Results for 'Normative explanation'

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  1. Normative Explanation and Justification.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):3-22.
    Normative explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair are ubiquitous in ordinary practice and normative theory. This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well (...)
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    Normative Explanation.Robert Ackermann - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):522-529.
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    Varieties of Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers pursue a number of different explanatory projects when explaining various sorts of normative phenomena. This chapter takes some steps towards understanding this variety. I lay some general ground about explanation. I describe some key axes of debate about explanations that first-order normative inquiry typically seeks to state and defend. And I briefly discuss how two other sorts of normative explanation that seem more concerned with the foundations of normative domains like ethics and practical (...)
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  4. Normative Explanation Unchained.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):278-297.
    [This paper is available as open access from the publisher.] Normative theories aim to explain why things have the normative features they have. This paper argues that, contrary to some plausible existing views, one important kind of normative explanations which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non-normative facts. Normative explanation is plausibly subject to a kind of (...)
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  5.  84
    Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press.
  6. Reasons Why in Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):607-623.
    Normative explanations, which specify why things have the normative features they do, are ubiquitous in normative theory and ordinary thought. But there is much less work on normative explanation than on scientific or metaphysical explanation. Skow (2016) argues that a complete answer to the question why some fact Q occurs consists in all of the reasons why Q occurs. This paper explores this theory as a case study of a general theory that promises to (...)
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  7. Grounding and Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
    This paper concerns non-causal normative explanations such as ‘This act is wrong because/in virtue of__’. The familiar intuition that normative facts aren't brute or ungrounded but anchored in non- normative facts seems to be in tension with the equally familiar idea that no normative fact can be fully explained in purely non- normative terms. I ask whether the tension could be resolved by treating the explanatory relation in normative explanations as the sort of ‘grounding’ (...)
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  8.  61
    Normative Explanations.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:55-71.
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  9.  41
    Cudworth and Normative Explanations.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-28.
    Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work – that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focus (...)
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  10.  13
    Norm Explanations in History.L. A. Mulholland - 1971 - Dialogue 10 (1):96-102.
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  11.  25
    Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation.Arturs Logins - 2022 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Logins develops and defends a new theory: the Erotetic (...)
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    Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains.Ernest Sosa - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    An important book by the world's most eminent epistemologist. In Epistemic Explanations Sosa develops an improved virtue epistemology and uses it to explain several epistemic phenomena.
  13.  80
    A Normative Account of the Need for Explanation.Zanja Yudell & Wai-Hung Wong - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2863-2885.
    Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue concerning explanation that has not been discussed much, namely, why some phenomena need an explanation while some do not. In this paper we first explain why this is an important issue, and then discuss two accounts of the need for explanation that can be gathered from the literature. We argue that both accounts are inadequate. The main purpose of the paper (...)
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  14. Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms (...)
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  15.  74
    Normative Characterization in Biological and Cognitive Explanations.Mark Bauer - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (2):271-286.
    Normative characterization is a commonplace feature of biological and cognitive explanation. Such language seems to commit the biological and cognitive sciences to the existence of natural norms, but it is also difficult to understand how such normativity fits into a natural world of physical causes and forces. I propose to map normativity onto systems stabilized by counteractive constraints. Such a mapping, I believe, can explain normativity’s causal-explanatory role in biological and cognitive inquiry. The common approach in the literature (...)
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  16.  16
    Reason Explanation:A First-Order Normative Account.Neil C. Manson - unknown
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  17. Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations.Josep Corbí - 2004 - Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  18.  8
    Normative Characterization in Empirical Explanation.Mark Bauer - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (2):271.
    Normative characterization is a commonplace feature of biological and cognitive explanation. Such language seems to commit the biological and cognitive sciences to the existence of natural norms, but it is also difficult to understand how such normativity fits into a natural world of physical causes and forces. I propose to map normativity onto systems stabilized by counteractive constraints. Such a mapping, I believe, can explain normativity's causal-explanatory role in biological and cognitive inquiry. The common approach in the literature (...)
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  19. Action Explanations Are Not Inherently Normative.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):60-78.
    "Though this be madness, yet there is method in't." Hamlet , act II, scene ii Abstract: Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively (...)
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  20.  85
    Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.
    Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than evaluating, behavior. In (...)
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  21.  10
    Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations.Josep Corbí - 2010 - Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
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  22.  40
    The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion.Mona Simion - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):477-488.
    In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According (...)
