Results for 'Novel predictions'

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  1. Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument.Mario Alai - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):297-326.
    Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novelpredictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms (...)
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    Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev's Periodic Table: Response To.Samuel Schindler - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):265-269.
    In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use- (...) predictions did indeed contribute to the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.Keywords: Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev; Noble gases; Use-novel predictions; Heuristic account; Ad hoc hypotheses. (shrink)
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  3. Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table: Response to Scerri and Worrall.Samuel Schindler - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39 (2):265-269.
    In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J.. Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel (...)
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  4.  20
    Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):70-78.
    The aim of this paper is to put in place some cornerstones in the foundations for an objective theory of confirmation by considering lessons from the failures of predictivism. Discussion begins with a widely accepted challenge, to find out what is needed in addition to the right kind of inferential–semantical relations between hypothesis and evidence to have a complete account of confirmation, one that gives a definitive answer to the question whether hypotheses branded as “post hoc monsters” can be confirmed. (...)
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  5.  45
    What's Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):1 - 20.
    In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, ‘timeless’ and ‘historicized’. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall (Scerri and Worrall 2001, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32, 407–452; Worrall 2002, In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1, 191–209) and Patrick Maher (Maher 1988, PSA 1988, 1, pp. 273) is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such (...)
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    What’s Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):1-20.
    In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, 'timeless' and 'historicized'. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall and Patrick Maher is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.
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  7.  21
    Did Ptolemy Make Novel Predictions? Launching Ptolemaic Astronomy Into the Scientific Realism Debate.Christián Carman & José Díez - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:20-34.
  8.  15
    Introduction: Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis, Ludwig Fahrbach & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):43-45.
  9.  1
    Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table: Response To.Samuel Schindler - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39 (2):265-269.
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    Introduction: Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis, Ludwig Fahrbach & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 45 (1):43-45.
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  11.  1
    Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 45 (1):70-78.
    The aim of this paper is to put in place some cornerstones in the foundations for an objective theory of confirmation by considering lessons from the failures of predictivism. Discussion begins with a widely accepted challenge, to find out what is needed in addition to the right kind of inferential–semantical relations between hypothesis and evidence to have a complete account of confirmation, one that gives a definitive answer to the question whether hypotheses branded as “post hoc monsters” can be confirmed. (...)
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  12.  1
    Novel Predictions as a Criterion of Merit.H. R. Post - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. pp. 493--495.
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  13. Why Are Novel Predictions Important?Richmond Campbell - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2):111.
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  14. Pierre Duhem's Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.Milena Ivanova - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):58-64.
    This paper examines Duhem’s concept of good sense as an attempt to support a non rule-governed account of rationality in theory choice. Faced with the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis and the continuity thesis, Duhem tried to account for the ability of scientists to choose theories that continuously grow to a natural classification. I will examine the concept of good sense and the problems that stem from it. I will also present a recent attempt by David Stump to link (...)
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  15.  35
    Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions.Stephen G. Brush - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:133 - 145.
    The thesis that scientists give greater weight to novel predictions than to explanations of known facts is tested against historical cases in physical science. Several theories were accepted after successful novel predictions but there is little evidence that extra credit was given for novelty. Other theories were rejected despite, or accepted without, making successful novel predictions. No examples were found of theories that were accepted primarily because of successful novel predictions and would (...)
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  16. Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience.Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  17.  16
    How Theories Became Knowledge: Morgan's Chromosome Theory of Heredity in America and Britain. [REVIEW]Stephen G. Brush - 2002 - Journal of the History of Biology 35 (3):471-535.
    T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller and C. B. Bridges published their comprehensive treatise "The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity" in 1915. By 1920 Morgan 's "Chromosome Theory of Heredity" was generally accepted by geneticists in the United States, and by British geneticists by 1925. By 1930 it had been incorporated into most general biology, botany, and zoology textbooks as established knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons why it was accepted as part of a series of (...)
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  18.  5
    Theoretical Fertility McMullin-Style.Schindler Samuel - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):151-173.
    A theory’s fertility is one of the standard theoretical virtues. But how is it to be construed? In current philosophical discourse, particularly in the realism debate, theoretical fertility is usually understood in terms of novel success: a theory is fertile if it manages to make successful novel predictions. Another, more permissible, notion of fertility can be found in the work of Ernan McMullin. This kind of fertility, McMullin claims, gives us just as strong grounds for realism. My (...)
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  19.  41
    Prediction and the Periodic Table: A Response to Scerri and Worrall. [REVIEW]F. Michael Akeroyd - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):337-355.
    In a lengthy article E. Scerri and J. Worrall (2001) put forward the case for a novel ‘accommodationist’ version of the events surrounding the development of Mendeleef's Periodic Table 1869–1899. However these authors lay undue stress on the fact that President of the Royal Society of London Spottiswoode made absolutely no mention of Mendeleef's famous predictions in the Davy Medal eulogy in 1883 and undue stress on the fact that Cleve's classic 1879 Scandium paper contained an acknowledgement of (...)
