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Oded Na'aman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  1. The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.
    The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...)
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  2. What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - forthcoming - In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...)
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  3.  91
    Reasons of Love: A Case Against Universalism About Practical Reason.Oded Na'aman - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):315-322.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 315-322, December 2015.
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  4. Can We Intend the Past?Oded Na'aman - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):304-311.
    First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality (...)
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