21 found
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  1.  39
    Unconscious Sensations.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41.
    Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness , I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state . CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states (...)
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  2. Pains and Pain Sensations.Norton Nelkin - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (March):129-48.
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  3. The Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness.Norton Nelkin - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
     
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  4.  80
    Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
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  5.  62
    Categorizing the Senses.Norton Nelkin - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.
  6.  53
    Reconsidering Pain.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.
    In 1986, I argued that pains are essentially not phenomenal states. Using a Wittgen-steinian son of argument, I showed that the same sort of phenomena can be had on different occasions, and on one occasion persons be in pain, while on another occasion persons not be in pain. I also showed that very different phenomena could be experienced and, yet, organisms have the same sort of pain. I supported my arguments with empirical data from both laboratory and clinical studies. There (...)
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  7.  41
    Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.Norton Nelkin - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the (...)
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  8. Phenomena and Representation.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-547.
  9.  97
    What is Consciousness?Norton Nelkin - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
    When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation.
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  10.  60
    How Sensations Get Their Names.Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):325-39.
  11.  64
    Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.Norton Nelkin - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):178-180.
    This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the (...)
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  12. What is It Like to Be a Person?Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
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  13.  77
    Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
  14.  9
    Pains and Pain Sensations.Norton Nelkin - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):129-148.
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  15.  16
    What is It Like to Be a Person?Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):220-241.
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  16. Internality, Externality, and Intentionality.Norton Nelkin - 1988 - In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  17.  28
    Mr. Roberts on Strawson.Norton Nelkin - 1972 - Mind 81 (323):405-406.
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  18. Perception and Language.Norton Nelkin - 1969 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
     
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  19. Perspectives On Mind.Norton Nelkin - 1988 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  20.  37
    Searle's Argument That Intentional States Are Conscious States.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.
  21. The Dissociation of Phenomenal States From Apperception.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.