There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, (...) care must, ab initio, be taken to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of considering phenomenal characters or properties of mental states to be part of the fabric of the world. (shrink)
Wilfred Sellars's deeply original and systematic thought continues to inspire into the twenty-first century. Part of the explanation must be that Sellars's struggle to integrate a Kantian-Wittgensteinian normative view of meaning and intentionality with a naturalistic outlook remains at the forefront of philosophical inquiry. To acknowledge the deep impact that Sellars has had on their work, a list of prominent, contemporary philosophers honor Sellars's legacy in a volume craftily edited by James R. O'Shea with a superb introduction. Like Sellars's own (...) work, the contributions are distributed across a wide range of topics from, roughly, philosophy of perception, philosophy of... (shrink)
Straightforward reinforcement learning for multi-agent co-learning settings often results in poor outcomes. Meta-learning processes beyond straightforward reinforcement learning may be necessary to achieve good (or optimal) outcomes. Algorithmic processes of meta-learning, or "manipulation", will be described, which is a cognitively realistic and effective means for learning cooperation. We will discuss various "manipulation" routines that address the issue of improving multi-agent co-learning. We hope to develop better adaptive means of multi-agent cooperation, without requiring a priori knowledge, and advance multi-agent co-learning beyond (...) existing theories and techniques. (shrink)
O'Neill's critique of my account of Kant does point to serious inadequacies in that treatment, but I argue in reply that on some central points she is mistaken and that Kant's moral rigorism and his conception of what it is to be a rational agent are more open to the conventional objections than she allows. What needs to be put in question is the whole nature of rational justification in morality, for justification always in fact requires the context of a (...) tradition. In confronting Gaita's criticisms of my views on the relationship of moral philosophy to morality and of the teleological aspect of the virtues the relevant notion of tradition is further elaborated in a way that provides premises both for a response to Clark's defense of Moore and for an indication of how the social analysis of modernity in After Virtue might be defended. (shrink)
RESUMEN Largamente desatendida o malinterpretada, la noción de caos en la filosofía de Nietzsche es una pieza constitutiva de la particular concepción del ser que este autor habría dejado apenas esbozada. El artículo se propone elaborar este concepto en la obra nietzscheana, siguiendo algunas de las metáforas que lo iluminan. Desde allí se busca plantear los rasgos centrales de una ontologia del caos, de sesgo no metafísico, que, al afirmar el carácter acontecimental de la realidad, puede verse como precursora de (...) la ontología hermenéutica contemporánea. ABSTRACT The notion of chaos, which has long been neglected or misinterpreted, is a constitutive element of a peculiar conception of being that the philosopher only had time to outline. The objective of this article is to elaborate on this concept in Nietzschean philosophy, guided by some of the metaphors that shed light on it. This serves as the basis to set forth the main characteristics of a non-metaphysical ontology of chaos that asserts the eventful nature of reality and can thus be seen as a precursor of contemporary hermeneutic ontology. (shrink)
Scopo del saggio è confrontare alcune tra le principali visiones della letteratura occidentale – tra cui la Visio Pauli e la Commedia – e le diverse redazioni della tradizione islamica dell’ascensione celeste e viaggio oltremondano del profeta Muhammad, nel tentativo di stabilire se le affinità, tematiche e strutturali, osservabili tra i due gruppi di testi siano frutto di semplice poligenesi o vadano piuttosto spiegate con rapporti di effettiva intertestualità.Tra le visiones, la tradizione mirajica e la Commedia si instaura dunque un (...) dialogo a tre voci, o di sinfonia, i cui temi principali si arricchiscono e si richiamano a vicenda. Dante, primo comparatista, è in grado di reinventare, armonizzandoli, elementi strutturali e tematici provenienti sia dalle visiones latine che dalla tradizione islamica del Isra’ wa’ l Mi‘râj.The purpose of this essay is to make a confrontation between the main important visiones of the Occidental Literature – also the Visio Pauli and the Dante’s Commedia – anche the various redactions of the Islamic Isra’ wa-l mi’râj. The confrontation is in order to establish if the remarked affinities are just due to polygenesis or rather caused by concrete intertestuality.Between the visiones, the mirajic tradition and the Commedia we are in front of a three voices dialogue: it’s like a symphony, in which the themes enriches themselves and, at least, the arrive to Dante for being harmonized. Dante is the first comparatist. (shrink)
There is a surprising amount of philosophy underlying the way we choose to measure poverty, including in the matter of the seemingly uncomplicated task of specifying an income poverty line. The present essay examines some of these issues of fact, value, and reasoning as they apply to the enterprise of assessing magnitudes of, and trends in, global money-metric poverty.
Contemporary liberal democracy employs a conception of legitimacy according to which political decisions and institutions must be at least in principle justifiable to all citizens. This conception of legitimacy is difficult to satisfy when citizens are deeply divided at the level of fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical commitments. Many have followed the later Rawls in holding that where a reasonable pluralism of such commitments persists, political justification must eschew appeal to any controversial moral, religious, or philosophical premises. In this way, (...) the Rawlsian account of public political justification involves a politics of omission, where citizens are expected to bracket off their most fundamental commitments and seek justifications that draw only from uncontroversial premises. This politics of omission is necessary, Rawls argues, for political stability. But there is good social epistemic evidence for the view that the politics of omission encourages insularity among like-minded groups, and that this insularity in turn generates extremism. So omission is likely to lead to instability, not stability. (shrink)