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  20.  56
    The Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perseverative Reaching.Esther Thelen, Gregor Schöner, Christian Scheier & Linda B. Smith - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):1-34.
    The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...)
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  21. Conditionals, Context, and the Suppression Effect.Fabrizio Cariani & Lance J. Rips - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (5):n/a-n/a.
    Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B. Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional (...)
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  22. The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from (...)
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  23. An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science.P. Kyle Stanford - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):266-284.
    I develop an account of predictive similarity that allows even Antirealists who accept a correspondence conception of truth to answer the Realist demand (recently given sophisticated reformulations by Musgrave and Leplin) to explain the success of particular scientific theories by appeal to some intrinsic feature of those theories (notwithstanding the failure of past efforts by van Fraassen, Fine, and Laudan). I conclude by arguing that we have no reason to find truth a better (i.e., more plausible) explanation of a theory's (...)
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  24.  31
    Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table.Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):62-69.
    Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the (...)
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    A Bayesian Framework for Knowledge Attribution: Evidence From Semantic Integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139:92-104.
    We propose a Bayesian framework for the attribution of knowledge, and apply this framework to generate novel predictions about knowledge attribution for different types of “Gettier cases”, in which an agent is led to a justified true belief yet has made erroneous assumptions. We tested these predictions using a paradigm based on semantic integration. We coded the frequencies with which participants falsely recalled the word “thought” as “knew” (or a near synonym), yielding an implicit measure of conceptual (...)
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    Defending Deployment Realism Against Alleged Counterexamples.Mario Alai - 2014 - In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter. pp. 265-290.
    Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by (...)
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  27.  71
    Granularity and Scalar Implicature in Numerical Expressions.Chris Cummins, Uli Sauerland & Stephanie Solt - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (2):135-169.
    It has been generally assumed that certain categories of numerical expressions, such as ‘more than n’, ‘at least n’, and ‘fewer than n’, systematically fail to give rise to scalar implicatures in unembedded declarative contexts. Various proposals have been developed to explain this perceived absence. In this paper, we consider the relevance of scale granularity to scalar implicature, and make two novel predictions: first, that scalar implicatures are in fact available from these numerical expressions at the appropriate granularity (...)
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  28. The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument.Greg Frost-Arnold - manuscript
    There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, (...)
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  29.  98
    Prediction in Selectionist Evolutionary Theory.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):889-901.
    Selectionist evolutionary theory has often been faulted for not making novel predictions that are surprising, risky, and correct. I argue that it in fact exhibits the theoretical virtue of predictive capacity in addition to two other virtues: explanatory unification and model fitting. Two case studies show the predictive capacity of selectionist evolutionary theory: parallel evolutionary change in E. coli and the origin of eukaryotic cells through endosymbiosis. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of California, (...)
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  30.  34
    Deployment Vs. Discriminatory Realism.Mario Alai - manuscript
    The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos. According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best explanation of their predictive success, and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions. According to Doppelt this account (...)
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  31.  21
    Predictivism and the Periodic Table.Stephen G. Brush - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):256-259.
    This is a comment on the paper by Barnes and the responses from Scerri and Worrall , debating the thesis that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers (...)
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  32.  4
    Taking the Rationality Out of Probabilistic Models.Bob Rehder - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):210-211.
    Rational models vary in their goals and sources of justification. While the assumptions of some are grounded in the environment, those of others are induced and so require more traditional sources of justification, such as generalizability to dissimilar tasks and making novel predictions. Their contribution to scientific understanding will remain uncertain until standards of evidence are clarified.
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    Not Only Size Matters: Early‐Talker and Late‐Talker Vocabularies Support Different Word‐Learning Biases in Babies and Networks.Eliana Colunga & Clare E. Sims - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S1):73-95.
    In typical development, word learning goes from slow and laborious to fast and seemingly effortless. Typically developing 2-year-olds seem to intuit the whole range of things in a category from hearing a single instance named—they have word-learning biases. This is not the case for children with relatively small vocabularies. We present a computational model that accounts for the emergence of word-learning biases in children at both ends of the vocabulary spectrum based solely on vocabulary structure. The results of Experiment 1 (...)
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    Conditionals, Context, and the Suppression Effect.Fabrizio Cariani & Lance J. Rips - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (3):540-589.
    Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B. Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional (...)
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  35.  19
    The Interdependence of the Core, the Heuristic and the Novelty of Facts in Lakanto's MSRP.Elie G. Zahar - 2001 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (42):415-435.
    In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction can legitimately be made (...)
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  36.  14
    Heuristic Novelty and the Asymmetry Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Richard Nunan - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):17-36.
    Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view that the temporal relationship between (...)
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  37.  47
    The Interdependence of the Core, the Heuristic and the Novelty of Facts in Lakatos's MSRP.Elie G. Zahar - 2001 - Theoria 16 (3):415-435.
    In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s (and Popper’s) conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP (Research Programme) can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction (...)
