangular and quadrilateral, I cannot also believe it to be possible, since to understand what it means for a plane figure to have three sides is to understand that this excludes its having any other number of sides, e.g. four. But ‘some events are not caused’ is not logically incoherent in this way, or not apparently so; for in thinking of an event I am by definition thinking of a happening in isolation from any cause; I am thinking of it not as caused. Thus ‘some events are uncaused’ is not incoherent ex vi terminorum. (shrink)

This book, a reworking of Les enonces performatifs, is perhaps the most interesting and sustained work in English on speech acts since Searle's influential work of that name published in 1969. Whether it is "a major new contribution to the philosophy of language" is more doubtful. It contains nuanced discussions of many of the writers who have nourished the Austin-Searle tradition over the last twenty years, including a number of French authors. But it suffers from being descended from a thesis; (...) there is too much of ringing changes on the commentators, and it is often difficult to keep a tally of Recanati's own views as he states provisional positions later to be modified. More seriously, a distortion of Austin's notion of performativity is central to the book. There is space only to mention two or three problems here. (shrink)