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  23. The Normative Character of Interpretation and Mental Explanation.Paul D. Thorn - 1998 - Dissertation, Simon Fraser University
    This essay is devoted to the study of useful ways of thinking about the nature of interpretation, with particular attention being given to the so called normative character of mental explanation. My aim of illuminating the nature of interpretation will be accomplished by examining several views, some of which are common to both Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, concerning its unique characteristics as a method of prediction and explanation. Moreover, some of the views held by Davidson and (...)
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  24.  30
    Functional Explanations and Natural Norms.Carolyn Price - 1995 - Ratio 8 (2):143-160.
    In this paper, I try to develop an account of functions which might be of use to a biologist engaged in classifying and explaining natural phenomena. The most pressing difficulty facing such an account is the need to reconcile the normativity of function statements with their explanatory force. I consider two familiar accounts of function statements, offered by Andrew Woodfield and Larry Wright . I examine both accounts in search of the strongest possible formulation of each type of theory. I (...)
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  25.  20
    Scientific Explanation and Norms in Science.David Gruender - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:329 - 335.
    The paper discusses theories of scientific explanation from the point of view of the norms or ideals of science they exemplify. The relationship of the adoption of these norms to metaphysical positions on determinism is explored, and means for reducing the conflict between methodological and metaphysical issues are suggested.
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  26.  14
    From Explanation to Understanding: Normativity Lost?Henk W. de Regt - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (3):327-343.
    In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly, many ‘friends of understanding’ sympathize with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science. However, this raises the question of whether the (...)
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  27.  42
    “Norming” and “Conforming”: Integrating Cultural and Institutional Explanations for Sustainability Adoption in Business. [REVIEW]Dan V. Caprar & Benjamin A. Neville - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 110 (2):231-245.
    Sustainability is increasingly a matter of concern in the corporate world. Many business scholars have analyzed the phenomenon from institutional and cultural perspectives, addressing the key questions of what drives the spread of sustainability principles, and also why sustainability adoption varies so widely among organizations and cultures. In this article, we propose that sustainability adoption can be better explained by integrating the insights from the institutional and cultural perspectives. This would break the current practice of choosing one approach or the (...)
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  28. Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: Some Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and (...)
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  29. Normative Phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom's Practice‐Based Explanation of Meaning.Ronald Loeffler - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):32-69.
  30. A Structural Explanation of Injustice in Conversations: It's About Norms.Saray Ayala-López - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):726-748.
    In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a (...)
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  31.  65
    Norms, Normative Principles, and Explanation: On Not Getting is From Ought.David Henderson - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
    It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of (...)
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  32. Structural Explanations and Norms: Comments on Haslanger.Amie Thomasson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):131-139.
    Sally Haslanger undertakes groundbreaking work in developing an account of structural explanations and the social structures that figure in them. A chief virtue of the account is that it can show the importance of structural explanations while also respecting the role of individual autonomy in explaining many decisions, by demonstrating the way in which social structures may set up a ‘choice architecture’ in which these choices are made. This paper gives an overview of this achievement, and goes on to consider (...)
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  33.  4
    Explanation and Agency: Exploring the Normative-Epistemic Landscape of the “Right to Explanation”.Esther Keymolen & Fleur Jongepier - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (4).
    A large part of the explainable AI literature focuses on what explanations are in general, what algorithmic explainability is more specifically, and how to code these principles of explainability into AI systems. Much less attention has been devoted to the question of why algorithmic decisions and systems should be explainable and whether there ought to be a right to explanation and why. We therefore explore the normative landscape of the need for AI to be explainable and individuals having (...)
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  34. Normative Structure of Human Actions and Causal Explanations.Satya P. Gautam - 1992 - In Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Indu Banga & Chhanda Gupta (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Perspectives From Natural and Social Sciences. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. pp. 40--179.
     
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  35.  16
    Systemic Explanations of Scientific Misconduct: Provoked by Spectacular Cases of Norm Violation?Pieter Huistra & Herman Paul - 2022 - Journal of Academic Ethics 20 (1):51-65.
    In the past two decades, individual explanations of scientific misconduct have increasingly given way to systemic explanations. Where did this interest in systemic factors come from? Given that research ethicists often present their interventions as responses to scientific misconduct, this article tests the hypothesis that these systemic explanations were triggered by high-visibility cases of scientific norm violation. It does so by examining why Dutch scientists in 2011 explained Diederik Stapel’s grand-scale data fabrication largely in systemic terms, whereas only fifteen years (...)
