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Oded Na'aman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  1. The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.
    The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...)
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    Can We Intend the Past?Oded Na'aman - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):304-311.
    First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality (...)
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    Reasons of Love: A Case Against Universalism About Practical Reason.Oded Na'aman - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):315-322.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 315-322, December 2015.
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    The Moral Significance of Shock.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - In Ana Falcato & Sara Graça da Silva (eds.), The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 165-186.
    I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to (...)
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