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  38.  18
    The Functional Complexity of Scientific Evidence.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):65-83.
    This article sketches the main features of traditional philosophical models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that it regards as doing more harm than good. It then proceeds to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, a view the author calls dynamic evidential functionalism (DEF). This alternative builds on insights from philosophy of scientific practice, Kuhnian philosophy of science, pragmatist epistemology, philosophy of experimentation, and functionalist philosophy of mind. Along the way, the (...)
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    On the Need for Conscious Control and Conceptual Understanding.Stuart Marcovitch & Philip David Zelazo - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):48-49.
    The dynamic systems approach simulates a wide range of effects and generates novel predictions, but it fails to explain age-related behavioral changes in psychological terms. We argue that the roles of conscious control and explicit knowledge must be addressed in any model of A-not-B performance, and a fortiori, in any model of goal-directed action.
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  40.  13
    Studying the Study of Science Scientifically.David L. Hull - 1998 - Perspectives on Science 6 (3):209-231.
    : Testing the claims that scientists make is extremely difficult. Testing the claims that philosophers of science make about science is even more difficult, difficult but not impossible. I discuss three efforts at testing the sorts of claims that philosophers of science make about science: the influence of scientists' age on the alacrity with which they accept new views, the effect of birth order on the sorts of contributions that scientists make, and the role of novel predictions in (...)
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  41.  38
    Many Reasons or Just One: How Response Mode Affects Reasoning in the Conjunction Problem.Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks-and propose (...)
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  42.  1
    Not Only Size Matters: Early‐Talker and Late‐Talker Vocabularies Support Different Word‐Learning Biases in Babies and Networks.Eliana Colunga & Clare E. Sims - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8).
    In typical development, word learning goes from slow and laborious to fast and seemingly effortless. Typically developing 2-year-olds seem to intuit the whole range of things in a category from hearing a single instance named—they have word-learning biases. This is not the case for children with relatively small vocabularies. We present a computational model that accounts for the emergence of word-learning biases in children at both ends of the vocabulary spectrum based solely on vocabulary structure. The results of Experiment 1 (...)
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  43.  10
    Emulation Theory Offers Conceptual Gains but Needs Filters.Catherine L. Reed, Jefferson D. Grubb & Piotr Winkielman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):411-412.
    Much can be gained by specifying the operation of the emulation process. A brief review of studies from diverse domains, including complex motor-skill representation, emotion perception, and face memory, highlights that emulation theory offers precise explanations of results and novel predictions. However, the neural instantiation of the emulation process requires development to move the theory from armchair to laboratory.
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  44. Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table.Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 45 (1):62-69.
    Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the (...)
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  45.  98
    The Book of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
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  46.  51
    Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanz
    An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and (...)
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  47.  19
    Parasite-Stress Promotes in-Group Assortative Sociality: The Cases of Strong Family Ties and Heightened Religiosity.Corey L. Fincher & Randy Thornhill - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (2):61-79.
    Throughout the world people differ in the magnitude with which they value strong family ties or heightened religiosity. We propose that this cross-cultural variation is a result of a contingent psychological adaptation that facilitates in-group assortative sociality in the face of high levels of parasite-stress while devaluing in-group assortative sociality in areas with low levels of parasite-stress. This is because in-group assortative sociality is more important for the avoidance of infection from novel parasites and for the management of infection (...)
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  48.  29
    A Probabilistic Computational Model of Cross-Situational Word Learning.Afsaneh Fazly, Afra Alishahi & Suzanne Stevenson - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (6):1017-1063.
    Words are the essence of communication: They are the building blocks of any language. Learning the meaning of words is thus one of the most important aspects of language acquisition: Children must first learn words before they can combine them into complex utterances. Many theories have been developed to explain the impressive efficiency of young children in acquiring the vocabulary of their language, as well as the developmental patterns observed in the course of lexical acquisition. A major source of disagreement (...)
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  49.  6
    Board Age and Gender Diversity: A Test of Competing Linear and Curvilinear Predictions[REVIEW]Muhammad Ali, Yin Lu Ng & Carol T. Kulik - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 125 (3):1-16.
    The inconsistent findings of past board diversity research demand a test of competing linear and curvilinear diversity–performance predictions. This research focuses on board age and gender diversity, and presents a positive linear prediction based on resource dependence theory, a negative linear prediction based on social identity theory, and an inverted U-shaped curvilinear prediction based on the integration of resource dependence theory with social identity theory. The predictions were tested using archival data on 288 large organizations listed on the (...)
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  50.  14
    Time and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics.Thomas Pashby - unknown
    Quantum mechanics has provided philosophers of science with many counterintuitive insights and interpretive puzzles, but little has been written about the role that time plays in the theory. One reason for this is the celebrated argument of Wolfgang Pauli against the inclusion of time as an observable of the theory, which has been seen as a demonstration that time may only enter the theory as a classical parameter. Against this orthodoxy I argue that there are good reasons to expect certain (...)
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