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Ole Koksvik [10]O. Koksvik [2]
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Ole Koksvik
Australian National University (PhD)
  1. Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
    In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some (...)
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  2. Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 1 I identify our target and provide some important reliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is (...)
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  3. Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism.Ole Koksvik - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):573-582.
    I argue against Barbara Montero's claim that Conservation of Energy has nothing to do with physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument for physicalism from CoE, and offer an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE.
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  4. Intuition and Conscious Reasoning.Ole Koksvik - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):709-715.
    This paper argues that, contrary to common opinion, intuition can result from conscious reasoning. It also discusses why this matters.
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  5.  59
    The Phenomenology of Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1):e12387.
    When a person has an intuition, it seems to her that things are certain ways; to many it seems that torturing the innocent for fun is wrong, for example. When a person has an intuition, there is also something particular it is like to be her: intuitions have a characteristic phenomenal character. This article asks how the phenomenal character of intuition is related to two core core questions in the philosophy of intuition, namely: Is intuition a source of justification and (...)
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  6. Three Models of Phenomenal Unity.O. Koksvik - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):105-131.
    There is something it is like for me to hear a seagull crying, something it is like to see a boat in the distance, and something it is like to suffer a slight headache. Each of these local conscious experiences have their own phenomenal character. The experiences are phenomenally unified just in case there is also something it is like to enjoy these and all the other local experiences I have at the relevant time together. For there is also something (...)
     
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  7.  31
    Profiting From Poverty.Ole Koksvik & Gerhard Øverland - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):341-367.
    ABSTRACTWe consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.
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  8. Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.Ole Koksvik - manuscript
    A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that (...)
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  9. Précis of Intuition.Ole Koksvik - manuscript
    This thesis seeks to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that there is a class of mental states deserving of the label ‘intuition’, and which is a good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints. These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.
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  10.  78
    Metaphysics of Consciousness.Ole Koksvik - 2010 - In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
  11. Aspects of Phenomenal Unity: Editorial Introduction.O. Koksvik - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):6-12.
  12. Précis of Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2012 - Dissertation, ANU
    This thesis seeks to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that there is a class of mental states deserving of the label ‘intuition’, and which is a good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints. These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.
     
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