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  36.  12
    Davidson on Norms and the Explanation of Behavior.Denis Fisette - 1995 - In Logic and Philosophy of Science in Québec. Boston: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. pp. 139-158.
    In ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, D. Davidson distinguishes three types of knowledge: knowledge of the self, of others’ thoughts, and knowledge of the world. He notes that the Cartesian tradition privileged the first type of knowledge believing that the other two could be derived from it. Against Cartesianism and logical positivism, Davidson maintains that these three modes of knowledge are irreducible, although complementary. I am particularly interested here in one of the arguments brought up by Davidson against the reduction of (...)
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  37.  13
    Rationalizing Explanation, Normative Principles, and Descriptive Generalizations.David K. Henderson - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):1 - 20.
  38. Understanding and the Norm of Explanation.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1171-1175.
    I propose and defend the hypothesis that understanding is the norm of explanation. On this proposal, an explanation should express understanding. I call this the understanding account of explanation. The understanding account is supported by social and introspective observations. It is also supported by the relationship between knowledge and understanding, on the one hand, and assertion and explanation, on the other.
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  39. The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological Explanations.Jeroen De Ridder - 2006 - Techne 10 (1):79-94.
    Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical make-up. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there issomething peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one (if an artifact has a (...)
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  40.  4
    From Explanation to Understanding: Normativity Lost?Henk Regt - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (3):327-343.
    In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly, many ‘friends of understanding’ sympathize with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science. However, this raises the question of whether the (...)
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  41.  35
    Norms and Explanation in the Social Sciences.Mark Risjord - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (2):223-237.
  42.  16
    Norms, Competence, and the Explanation of Reasoning.Gary S. Kahn & Lance J. Rips - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):501.
  43.  15
    Can Norms Rescue Self‐Interest or Macro Explanation Be Joined to Micro Explanation?Aaron Wildavsky - 1991 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 5 (3):301-323.
    In three recent books, Jon Elster continues the project that began when he showed that Marxism lacked micro foundations. This project is the use of methodologically individualistic assumptions to understand social behavior. In his latest work, however, he supplements rational choice theory by means of non?rational ?norms,? begging the question of the sources and possible variations among these ?given? individual value?preferences. This move invites a comparison of Elster's results with those offered by cultural theory. While not a review of Elster's (...)
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  44. On Nature and Normativity: Normativity, Teleology, and Mechanism in Biological Explanation.Lenny Moss & Daniel J. Nicholson - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):88-91.
  45.  13
    The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment.James Dreier - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136-143.
    To naturalize normative judgment is to give some account of it, in naturalistic and non-normative terms. Simon Blackburn’s Ruling Passions embraces naturalism, about ethics especially.
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  46.  11
    Normative Ethics in the Age of Neuroscience: Can Moral Explanation Replace Moral Justification? 김남준 - 2018 - Journal of Ethics: The Korean Association of Ethics 1 (118):1-47.
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  47.  24
    The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological Explanations.Jeroen De Ridder - 2006 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1):79-94.
    Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical make-up. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there issomething peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one an explanation of an (...)
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  48.  55
    Teleosemantics Re-Examined: Content, Explanation and Norms: Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury and Kenneth Williford : Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2013, 297 Pp.Carolyn Price - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):587-596.
    This essay reviews a collection of thirteen critical essays on the work of Ruth Millikan. The collection covers a broad range of her work, focusing in particular on her account of simple intentionality, her theory of concepts and her metaphysical views. I highlight and briefly discuss three issues that crop up repeatedly though the collection: (1) Millikan’s externalism (and in particular, her emphasis on how intentional states are used, rather than how they are produced); (2) the nature of intentional (...); and (3) the normativity of meaning. (shrink)
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  49.  25
    The Role of Normative Assumptions in Historical Explanation.Gregory Currie - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (3):456-473.
    This paper concerns the problem of how to give historical explanations of scientist's decisions to prefer one theory over another. It is argued that such explanations ought to contain only statements about the beliefs and preferences of the agents involved, and, in particular, ought not to include evaluative premises about the theories themselves. It is argued that Lakatos's attempt to build into such historical explanations premises of an evaluative kind is deficient. The arguments of Laudan to the effect that such (...)
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  50.  49
    On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity.Graham Hubbs - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):78-95.
    If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are “entirely different” matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of (...)
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